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The concept of commitment has emerged in international business literature especially in 
explaining importer behavior as a counterpart to the internationalization process. Importer 
commitment often plays a dominant role influencing relationships in the exporter-importer dyad 
and facilitating the internationalization process by imparting access to the international market. 
This dissertation’s primary data is a sample of 51 persons directly connected with various aspects 
of South Asian Free Trade. 
Asia is economically important as the forefront of global free trade agreement (FTA) 
activity. This spark concerns about the negative effects of Asian FTAs, including the “noodle 
bowl” problem. Asian regionalism is here to stay despite the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Doha negotiations slow progress and the global financial crisis. The focus for policy makers should 
be how to minimize FTAs costs while maximizing benefits. Adopting a pragmatic perspective, 
this paper examines key trends and challenges to Asian FTAs. It provides new evidence from firm 
surveys, analysis on specific agreements, and computable general equilibrium estimates. This 
paper offers the following recommendations: strengthen the support system for using FTAs; 
rationalize and upgrade the administration of the rules of origin; ensure better agricultural trade 
coverage; forge comprehensive “WTO-plus” agreements; and encourage a region-wide FTA. 
Political economy considerations suggest Asia FTA consolidation by creating a People’s Republic 
of China–Japan–Republic of Korea FTA, combining it with ASEAN+1 FTAs, and then involving 
Australia, India, and New Zealand— followed by connections with North America and Europe. In 
conclusion, the analysis suggests adopting a bottom-up approach to a Doha Round Agreement. 
 
Geographically, the South Asian countries are close to each other. The positive things are 
uppermost growth in this region. This is mostly for of the inward-looking policies of the 
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government, political strife, conflict, and ideological difference between members countries. South 
Asian economic growth rose to 6.9% in 2015 from6.7 % in 2014. The prediction is it will accelerate 
to 6.8% in 2017 and to 7.1% in 2018. India is the leading and largest emerging market economy 
in South Asia. 
South Asia attracts global attention because it has experienced rapid GDP growth since 
1980, averaging nearly 6% per annum. Yet, it faces many challenges. First, South Asia is dynamic, 
growing rapidly, highly urbanized, and is advancing from global integration. The second South 
Asia is largely agricultural, land-locked, exhibits high poverty, suffers from many conflicts, and 
lags. The divergence between the two faces of South Asia is on the rise. Many policy and 
institutional constraints contribute to this dichotomy. One important constraint is regional conflict 
that has made South Asia one of the least integrated regions of the world. Despite progress in 
reducing trade barriers with the rest of the world, intraregional trade is 5 % of total trade compared 
with over 50 % in East Asia. 
The unique geography of South Asia, distance, and density, has the potential grow through 
increased trade. South Asia has the highest population density in the world. The distances between 
the cities and the border is low. These features naturally propel trade between countries but 
presently policy barriers hinder this. For example, Indian and Pakistan trade is currently US$ 1 
Billion, removing trade restrictions could jump their trade to US$ 9 Billion. Similarly, estimates 
suggest that South Asia intraregional trade could increase from US$ 5 Billion to US $20 Billion if 
they remove restrictions on trading. 
The benefits of regional cooperation for South Asia are obvious. Yet a range of political 
constraints prevent cooperation from happening. The political dynamics needs to change as the 
opportunity cost of non-cooperation for South Asia's poor is large. A part of this change will come 
vi 
 
from leadership from civil society in terms of much more informed knowledge and debate of the 
underlying opportunities, issues, and constraints. In developing and elaborating on that core thesis, 
this dissertation has six chapters, following an introduction that summarizes the significance, 
structure, approach, and terminology of the dissertation. 
Chapter one is the introductory chapter and presents the major issues for consideration for 
moving toward SAFTA. This chapter also provides an overview of the literature on South Asia 
regional integration. This chapter presents an overview of the approach for SAARC and SAFTA. 
The main part of this chapter offers relevant literature findings. These findings serve as the 
foundation and as starting point for further research as reflected in this dissertation. These literature 
findings helped formulate the two hypotheses proposed in this dissertation. The WTO legal 
regimen insufficiencies provide the possibility and necessity for WTO Members to indigenize 
WTO law by resorting to their own legal traditions and cultures. The second hypothesis is that the 
WTO Members’ practices in dealing with the WTO have demonstrated their willingness and 
efforts to indigenize WTO law. 
Chapter two, this chapter starts by reviewing legal fragmentation in international trade law. 
It also provides an analysis of GATT Article XXIV and other FTA legal areas. These include 
topics like the general character and structure of the WTO regime, specific trade mechanisms, the 
relationship between WTO law and domestic law, the relationship between WTO law and general 
international law, principles and interpretation of WTO agreements, the position of developing 
countries in the multilateral trading system, strategies pursued in international trade negotiations, 




Chapter three provides an overview of SAARC and SAFTA main features including major 
articles of both agreement. This chapter includes sensitive lists, rules of origin, treatment of non-
tariff barriers, and compensation and dispute resolution mechanisms. This chapter discusses South 
Asia overall trade performance and potential, including indicators related to overall economic 
conditions, the sectoral composition and direction of trade, and tariff and non-tariff protection. 
Chapter four examines how trade in services contributes to connectivity. It discusses the 
role of policies in services trade, looking at how these promote integration into the international 
trading system. This chapter outlines the key features and modalities of negotiations under SAARC 
Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS), together with the opportunities and challenges of trade 
liberalization for a representative set of services (energy, telecommunications, tourism, and 
health). It also analyzes pattern of intra-regional trade and comparisons made with other regions 
and bilateral trade agreements in South Asia and investigates how these agreements could 
harmonize with SAFTA. This chapter details the importance of transit trade in South Asia and 
differentiates characteristics between formal and informal traders. Additionally, this chapter 
focuses on facilitating professionals and skilled workers movement to ease, reduce, or remove 
barriers and under trade agreements. 
Chapter five discusses the methodology of the research data collection and analysis. The 
first part surveys the key academic, professional, and official literature regarding a range of issues 
that are pertinent to this dissertation. This chapter examines the primary data compared with 
different secondary data. Most data collected is from different sources like ADB, WB, UNCOM 
Trade, SAARC, and SAARC member countries and provides a review on SAARC’s perspective 
on investment cooperation. This chapter includes a theoretical and empirical analysis of the 
interrelationship between regional integration and poverty reduction. 
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Chapter six quantitatively assesses the implications of SAFTA full implementation, with 
and without sensitive lists, and the impact of deeper degrees of South Asia regional integration. 
This chapter addresses trade facilitation measures consistent with SAEU creation, reviews SAARC 
member countries performance in promoting trade facilitation, and examines the South Asia 
regional trades untapped potential. 
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Both Addis Agenda of Action (para 82) and the 2030 Agenda (para 68) identify trade as a 
vehicle of inclusive economic growth and poverty reduction mechanism contributing to 
sustainable economic growth.1 To expedite regional trade in 1993 the South Asian Preferential 
Trading Agreement (SAPTA) formed and was subsequently renamed as South Asian Free Trade 
Agreement (SAFTA). SAFTA Article 3(1) denotes: 
“The trade relationship between South Asian countries is currently of special 
interest for a number of reason including eliminating barriers to trade and 
facilitating the cross-border movement of goods between the territories of the 
contracting States, promoting conditions of fair competition in the free trade area, 
and ensuring equitable benefits to all contracting countries, taking into account their 
respective levels and patterns of economic development.” 
SAFTA’s concern is free movement of goods through; inter alia, elimination of tariffs, 
para-tariffs, non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and other equivalent measures. 
The elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers should significantly boost trade amongst the 
member countries and thus furnish sustainable economic development. As a result, many 
countries are signing Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs). 
In recent times, South Asian counties entered FTAs with promising economic rationales. It has 
been over a decade since the signing of SAFTA. Despite this, SAARC countries lag in 
effectively implementing the General Agreements of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and SAFTA 
agreements. 
                                                 




RTAs are a popular method of increasing trade in the present era of trade liberalization. 
For example, from 1948 – 2017, GATT received around 445 RTA notifications. Since the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) formed, 225 arrangements initiated covering trade in goods or 
services. These arrangements notified2 (Appendix 2 enclosed) to the GATT or the WTO, were 
mostly concluded in the past 20 years.3 Additionally, there is a noticeable increase in plurilateral 
agreements under negotiation. All WTO members have RTAs in force.4 Two of the WTO leaders 
are the United States of America (U.S.)5 and the European Union (EU).6 These leaders play a 
vital role in developing the existing and new frameworks. The rise of RTAs is an accurate 
indicator of global economic efficiency and welfare. Moreover, the rise of RTAs boosts 
regionalism into multilateralism. 
                                                 
2 Facts and figures of RTAs and see https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm 
3 See Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Basic Information on Regional Trade Agreements, WTO Doc. 
available at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx 
4 See Trade topic discussion on RTAs and visit, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm 
5 The United States has recently concluded FTAs with Chile and Singapore. It is also actively negotiating FTAs with 
33 other governments to form Free Trade Area of Americas (FTAA), with Central American Common market 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), with southern African Customs Union (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland), with Australia and Morocco. See 2003 Trade Policy Agenda and 
2002 Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/reports/2003.html. See Press Release, Policies in Focus, Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative 
(announcing White House initiative to ultimately form an FTA with the ASEAN) available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/internationaltrade/aseaninitiative (last visited Jan. 17, 2004); see also Edward 
Alden, Countries Line up to Sign US Trade Deals, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2002, at 10. 
6 The EC, of course, has untiring enthusiasm for RTAs. The EC has some form of RTA relationships with almost all 
members of the WTO. In fact, there are only few countries, including Australia, Canada, China, Japan, New 
Zealand, Taiwan, and the United States, with which the EC trades on most-favored-nation basis. The EC now 
negotiating RTAs with MERCOSUR, Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
UAE), and Chile. See http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/bilateral/euta.htm (listing the complete list of EC 




South Asia has very low level of regional integration amongst member states. High trade 
barriers are one main reasons. GATT Articles V and XXIV call for freedom of transit and free 
trade through the most convenient route. They ban discrimination based on the vessel’s flag, 
place of origin, departure, entry, exit, or destination. However, GATT Article V requires WTO 
members to operate national transit schemes instead of transit at regional levels. Members 
observed that the regional cooperation can occur following the footsteps of developed systems 
like the EU and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
This issue lacks thorough research in the South Asian region. As a result, this research 
attempts to fill the gaps in the literature by conducting the proposed research project. Meticulous 
and objective analysis is essential to successful SAFTA implementation. This work delves into 
the legal issues and determines what factors hinder FTA implementation. Then this research will 




On January 22, 2017 the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) came into effect. The 
TFA’s design is to simplify, streamline, and facilitate the flow of goods at borders. The full 
implementation of TFA of the WTO should reduce trade costs up to 14.3%. On the other hand, 
the SAARC’s dedication is to facilitate South Asian region people together with the spirit of 
friendship, trust, and understanding. However, SAFTA fails to achieve this purpose.  
Nonetheless, SAFTA has made strong theoretical impacts on Member States trade. 
However, that is far from reality. This dissertation seeks to make a critical and comprehensive 
analysis of progress towards SAFTA. South Asia is an adverse business region. This region 




international strategic outlooks. Proper implementation of SAFTA can neutralize this hostile 
situation. An economically integrated and prosperous SAFTA will promote peacemaking and 
peacekeeping in South Asia. Currently, SAFTA has a rudimentary effect on this region’s 
business. 
This study takes an intra-disciplinary approach in some caveats. However, this study does 
provide a full and comprehensive account of RTAs legal, political, and economic aspects. This 
premise of this work is the border policies and other associated RTA aspects. Further, the study 
does not make a comprehensive comparative analysis of all RTAs. However, it delves into 
various comparative analyses from the EU and NAFTA. 
 
1.3.Study Background 
SAARC design is to accelerate Member States economic processes and social 
developments. In the consumer market, SAARC is the largest regional organization. SAARC 
formed on December 08, 1985 by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, India, and Sri 
Lanka. On April 03, 2007 Afghanistan became a Member State following India’s 
recommendation. SAARC has nine observer members including EU, China, Japan, and the U.S. 
South Asia covers around 5,221,133 square kilometers i.e. 11.51% of the Asian continent and 
3.4% of the world’s land surface.7 It has 39.49% of the total Asian population and 24% of the 
world’s population.8 In 2010, South Asia had the largest population of Hindus, Jains, Sheikhs, 
                                                 
7 Arnall, A (24 September 2010). "Adaptive Social Protection: Mapping the Evidence and Policy Context in the 
Agriculture Sector in South Asia". Institute of Development Studies (345). 





Christians, Buddhist, and Muslims. There are around 600 million of Muslims, 35 million of 
Christians, and 25 million of Buddhist in this region (Annexure: 01). 
Over the years, intra-regional trade has taken a down step in this region. In 1948 intra-regional 
trade amongst the South Asian countries was at 19% and decreased to 5% over the years. 
SAARC performance in intra-regional trade is very poor in comparison to other trade blocs 
around the world.9 The cultural, political, and religious differences between countries in this 
region attributed to the poor performance. Therefore, individually countries are doing excellent 
in exporting to other parts of the world but perform miserably in intra-regional trade. As a 
region, South Asia is thriving towards a leadership position but is severely constrained because 
of deeply rooted belief system. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide clear and comprehensive reasoning of 
SAARC and SAFTA fundamental principles and to focus on ways to improve this region by 
adopting policy development and increasing trade. The premise of this study is the success rates 
of other trade blocs in achieving sustainable developments. However, this study also considers 
the regional limitation that arises due to cultural and socio-economic differences and inter-
country relationship. The dissertation will make a substantial contribution in the field of research 
related to SAARC and SAFTA. A meticulous analysis of the data reveals that the harmonization 
of the trade laws and policies of this region are heavily constrained due to the cultural, political, 
and socio-economic differences. As a result, this study’s design is to provide contextual 
explanations and understandings of this region’s trade laws and policies. Researchers and 
academicians may refer to this study for a deeper understanding of the history of SAARC 
                                                 





regional trading and the factors playing a key role in this region’s growth. This study provides 
authentic and relevant information and makes recommendations through which Member States 
may improve intra-regional trade. 
In the past decade the trade in the South Asia almost doubled. From 2010 to 2014 this 
region’s overall GDP increased to 18 %. Moreover, with 6.8% of annual rate this region, after 
East Asia, has achieved the most economic growth since 2000. In 2014, trade accounted for a 
smaller share of GDP in South Asia at 47% than in East Asia at 55%. South Asia’s economic 
competitiveness continued to lag other regions. The Global Competitiveness Report identified 
shortcomings in institutional, business, investment environments, and a lack of infrastructure as 
the main problems of this region.10 
India is the largest GDP growth provider in South Asia providing 78% of GDP, followed 
by 9.7 % from Pakistan, 7.9 % from Bangladesh and 4.5 % from Sri Lanka.11 Other countries 
have insignificant GPD contributions. India must take the leading role towards regional 
integration of this region.12  
                                                 
10 “Herrera Dappe, Matías; Suárez-Alemán, Anchor. 2016. Competitiveness of South Asia’s Container Ports: A 
Comprehensive Assessment of Performance, Drivers, and Costs. Directions in Development-
Infrastructure; Washington, DC: World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/24333 License: 
CC BY 3.0 IGO.” 
11 See the figure 1.1 for details of contribution of individual countries GDP in total South Asian GDP 
12 World Bank (2012). World Development Indicators Database. Available: http://data.worldbank.org/data-




FIGURE 1: 1 CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES GDP IN TOTAL SOUTH ASIAN 
NOMINAL GDP, 2017 
 
 
Despite Member State’s inward-looking policies, internal strife and conflict due to 
political and ideological reasons, the South Asian countries achieved uneven growth.13 In 2015, 
economic growth rose to 6.9 % from 6.7% in 2014, and should cross 6.9% in 2017 and 7.1% in 
2018.14 India had the strongest growth rate.15 
This study, relying on nominal GDP volume, tries to explore the market at the ground 
level and seeks to examine trade realities. It also examines the SAFTA potentiality and identifies 
areas for further modification. A wide range of secondary sources was relied upon to ascertain 
                                                 
13 Ershad Ali1 & Dayal Talukder2, Political Economy Of The Preferential Trade 
Liberalizations And Regionalism In South Asia: Opportunities And Challenges, THE CANADIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 
(2010). 
14 See more at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/16/south-asia-could-potentially-benefit-
from-globalization-backlash 



























the trends of the regional trade. Statistics reveal that this region’s intra-regional trade is slowly 
progressing but has great prospects for regional trade integration. Therefore, this paper explores 
SATFA benefits. The current SAFTA literature is dearth and this paper shall effectively 
contribute to this field and provide useful guidelines to this region’s policy makers.16 
There are many problems in this region such as dependence on other countries, low value 
agriculture, weak export performance, poor infrastructure, unregulated investments, low paying 
jobs, and unemployment. Sustainable growth can diminish these problems and contribute to 
human development. In 2012, around 18.8 % of this region’s population were living on less than 
$1.90 a day. Further, more than 200 million people were living in slums and more than 500 
million cannot access electricity.17 Moreover, this region also witnesses extreme infrastructure 
gaps, social exclusions, and extreme level of inequality. To achieve global poverty and 
prosperity goals regional development is necessary.18 World Bank’s South Asia Region Chief 
Economist, Martin Rama, suggested that “To make the most of this export opportunity, countries 
in the region should continue to focus on policies that promote economic growth.” 
Implementation of some elements of SAFTA is necessary to fully benefit. These 
elements include trade liberalization scheme, rule of origin, dispute settlement mechanism, list of 
sensitive items, technical assistance, compensation to revenue loss, trade facilitation, institutional 
arrangements. This dissertation highlights these aspects.19  The features are vital to SAFTA 
success follow: 
                                                 
16 Hoi-Yong*․ Dhruba Kumar Gautam**․ Lee Chong, Hak-Chun, South Asian Free Trade Area 
(SAFTA) and Regional Integration: Revisit the Existing Reality,  (2014). 
17 See more at. http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview 
18 Id at. 





1.3.1. Trade Liberalization 
GATT Article XXIV paragraph 8 section (b) states that: “A free-trade area shall be 
understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories.” Similarly, GATS Article V calls 
for agreement on liberalizing trade in services between member parties. SAFTA Article 7 
emphasizes trade liberalization programs. Full trade would improve 95% of trade and tariff lines. 
However, to achieve this goal a planned approach with appropriate steps is necessary. 
1.3.2. Appropriate Rules of Origin 
Rules of Origin (ROOs) establish the goods “nationality” and determine eligibility for the 
preferential treatment. Establishing a free trade area without ROOs would result non-member 
countries with the lowest tariff entering their goods and making a FTA a customs union (CU) 
with the common external tariff that of the member with the lowest tariff. 
1.3.3. Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
To ensure fair and speedy resolution of the dispute among the contracting parties, 
SAARC established two forums. The committee of the experts and the SAFTA Ministerial 
Council (SMC).20 Member States can exhaust these forums whenever other Member State 
violate SAFTA provisions. SAFTA Article 10 (7) denotes that “The COE will also act as Dispute 
Settlement Body under this Agreement”. According to the provisions of SAFTA, before 
recommending their dispute to the settlement body the Member States should try to resolve the 
dispute through mutual conciliation.”21 
1.3.4. Sensitive List: 
                                                 
20 Moinuddin, M. (2013). Fulfilling the Promises of South Asian Integration: a Gravity Estimation, ADBI Working. 
Paper, Asian Development Bank Institute 




Every country has a sensitive list containing a list of the goods excluded from tariff 
requirements. However, Member States are obligated to constantly revise the sensitive list to 
reduce the number of items. Sensitive list is defined by SAFTA Article 7 (3B) as: “The Sensitive 
List shall be reviewed after every four years or earlier as may be decided by the SAFTA 
Ministerial Council (SMC), established under Article 10, with a view to reducing the number of 
items in the Sensitive List.”22 
1.3.5. Technical Assistance to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
Technical assistance and cooperation arrangements are vital factors to fully benefiting 
from SAFTA. SAFTA Article 11(D) provides technical assistance and cooperation to LCDs. 
LCDs should be designed and addressed on a priority basis, but they do not have binding 
commitments. The assistance areas include developing training and skills, product certificate, 
improving national capacity on legislation on anti-dumping, export, and investment promotion 
measures, developing and improving tax policies and instruments, trade policy reforms, reducing 
technical barriers to trade measures, improving sanitary and phytosanitary measures, legislative 
and policy related measures, safeguards and compensation, etc. 
1.3.6. Revenue Loss Mechanism Compensation 
To promote and facilitate LCDs trade SAFTA requires non-LDCs compensate LDCs for 
the loss of customs and revenues for undertaking tariff reduction. SAFTA Article 10(E) states, 
“… Until alternative domestic arrangements are formulated to address this situation, the 
Contracting States agree to establish an appropriate mechanism to compensate the Least 
Developed Contracting States for their loss of customs revenue. This mechanism and its rules 
                                                 





and regulations shall be established prior to the commencement of the Trade Liberalization 
Programme (TLP).”23 
1.3.7. Institutional Agreements: 
SAFTA Article 10(6) denotes that the COE shall monitor, review, and facilitate SAFTA 
provisions every six months assigned by the SMC. SAFTA Article 7(4) highlights the barrier to 
trade issues. Under this Article, the contracting states must annually notify the SAARC 
Secretariat of all non-tariff and para-tariff measures to their trade. The COE shall examine their 
compatibility with relevant WTO provisions in their regular meetings. After that, the COE shall 
either eliminate or implement measures to facilitate the intra-SAARC trade. In South Asian 
countries, the intra-regional trade in below 5%.24 SAFTA features lack practical implication. As 
a result, this research deliberately investigates the reasons and identifies blockage for policy 
adaptation for improvement. 
 
1.4.Literature Review 
There is a considerable amount of SAFTA literature. However, the literature is not 
concise or precise and does not mention all aspects of South Asian. Some western literatures 
exist in this area, but they only deal with basic aspects like business or trade and political aspects 
of this region. Meticulous SAFTA study is not available. Specifically, there is no research on 
SAARC and SAFTA legal aspects and their shortcomings. This dissertation will fill the gap in 
this area. There have been many studies delving into South Asian regional economic integration, 
but few dedicated to SAFTA and SAARC legal matters. 
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In 2006, a study conducted by Nag and Nandi revealed that in today’s multilateral trade 
RTAs have become a common phenomenon.25 India is one prominent SAARC member. 
According to Mehta and Kumar (2004), since its inception in 1985, SAFTA has become a 
prominent feature of SAARC.26 SAARC countries can benefit more from SAFTA if they come 
out of the formal trade shell. Dhungel (2004) observed that SAARC agendas mark actual 
progress and achievements. Jhamb (2006) supports Dhungel’s view and observed that it was 
primarily due to tenuous political relations between India and Pakistan and a general 
environment of mistrust among Member Countries.27 
Rehman et al (2006) observed that a gravity model can eliminate trade barriers and 
structural rigidities originating from adverse political relationship and thus could substantially 
increase intra-SAARC trade.28 Modern South Asia’s comprehensive history explores the 
historical Michael Mann charts and the role of emerging states within the Mughal South Asia’s 
Modern History: Thematic Perspectives and over one million.29 Further, Pitigala30 observed that 
due to weak trading relations and trade structures between SAARC countries the South Asian 
                                                 
25 Nag, B. and Nandi, A. (2006). ‘Analyzing India’s trade dynamics vis-a-vis SAARC members using the gravity 
model’, South Asia Economic Journal, Vol. 7(1):83–98. 
26 Mehtha, S.P. and Kumar, P. (2004), ‘RTAs and South Asia: option in the wake of Cancun fiasco’, ASARC, working 
paper 2004-11, The Australian National University, Canberra. 
27 Dhungel, D. (2004). ‘South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): Prospect for development’, The 
Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 43 (4) Part II, pp.933–941. 
28 Rahman, M., Shadat, W.B. and Das, N.C. (2006). Trade Potential in SAFTA: An Application of Augmented Gravity 
Model. Dhaka: Centre for Policy Dialogue 
29 MICHAEL MANN, SOUTH ASIA'S MODERN HISTORY: THEMATIC PERSPECTIVES   (Routledge. 2014). 
30 Pitigala, N., ‘What does regional trade in South Asia reveal about future trade integration? Some empirical 




countries could not have the fruits of the intra-regional trade.31 Baysan et al (2006) supports this 
view.32 They observe that SAFTA’s economic framework is relatively weak. From the economic 
perspective there is neither qualitative arguments nor quantitative assessments available to give a 
reason to feel enthusiastic about the arrangement. 
Further, this region is small in terms of economic size as measured by GDP (and per 
capita income) and its world trade share. Consequently, the regional partners trade preference is 
likely leading to trade diversion rather than trade creation. Das (2007) observes that preferential 
initiative in this region is based on a weak proposition.33 Moreover, Sadiq et al (2010) describes, 
the Promoting Regional Economic Cooperation in South Asia as having the potential and hopes 
of fresh and insightful offerings that can be used as inputs in formulating credible policy 
measures to achieve sustainable economic cooperation of this region.34 The study highlights the 
‘dichotomy’ in South Asia and describes its ‘two faces’ one that is ‘highly urbanized and well 
linked to global markets’ and the other ‘rural, isolated from the global economy and growing 
very slowly.’35 
There is a vast amount of literature on the intra-SAFTA trade. This study incorporates the 
most relevant considering the title and broader research question of the essay. R.K. Pruthi, in his 
book titled “The South Asian Free Trade Area: Problem & Perspective” observed that regional 
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cooperation has the impetus of healthy and sustainable development of the people living in that 
region.36 He further observes that due to the strategic location the South Asian region attracted 
adventures through ages. He makes a critical evaluation of SAFTA considering each of the eight-
member’s perspective.37 Another celebrated western writer Lawrence Saez (2011) portrayed a 
fresh and accessible account of SAARC. He emphasized that this region provides a unique 
security complex that can facilitate regional cooperation.38 He further stressed the bars of 
cooperation on areas like historical developments. He focused on the inner framework of the 
Regional Centers, and their realities in implementing the decisions reached at SAARC summits 
on areas like security challenges such as health pandemics, terrorism, and energy security of this 
region.39 
Jiaxia and Mathias Vahullebusch (2013) concentrated their research on the Regional 
Cooperation and Free Trade Agreements in Asia and focused on the dynamics of Asian 
economic development and its effect on both global and regional trade cooperation.40 The WTO 
has taken a significant step to integrate national economies into global trade regulations and 
liberalized the trade relationship between developed, developing, and emerging economies. 
Further, proliferation of FTAs in Asia raised growing concerns about fragmentation of the world 
trade orders.41 Jayatilleke S Bandara and Wusheng Yu (2003) are of the view that RTAs have 
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begun making an impact in the last two decades. Based on the trade data and global computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model they observed that the small countries would gain very little or 
even lose under the preferential liberalization schemes.42 
Jagdish Bhagwati (1995) opined that RTAs are the stumbling blocks of multilateral trade 
liberalization.43 He referred the overlapping RTAs as the ‘spaghetti bowl’ and is of the view that 
regional trade is an unfortunate development.44 Further, Panagariya (1999) observed that RTAs 
tend to have drastic effect on the multilateral trade liberalization because of its high visibility and 
resultant possibility to energize and unify protectionist lobbies as well as drain the negotiating 
capital, particularly in poorly endowed countries.45 
Similarly, two other studies use the gravity model. Those studies analyzed the impact of 
SAFTA in the regional trade flows and found that it had either no or asymmetric impact on this 
region’s trade. The first study used the augmented gravity model. It depicted that countries such 
as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are likely to benefits from SAFTA, but Maldives, Nepal and 
Sri Lanka are likely to lose out.46 The second study conducted by Rodriguez and Daniel (2007) 
mentioned that SAFTA shall have little practical effect on regional trade flows. This study 
reveals that Bangladesh shall sufferer the most welfare loss while India, Sri Lanka and other 
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South Asian countries are likely to have a welfare gain. Bangladesh is likely to suffer because of 
the negative trade diversion effect.47 
Razzaque (2008)48 conducted a study based on a qualitative analysis and three types of 
quantitative analysis (gravity model, CGE model, and GTAP) that are like the research 
conducted by Bandra and Yu (2003).49 The study revealed that weaker economies shall suffer the 
most because of SAFTA. They will mainly suffer because of the increased import from the 
neighboring countries and nominal increase in exports to the region and significant loss of tariff 
revenue.50 
Ahmed (2015) makes a critical analysis and evaluates SAARC’s progress, economic 
cooperation, environmental security, human welfare, and cooperation in security matters. 
According to him, SAARC identified the key issues on its agenda. Over the years SAARC has 
been more active in less controversial areas of human security like the poverty alleviation, health 
and safety, human resource development, and higher education. The study also revealed that 
greater cooperation in human security can pave the way for some more ‘contentious’ issues like 
terrorism.51 
Mahendra (2010) commented on the creation of  SAARC Integrated Programme of 
Action (SIPA), including Agriculture and Rural Development; Communications and Transport; 
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Social Development; Environment, Meteorology, and Forestry; Science and technology; Human 
Resources Development; regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism; regional Convention 
on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances; SAARC Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Trafficking in Women.52 Further, Pierola (2007) observes that for reservations and 
special arrangement for selected products, product exemptions and restrictive rules for point of 
origin constrains the effective flourish of SAFTA.53 
In his book titled ‘the Geopolitics of South Asia (2009)’ Professor Chapman referred how 
the organization of the territory played an important role in the historic, cultural, linguistic, and 
economic development of this region.54 For the North-West frontier Afghanistan and Kashmir 
became included in second edition and the North-Eastern borders are considered for the third and 
revised edition of the book. The present geographic condition of this region has is enhanced and 
updated. Chapman not only provides a useful insight of the historical political geography but 
also a critical account of the forces underpinning changing region.55 
Hafiz et al (2012) focused on SAARC. The study provides insights regarding the 
interrelation with the civil society in the process of South Asian regional cooperation and 
integration. Moreover, it stresses the urgency of regional public goods. Further, it recommends 
that critical engagement of civil society can have beneficial effect on future integration and 
cooperation between Member States. The study specifically highlights certain factors like 
industry and trade sectors when the cross-border activities established within SAFTA 
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framework.56 This book interrelates between policy reforms and poverty reduction outcomes in 
South Asia. Given its significant inter-country differences in terms of timing and 
comprehensiveness of reforms this region is a place for significant comparative analysis.57 
Jayatilleke S. Bandra (2011) concentrate on scholarship from several South Asian 
countries that focus on this region’s conflict resolution and cooperation building. The center of 
the essay is the inter related issues like security, political economy-domestic politics, and the 
construction of identities, and normative frameworks. Further the study makes a comprehensive 
analysis of the international frameworks and figure out the possible outcomes to solve this 
region’s disputes. The study focuses on the bilateral trade conflict between India and Pakistan 
along with other multilateral problems of this region.58 
Rahman (2008) dedicates his studies to the SAFTA countries’ macroeconomic structure, 
namely Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and explores the possibility of trade 
expansion within these countries based on regional link models on time series data of 28 years.59 
The study reveals the inter-country differences in SAARC countries’ production and 
consumption, investment behavior, tax and non-tax structures. There is huge potential for trade 
expansion in SAFTA countries. Further the study reveals that unlike the EU, NAFTA, 
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MERCOSUR, ASEAN, and APEC SAFTA never played an important role in the international 
market. This is mainly because of its policy of inward orientation.60 
Kaur and Nanda (2010) calculated India’s potential export to other SAARC Member 
States by using the gravity model of export. He deployed the panel data methodology (i.e. the 
fixed effect model, pooled model, and random effect model) within 1985-2005. The study 
revealed that India has great export potential with Bhutan, Pakistan, Maldives, and Nepal. India 
is in a suitable geographic condition sharing land border with 4 SAARC members and sea border 
with 2 countries. Apart from India, no other country in this region shares common borders. India 
has enormous potential for investment and can further bloom as a major market for products 
from all SAARC countries. As a result, business integration with India has a major role in the 
overall business integration within SAARC.61 
 
1.5.Objectives of the study 
To achieve the broader goal of liberalization South Asian countries should upgrade 
inefficient borders customs station by implementing either GATT Article XXIV or SAFTA. This 
is the primary focus of this study. In a official capacity, the researcher had the opportunity to 
attend Border, Trade and Customs related meetings within UNESCAP and SAARC and 
participated in border and free trade related issues. This research highlights the free movement of 
goods and services and other associated issues. This dissertation aims to figure out how these 
South Asian countries can evolve, grow, and compete with another economic zone like the EU, 
NAFTA, or ASEAN. 
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The goal of this study is to figure out the shortcomings and challenges FTAs among 
SAARC Member Countries. This study examines the individual economic conditions of each 
SAARC member state and determines to what extent their policies and framework 
commensurate with SAARC and SAFTA. Free trade region will not become a reality unless 
member states do not facilitate free movement of labors across borders. Therefore, transit issues 
are an important factor in cross border trade. This study highlights on the intra-country relations 
related to transit and other co-related issues. This study provides a thorough analysis as to why 
SAARC and SAFTA frameworks have failed to achieve effective regulatory status. Further, this 
work discusses how business relations in this region can improve to bring a sustainable and 
beneficial change to the SAARC region. 
The major objective of this study is to explore the vital features of SAFTA and to identify 
the factors that are hindering its proper implementation. The study shall also discuss about the 
SAFTA’s shortcomings. SAFTA shall ensure free trade between Member States which may not 
be beneficial for all the members. The concern is that free trade will allow India to consume the 
economies of the smaller countries like Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal etc. This research shall also 
focus on such contentions in socio-cultural, political, and economic aspects.62 
This research relied on both primary interviews and secondary literature reviews to 
collect the data for the research. This dissertation is limited to the data collected. The research 
focuses on the historical background of SAARC, the gradual development of its framework and 
policies through summits, the role of member countries during and after SAARC and SAFTA, 
and how their attitude affected SAARC and SAFTA growth and progress. SAARC’s formation 
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was to promote free trade amongst Member Countries and focus on important issues such as 
religion, counter terrorism, poverty alleviation, health benefits, and other issues. Trade 
facilitation and free movement of the labors are some salient SAFTA features. This research 
focuses on the past data that available in this regard and on business trends between Member 
States after SAFTA. The study focuses on how SAARC stimulates free trade and propels 
countries towards greater economic integration and sustainable prosperity. 
The outcome of the study depicts that creation of greater trade facilities among Member 
Countries coupled with streamlined regulatory schemes can result in sustainable and positive 
societal change. The present world requires understanding the role of connectivity. Policy 
makers should take a pro-active approach to ensure elimination of cooperation obstacles. They 
can seek assistance from the legal and judicial bodies. Their expertise in this field may enable the 
government to find out the legal limitations of the instruments and can also recommend on the 
areas that need further amendments and modifications. The instant research explores various 
crucial factors not previously examined in detail by any other authors. 
 
1.6.Study Limitations 
This dissertation focuses on various key aspects and could have been broader. While 
conducting the essay various related topics and interesting perspectives became known. 
However, due to time constraints this work is only able to explore the most relevant ones. If this 
work included all the relevant data the research would have been richer, but this could not be 
accomplished within a reasonable timeframe.63 
                                                 




The primary data collection limit is 51 numbers of the most relevant persons. These 
persons are categorized and prioritized depending on their relevancy and position considering the 
research topic. Some of the interviews were from the members of the parliament and the minister 
of commerce. It was very difficult to collect feedback from them. Collection of the data was 
mostly through email or online. Moreover, there were situations where the interviewers became 
busy after filing in few questions. In those circumstances, the system automatically submitted the 
result after 7 days. This dissertation contains data obtain from people directly involved with the 
South Asian trade. Further, the secondary data was revised continuously to ensure that the most 
up to dated and the relevant materials are incorporated in the research essay. Due to time 
constraint this work could not explore some factors of regional trade. 
It is difficult to assess issues like unilateral liberalization and accessibility, quality of 
service, variety of services, and how the unilateral liberalization made an impact on GATT 
commitments by asking qualitative questions. This is because these factors are dependent on the 
perception of general people rather than empirical facts. To overcome this, the work derives first-
hand perceptions from policy makers, government officials, regulators, and other stakeholders. 
This helps to enhance the richness of interpretation. The research is based on the qualitative 
research model. This facilitates analytic generalization and was not dependent on inferences 
about the chosen sample population. As a result, there was no need for a statistical generalization 
in this study. 
Although there are various advantages of data collection such as the opportunity of 
immediate feedback and clarification of confusion as noted by Zikmound,64 they are subject to 
limitations of distorted responses resulting from personal biasness and recall error. To minimize 
                                                 




this effect this work applies the data triangulation method. Further, access to three key 
informants (policy makers, Member of Parliament, and people from trade body) was very 
limited. 
Likelihood of biasness because of conflict of interest was one of the major limitations the 
faced in the data collection process. The patriotism desirability bias may have compromised the 
quality of the data in some instances. To minimize the social desirability bias, assurance was 




According to intra-SAARC Trade, SAFTA has not been successful in achieving the goal 
of trade liberalization. SAFTA is a pretty flower vase made by various economic and trade 
agreements. However, the vase has many cracks and the water (trade transactions) is leaking out 
which is preventing liberation and wealth generation through SAFTA. The central objective of 
SAFTA is to ensure an effective competition in free trade regimes by reducing the tariff and non-
tariff barriers by promoting the least development countries and applying transparency and 
integrity among the member states. The next chapter concentrates on FTA legal issues along 









Chapter Two: South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA) and Its Compatibility with World Trade 






Since 2004, Under the framework of the Doha Development Agenda, the WTO members 
are engaging in negotiations of multilateral trade facilitation rules which would clarify and 
improve the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 Articles V, VIII, X and 
XXIV.65 Four years after 2004, at the 10th SAARC summit, held in Colombo, Sri Lanka from, 
29th to July 31st, 1998, the SAARC leaders agreed to set up a Committee of Experts (COE). The 
COE consisted of a nominee from each member state with the primary purpose of drafting a 
comprehensive treaty framework on which a free trade agreement could be initiated among the 
SAARC member nations. The COE, mandated by the Member States, was forged by the regional 
integration guidelines of WTO.66 The agreement, named SAFTA, was signed on 6th January 2004 
and implemented on the 1st January 2006.  
The number of provisions relating to customs and trade facilitation included in RTAs has 
increased over time.67 At present, most of RTAs that have been notified to the WTO comprise 
commitments in such matters, reflecting the growing importance of trade facilitation at the regional 
level. At the same time, trade facilitation is also being negotiated at the WTO, which suggests the 
need to examine linkages between future provisions of the agreement currently being negotiated 
at WTO and trade facilitation commitments in RTAs. The current chapter presents and discusses 
issues WTO rules and regulations, which is important to know the RTAs states to find 
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discrimination and discrepancies between trade facilitation commitments at the regional and 
multilateral levels.68  
2.2. Explanation of Terminologies in Relation to Free Trade.  
2.2.1. “RTA”, “PTA”, “FTA”, and “CU” 
The arrangements between states regarding trade associations are included in a RTA. These 
arrangements are also known as Preferential Trading Agreements (PTAs), FTAs, and Custom 
Unions (CUs). There are differences between the terms CU, RTA, and FTA. To better understand 
these, it is necessary to note the technical differences in the terminology. In relation to each other, 
RTAs are at the top, an umbrella housing CUs and FTAs. However, the term is misleading in that 
RTAs indicate that FTAs and CUs can only occur between countries within the same geographical 
region. These RTA are not the case, for example the U.S. and Bahrain are in different regions but 
have entered into a FTA with each other. Professor Raj Bhala differentiates the terms FTAs and 
CUs in two ways: 
“A CU is 1 step deeper than an FTA in terms of economic integration. The members 
of a CU – which may be bilateral or plurilateral – agree to delete all, or substantially 
all, barriers to internal trade between or among them. In that sense of internally free 
movement of goods, and an attendant set of rules to determine origin within the 
grouping, a CU is like an FTA. However, the CU parties also agree to a CET, which 
means they establish the same trade barriers on the same categories of products in 
                                                 
68 This dissertation rests on standard free trade theory, as its focus is on liberalizing trade across South 
Asia. Thus, it does not incorporate or evaluate conceptual frameworks that are against free trade generally, 
or FTAs in particular. For those frameworks, a variety of sources exist. And see also Raj Bhala, et al., 
Iinternational Trade Law, Volume 1: Chapter 4 Institutional Foundations of Free Trade; An 




the HS – a unified set of customs laws and procedures. In brief, a CU is a single 
market both as among the members and visà-vis the rest of the world.”69 
Under GATT Article XXIV:8(a), FTA involves two or more countries agreeing to 
potentially remove all barriers to trade between or among them. The FTA may be bilateral or 
multilateral. Bilateral is between two countries e.g. the agreement between the U.S. and Bahrain 
or the agreement between the U.S. and Israel. Whereas, multilateral is among a group of countries 
e.g. NAFTA. In bilateral or multilateral FTAs all nations maintain independence in setting their 
import barriers to non-FTA member products. 70 A CU is one step ahead of an FTA in terms of 
economic integration. In a bilateral or multilateral CU all members agree to delete all trade barriers, 
i.e. EU. 
For example, In the U.S., PTAs and FTAs account for approximately 30% of all imports.71 
Among these arrangements, KORUS and NAFTA are statistically the strongest. However, RTAs 
are not analyzed from an institutional point. The WTO analyses the impact of RTAs through an 
economic point.72 These critiques, focusing specifically on the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) 
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confronted by RTAs and their patterns and efficiencies, do not analyses movements of trade 
liberalization of world trade.73 
 
 
2.2.2. Regional Trade Agreements: Some Mythologies  
FTAs change extensively under the influence of a surfeit of issues. A country may elect a 
new government with different political ideology, its economic strategies might change, and it 
might consider newer avenues of imports and exports in its annual budget. Though, a country’s 
nationalistic views along with its cultural, social context, and security issues may affect a FTA. 
Three key factors guide the formation of a FTA: breadth, depth, and timing. "Breadth" alludes to 
the scope of the FTA, or how extensive it is. Does the FTA cover a wide range of sectors, products, 
economies, and countries? Does it cover all areas and items in the nations’ economies? “Depth” 
refers to the extent of the reduction of tariffs and NTBs. Does the FTA slash all tariffs to zero, 
eradicate all quantitative restrictions, and move aggressively against abuse of SPS and TBT 
measures? Finally, “timing” concerns the speed with which a FTA liberalizes trade. Does the FTA 
forget a couple of delicate provisions or items recording for a vast volume or estimation of 
exchange? The finished scope of all products and services is an extraordinary unhindered 
commerce probability. In reality, complete coverage is not immediately possible. However, FTAs 
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can become complete. For example, the 1st January 1983, CER between New Zealand and 
Australia, and 1994 NAFTA, are complete FTAs. Another example of a complete FTA are the 
May and June 2003, U.S. - Singapore and U.S. Chile FTAs, which contain a significantly more 
components than NAFTA. (In like manner, the EU is an exhaustive CU). The U.S. requires far 
reaching FTAs, i.e., bargain covering merchandise, administrations, and IP. 
 
2.2.3. "Timing" Questions Speed of Exchange of FTAs– Quick or Moderate? 
Hypothetically, a 100% pure free trade FTA would be one without any kind of imposition 
of duty or tax on the export and import of goods among the relevant parties. However, it is 
impossible to create a 100% FTA, as various factors influence a country’s attitude towards certain 
goods. As implied, the three variables – breadth, depth, and timing74 – fall into 3 classes: 
(1) Goods termed “delicate” are excluded from concessions. The concession can 
exist for an unspecific or specific period of time, depending upon the country. 
(2) Goods with phased tariffs are not considered for concession. The tariff is 
reduced in phases, and depending on the merchandise in question, the duration of 
the contract is set. 
(3) Tariff Contingencies: Regardless of the nature of the product, there are 
impositions of certain alternative tax programs according to the needs of the 
country. The U.S. demands the installation of such programs in its FTAs, for 
example the TRQ. Additional protections that may be imposed are special 
safeguards. This allows MFN obligations to be re-enforced on categories which do 
not fall under the price and volume threshold set by the trading countries, i.e. if it 
                                                 




imports in a category is below a threshold price or above the cited volume from an 
FTA partner, the safeguard can be imposed.   
These three variables decide the financial advantages an FTA creates. An FTA is less 
financially important when it is limited in scope, shallow in barrier reductions, and moderate in 
eliminating boundaries.75 Thus, a FTA is not sustainable if is not economically important enough 
to be able to generate short and long-term benefits and will fail to generate monetary surpluses. 
The fact remains, even though a FTA is commended by national and political security elements, 
to the degree that these elements rely on monetary increases, they will be unfulfilled.76  
When an FTA needs financial aspiration, it demonstrates faltering political conduct. Such 
an FTA proposes member nations are making troublesome domestic political choices. These 
legislatures are not seeking full monetary change, but instead excluding certain favoured 
constituencies. An FTA failing in aspiration, soon after the commencement date, may not be a 
persisting model of accord utilized for "standard content." Rather, with new monetary 
improvements, there are requests for new and distinctive arrangements, adapted to fit 
characteristics of an ever-changing business atmosphere. 
 
2.3. Purposes of FTA 
 The focus of international trade is on the stipulations of “comparative advantage” (i.e., 
promoting individual cross-border exchanges, specialization, and global welfare).77 David Ricardo 
augmented the revolutionary views of free trade activist Adam Smith. Ricardo proclaimed, 
“comparative advantage” as the way ahead and an as alternative to “mercantilism” and “absolute 
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advantage.”78 Comparative advantage and free trade’s promotion of society’s net welfare, the 
allocation of resources, specialization of production, and division of labor coalesce to boost 
production, efficiency, and consumption.79 
Substantially, all restrictive regulations and duties should be removed only for those 
individual or group customs territory which are to be replaced by CUs. Trade should be consistent 
between the territories or unions regarding all products or items of trade, and where groups of two 
or more customs territories have eliminated duties and other prohibiting regulations, it shall be 
labelled as a free trade area. A free trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, as permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such 
territories. This FTA is applicable to substantially all products coming from these regions.80 
 
2.4. A Brief Negotiating History and Flexibility with GATT Article XXIV 
                                                 
78 See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, NONWESTERN 
TEXTBOOK 71-77 (vol. I, 4th ed. 2015). In the “economic orthodoxy” of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, 
mercantilism is “an anti-free trade doctrine that calls for government intervention to generate a trade surplus.” Id. at 
71. Accordingly, mercantilists seek to maximize wealth by maximizing exports and minimizing imports, and thereby 
maximize the net outflow of goods, i.e., a positive balance of trade, and the net inflow of payments. Mercantilist 
trade policy calls for restrictions, such as high tariffs, on imports, and support, such as subsidies, for exports. 
Id. at 71-72. David Ricardo argued, in regards to the law of “comparative advantage” in contrast to “absolute 
advantage,” that international trade is mutually beneficial for countries, even if one has an absolute advantage in the 
production of goods under the following terms: (1) For the country with an absolute advantage in both goods, 
Ricardo advised specializing in the production of, and exporting, the good in which it has the greatest absolute 
advantage[;] (2) For the country with an absolute disadvantage in both goods, Ricardo suggested specializing in the 
production of, and exporting, the good in which it has the least absolute disadvantage. 
79 Id. At. 




In 1947, after World War II, with some exceptions few countries had entered into RTAs 
within GATT Article XXIV. In this manner, GATT Article XXIV missed the mark in trying to 
dispose of prejudicial inclinations through controlling oppressive preferences. A RTA makes a 
broader trading range, clears contention blocks, makes more monetary benefits possible, and 
subsequently attempts to increase productivity and raise standards of living. A specific structure, 
on the other hand, holds internal deterrents, debilitates economic progress, and controls the 
advancement of pay and demand. A RTA is helpful for extending exchange on the premise of 
multilateralism and non-discrimination. The orchestrating parties swap necessity for affirmations, 
because individuals in RTAs could not be depended upon to move immediately to shared 
unhindered business and customary trade systems. This arrangement is acknowledged amid 
preliminary transactions under GATT Article XXIV. This proposition was limited to the trading 
of inclinations among topographically proximate nations, nations with close authentic or monetary 
ties, and creating nations to advance development. 
2.4.1. Substantive Provisions of GATT Article XXIV 
 The plan behind the arrangements in GATT Article XXIV is that when in doubt, the GATT 
will permit PTAs either a CU or a FTA among the constituent members as a reward for an 
undeniable advancement. Consequently, the earliest reference point takes note that GATT Article 
XXIV does not present any extraordinary difference for PTAs coming up short concerning an 
unquestionable FTA or CU past a sensible period, as found in GATT Article XXIV: 5 (c). To 
consent to the plan of GATT Article XXIV a PTA needs to show up on a FTA or CU 
implementation timeline.  
The central substantive courses of action are contained in GATT Article XXIV:4, 
Article XXIV:5 (a), (b) and (c), Article XXIV:6, and Article XXIV:8 (a) (i), (ii) and (b), 




should be to support trade between the constituent spaces and not to raise deterrents to the 
trading of other contracting parties within such areas. The CU or FTA needs to guarantee 
that PTAs would change trade among constituent people and would not raise trade 
impediments to people not engage with social affairs to the PTA. 
The scope of an RTA is crucial because it needs to consider all substantial trade among 
member countries.81 The importance is paramount because overpaid industry lawyers lobby for 
the release of industries from RTA negotiations. For example, in the U.S. Panama FTA the U.S. 
sugar industry lawyers lobbied for repeated tariffs against Panama.82 
Difficulty arises in understanding the Interpretation of Article XXIV. This WTO Article was 
written/drafted during the Uruguay Round negotiation. The difficulty is that it is unclear was the 
term “substantial” entails because exactly what percentage of trade constitutes a substantial 
amount is undefined. Three possible responses are:83 
(a) Substantial is less than all, as indicated by the work of the Preparatory Conferences.84  
(b) Substantial is more than zero. 
(c) Substantial is closer to all than it is to zero, e.g., in 1957 a delegate from the EEC suggested 
that internal tariffs must be eliminated 80% of all trade.85 
 
2.4.2. “Higher or More Restrictive” Test in GATT Article XXIV 
                                                 
81 This rule is set out in Article XXIV: 8. 
82RAJ BHALA, et al., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:AN INTERDISCIPLINARY, NON-WESTERN TEXTBOOK: GATT-WTO 
DISCIPLINES ON FTAS   (LexisNexis. 2015).  
83 Id. at. 
84 See JACKSON 1969, § 24.7 at 608. 
85 See The European Economic Community, Reports Adopted on 29 November 1957, B.I.S.D. (6th Supp.) 70, 98-99 
at 30 (1958) and Bhala, et al., GATT-WTO Disciplines on FTAs. 2015. And DAM, 280. Professor Dam opines the 




FTA Member States recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade by 
development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between the economies of the 
countries parties to such agreements. Under this rule, trade barriers should be greater after the 
formation of a RTA. According to GATT Article XXIV: 5, this rule applies to interim agreements 
(particularly Sub-Paragraphs (a) and (b)), FTAs, and CUs. Article XXIV: 11 and its Interpretative 
Note barred India and Pakistan from using the formation of a FTA as an excuse to increase their 
individually-set barriers applicable to a third country. India could not impose a tariff on third 
country cotton of 11% and Pakistan could not raise its barrier to 21%.86  
GATT Article XXIV: 7 is complemented by the WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of 
Article XXIV. This Understanding assists WTO Members within the RTA to get involved with 
the related Working Party. The Working Party passes the information to the Council on Goods 
Trades and the Council can recommend the RTA for WTO membership. 87 
 
2.4.3. The External Liberalisation Requirements under GATT Article 
XXIV 
If two or more WTO Members enter into a RTA, and the WTO Membership finds the 
initiative date establishing the FTA or CU implausible (that is, unworkable), then the RTA 
Members will not be allowed to set up the RTA. The Members within the interim agreement 
wishing to form the RTA must be put off. The contracting parties recognize that the purpose of a 
CU or a FTA is to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the 
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trade of other contracting parties with such territories.88Generally, 5(a) requires the CU to supply 
import measurements for a past agent period and forces an obligation on the WTO Secretariat to 
figure the weighted normal tax rates and traditions obligations collected. GATT Article XXIV: 4 
manages the indistinguishable part of the financial model by stipulating that the reason for PTAs 
ought to be to encourage exchange amongst gatherings and 'not to raise obstructions to the 
exchange of other contracting parties. 
However, GATT Article XXIV: 5 forces all of the more straight and substantive lawful 
commitments on gatherings to a PTA.89 According to GATT Article XXIV: 5 gatherings should 
not keep the arrangement of a traditions union or of a facilitated commerce region.'  This provision 
occurs when party states utilize a particular defence measure to make crisis moves in reaction to 
specific market circumstances on a transitory premise. For example, the U.S. and South Korea’s 
embraced this type of a defence measure on a pipeline by agreeing to the avoidance of imports 
from their NAFTA accomplices, Canada and Mexico. In utilizing this defence measure, the U.S. 
and South Korea were disregarding a few arrangements of GATT and the Agreement on Safe 
Guards.90  
 
2.4.4. Preferential Rules of Origins (ROOs) under GATT Article XXIV  
 Appearing in the context of CU or PTA being established under GATT Article XXIV: 
5 (a) is applicable duties ones in the constituent territories of the RTA commitments and 
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International Economic Law 107, 122 
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distinctive controls of businesses be no higher than in the pre-PTA period.91 PTAs 
conventionally arrange ROOs. These arrangements group things that should be met for all 
requirements for extraordinary treatment. The Agreement on Rules of Origin characterizes 
particular ROOs as those laws, directions, and authoritative conclusions of general application 
connected by any Member to figure out if merchandise fit the bill for particular treatment under 
legally binding or self-governing exchange administrations prompting to the giving of duty 
inclinations going past the use of GATT Article I Section 1. 
 
2.4.5. Dispute Settlement Process under GATT Article  XXIV 
 The Dispute Settlement Panel determined that GATT Article XXIV:7(b) appoints an 
obligation on the contracting gatherings to make proposals on PTAs if they consider that such a 
PTA would not bring about a CU or FTA, as required by GATT Article XXIV.92 However, the 
Panel did not make a decision because the absence of accord among contracting parties, with 
respect to the similarity of the PTAs being referred to, proposes the view that their lawful status 
stayed open. The Panel felt that a board could be established to issue a counselling supposition on 
the congruity of a PTA or a translation of particular criteria under Article XXIV to help the 
contracting parties check on a PTA under Article XXIV: 7(b). 2.4.6 the Coverage of GATT Article 
XXIV Exception. With respect to the extent of the Article, a prohibitive view subscribed to by a 
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few individuals from the WTO is that Article XXIV permits parties to a PTA disparagement from 
Article I of the GATT and they are bound by all other WTO activities. The inverse view is that 
Article XXIV approves disparagement from all GATT arrangements. A Brief Note on the 
Negotiations for the SAFTA: Compliance with WTO Rules. The WTO demands prompt 
notification of all PTAs entered into by WTO Members. The WTO Transparency Mechanism for 
Regional Trade Agreements (Transparency Mechanism), as adopted by the WTO General Council, 
deems it necessary for each WTO member to provide a timely notification of the clause. It 
categorically requires the prompt notification of any PTA to the WTO following the parties’ 
ratification of the treaty and before the commencement of its preferential treatment.93 The SAFTA 
was signed in 2004 and entered into force before this Mechanism was adopted in 2006. 
Nonetheless, this Agreement falls within the purview of this Mechanism as it applies to all PTAs 
and exempts from its application only those PTAs notified before its adoption.94 The SAFTA 
informed the WTO more than two years after its ratification by its signatories and then two years 
later the preferential treatment begun. Therefore, SAFTA violated the notification requirement of 
the Transparency Mechanism.95  
 
2.4.6.  Legitimate Changes among WTO Member and Non-Members States 
It is important to note that all eight parties of SAFTA are either less developed or 
developing WTO Member States. However, the WTO does not have any definition for “developing 
countries.” The absence of a definition makes the status of developing countries a self-declaratory 
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nature. One SAFTA signatory, Bhutan is not yet a WTO Member.96  Hence, the question was raised 
whether the rest of the PTA parties have violated their WTO obligation by entering into a PTA 
with a non-WTO Member State without any waiver from the WTO membership. The Enabling 
Clause does not provide an explicit answer. However, a textual interpretation implies that it 
arguably allows the conclusion of PTAs among developing countries or LDCs without the need of 
obtaining a waiver from the WTO’s broader membership, provided that all non-WTO members in 
the PTA are LDCs.97The SAFTA fulfils this criterion as both Afghanistan and Bhutan are LDCs. 
Therefore, the legality of SAFTA’s notification the Enabling Clause is in conforms to the WTO 
rules.98 
 
2.4.7. Compliance with Applicable Requirements of the Enabling Clause 
Enabling clause is an exception to GATT Article I of MFN rule only. Enable clause 
provides no legal basis for justification of preferential non-tariff measures among members of a 
trade arrangement.99Paragraph 2(c) of the enabling clause allows MFN-inconsistency of regional 
arrangements entered into amongst less developed contracting parties for the mutual reduction or 
elimination of tariffs.100 Under the Enabling Clause, this notification of SAFTA signifies that the 
state parties recognize the shallow scope of its liberalization scheme. The WTO discipline on 
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PTAs, as enshrined in this clause, takes a very discreet and simple approach towards PTAs notified 
under the Enabling Clause.101 Any PTA duly notified to the WTO under this clause is not subject 
to examination by the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA). It is to be notified 
to a separate committee called the CTD. The relevant provisions of the Enabling Clause for PTAs 
among developing countries and LDCs are contained in paragraphs 2(c), 3, and 4. 
Paragraph 2(c) does not require the implementation of a CU or a full-fledged PTA. It 
provides for an exception from the MFN rule in GATT Article I for concluding any regional trade 
arrangements among less-developed WTO Member States, to reduce or eliminate tariffs and non-
tariff measures on products imported from each other.102 Unlike GATT Article XXIV, paragraph 
2(c) does not require the removal of all trade barriers to substantially all trade. Therefore, few 
PTAs can comply with the superficial internal trade liberalization requirement of the Enabling 
Clause and SAFTA is no exception. The Enabling Clause does not impose any real requirement 
of extensive internal trade liberalization, rather, it provides an exception for shallow exchange of 
tariff and non-tariff preferences among developing and/or LDC states falling short of Article 
XXIV. The most significant requirement this clause imposes on the parties’ concerns third parties, 
which are handled with leniency. 
 
2.4.8.  Applying Article XXIV to Indo-Pakistani Trade 
 In order to enter into a FTA or CU, neither Pakistan nor India require a commitment to 
GATT Article XXIV. Pakistan and India have a way of backing out from FTAs because there is 
no time limit or expiration date for Article XXIV: 11 and its Interpretative Note. Pakistan and India 
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receive special allotments from Article XXIV because of these observations.  The Article on RTAs 
states: all trade will be covered among RTA members, trade barriers are to be reduced among RTA 
members, and increase in barriers should be avoided. The WTO should be notified of any change 
in information.  Pakistan and India can remove the trade barriers specifically under GATT Article 
V, as well as other RTA arrangements. The general MFN rule of GATT Article I:1 is excused by 
GATT Article XXIV: 11. That excuse neither exists in General Agreement of Trade in Service 
(GATS), nor is necessary in it. Whereas GATT applies to cross-border the exchange of goods, 
GATS applies to trade in services.   
 
2.5. An Institutional Critique of “RTAs-Conflict Creation,” “Resource Diversion,” and 
“Diminishing State” WTO Enthusiasm: 
 GATT Article XXIV remains weak and redundant as controlling component to RTAs. To 
some degree, that is due to Article XXIV focusing only on monetary aspects of RTAs.103 Typically 
the investigation into RTAs focuses on the monetary effect on the world exchange system.104 Over 
                                                 
103 For the requirements of Article XXIV are at first definitional, and then are focused on the trade distorting effects 
-too great a trade distorting effect and the RTA could, theoretically, be denied the exception. GAIT, art. XXIV. As 
noted earlier, this Article will not retreat the economic critique, the most common critique of Article XXIV and of 
RTAs in general, though it has been suggested that an economic critique of RTAs will, however, at the end of the 
day be inconclusive. See Bhala, supra note 11, at 305 (noting that "it depends" is probably the truest answer as to 
whether RTAs are beneficial); see also JACKSON (1969), supra note 47, at 621 (stating that economists are 
uncertain about regional arrangements such as GATT); FRANKEL, supra note 6, at 208 ("[From the standpoint of 
static economic welfare, trade economists are in fact ambivalent about the desirability of FTAs...”) 
104 The many sources cited in this Article are a testament to this proposition for only in small part, if at all, do they 
discuss noneconomic critiques of RTAs, and rarely, if ever, the institutional aspects of the relationship between 
RTAs and the multilateral system. Other noneconomic, yet not institutional criticisms of RTAs, include the idea that 
preferential systems like RTAs are just disguised imperialism- the idea being that RTAs tie smaller or weaker 
countries to bigger or more powerful ones, forcing the weaker or smaller state to orient its trade to the other even as 
the other state is free to do what it wants. The bigger or more powerful state can do this because its trade with the 




several decades, GATT Article XXIVs as mechanism to control RTAs has proven to be weak and 
irrelevant.105 
 Almost all the literature critiquing RTAs' relationships with the world trade system focuses 
on economic issues, despite the fact that the economic impact of RTAs on the multilateral trade 
system is unclear.106 In response to this problem efforts are taken to control RTA formation to 
minimize economic harm while maximizing economic benefit.107 There remains a potential 
conflict between the WTO and RTAs because they are different frameworks and divisions.108 The 
                                                 
regional arrangements could be dominated by considerations of market power...."); MATHIS, supra note 10, at 20 
(describing international trade preferences as an expression of modem imperialism). Another noneconomic critique 
of RTAs is that engagement in an RTA shows favoritism-that it shows "who your friends are" -to the detriment of 
cordial relations with other non-RTA countries. See Charles Roh, Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or 
Weakening Global Trade, Remarks Before the American Society of International Law (Apr. 7, 1994), in 88 AM. 
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 309, 309 (1994) (stating that one of the reasons the United States has over the years 
refrained from free trade agreements was to avoid having to "look as though we were choosing from among our best 
friends"). Indeed, it was suggested that this reason, avoidance of a "slap in the face" to non-RTA allies, was one of 
the reasons the United States avoided RTAs until relatively recently. For other critiques of RTAs, see Cho, Breaking 
the Barrier, supra note 73, at 430. 
105 Perhaps it was because prior to the creation of an international trade organization with real power, as opposed to 
GATT's diplomacy-oriented approach to international trade, there was not the same conflict we see today. Similarly, 
prior to NAFTA and the strengthening of the EU in the first half of the 1990s, RTAs were simply not the force they 
are today. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and Multilateralism, 42 HARV INT'L L.J. 
419, 428 (2001) ("[A] strong economic, rather than political, motivation for the formation of an RTA is key to its 
success."). 
106 See discussion supra note 75; see also Cottier, supra note 14, at 154 (discussing the little impact of RTAs on trade 
flows due to the already low tariff levels in existence, the fact that agriculture is rarely covered, and the significant 
issue of NTBs and other trade distorting government actions (and that these issues are not covered well in RTAs, but 
rather at the multilateral level, and that absent a move to federalism there is a limit on what regional arrangements 
can accomplish)). 
107 See, e.g., WORLD BANK, global economic perspectives, supra note 4, at 111115 (presenting a collection of 
suggested reforms to Article XXIV that are all economic-based proposals). 
108 Of course, RTAs may also contribute to conflict elimination -many believe that countries that trade with each 




conflicts between the WTO and RTAs appear in different situations: through the use of the RTA's 
substantive plans; in the midst of creating a RTA; resulting from progression of RTA statutes; in 
the midst of RTA organizing; and during negotiating the RTA settlement systems. The usage of 
RTAs is a different struggle. Conflicts are dangerous as the statute may produce harsh outcomes 
inside each of the strategies. Additionally, RTAs divert resources from the multilateral trade 
system to the negotiation, development, and nurturing of RTAs. This diversion of resources creates 
conflict and erosion of states' enthusiasm for the multilateral trade systems.  To the extent states, 
with their concomitant expenditure of scarce energies and resources, engage in RTA negotiation 
and development, these resources are denied to WTO development.109 
 
2.6. Diversity in Purpose of FTAs 
From the multilateralism viewpoint, MFN treatment should exempt the control of RTAs. 
It is tempting to derive an answer from the expansive and expanding number of RTAs. 110 The 
scope, coverage, and number of RTAs within the multilateral trade system are growing at a 
incredible percentage. Globalization is pushing for the development of regional enhancements.111  
While there is involvement in other time frames in this sector, aside from geopolitics, there are a 
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109 This concept, of RTA resource diversion, is not new-it has been discussed before, albeit briefly-too briefly, often 
receiving no more than a sentence or paragraph. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 4, at 133 ("proliferating regional agreements absorb scarce negotiating resources"). 
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myriad of reasons for countries to enter into RTAs.112  These reasons include outside approach 
objectives, security, and monetary benefits. States join RTAs to secure welfare increase from 
sectors where access is normally restricted, financial securities, or to guarantee access to a secured 
market by RTAs. For example, Canada, used a past RTA in the Canada- U.S. FTA (CUSFTA) to 
guarantee its entrance into the U.S. market and hence contributed to the North American Free 
Trade Association (NAFTA).  
No country wants to remain alone when other nations are entering into such agreements. 
The concept is best described as "domino regionalism” and it ensures multilateralism. Domino 
regionalism will not exploit a nation included in a RTA. Regionalism and its associated exchange 
preoccupation might support multilateral agreements. As a result of globalization, united with the 
opening of economies in the post-charge period, and the late addition in regionalism, the money 
related on-screen characters, have started keeping track of and managing Non-Tariff Barriers 
(NTBs). Provincial assertions may secure financial changes both externally and internally and 
offer validity to those changes.113 A few reviews propose that those welfare, monetary, and 
exchange increases are a long way from being guaranteed, with the fact that they might not exist.114 
An essential method of reasoning for RTAs is also the non-financial advantages that many may 
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consider.115  Specifically, major reasons for entering into RTAs are national security and foreign 
policy. A mix of many reasons: political, security, and budgetary, are all extensively comparative 
reasons to enter a RTA.116   
The force of Article XXIV broke down immediately in the after effect of one of the central 
inadequacies of the primary GATT. This inadequacy is in the first stage of moving against 
violators. Thus, while there were numerous GATT work gatherings considering the different 
RTAs, only one RTA was ever ready to be affirmed by GATT consistent with the functional 
groups.117 The Understanding states that the survey procedure of Article XXIV does not protect 
RTAs from the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). It incorporates particular subtle 
elements of how RTAs must gauge exchange in order to be consistent with Article XXIV. 
Additionally, the understanding gives a timetable on which to stage new rising RTAs into 
operation and creates a Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) to take part in 
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oversight of RTAs and their association with the WTO.118 The Understanding and the CRTA 
examination report demonstrate that Article XXIV is not able to guarantee RTA consistency.119  
2.7. The South Asian FTA in the Framework of International Trade Law  
A large scale of trade, between and among FTA partner countries, takes place through an 
ever-increasing number of FTAs. This continuous increase poses a threat to the multilateral trade 
reign of the WTO (as mentioned by the Sutherland Report), because only FTAs allow exchange 
of preferences between contracting parties.120 The six members of SAARC who are simultaneously 
members of WTO must follow all WTO rules. The WTO is the result of concurrent creations of 
international trade rules. Thus, studying these trade rules and the background of WTO is important 
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e/regcom...e.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). 
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general, see MATHLs, supra note 10, at 227-258. It should be noted, however, that Article 
XXIV compliance may improve slightly, though not sufficiently, as a result of the 
Understanding's specific discussion of RTAs' relationship to the WTO's Dispute Settlement 
Understanding. The Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") is starting to have an impact on Article 
XXIV jurisprudence. See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body, Report on Turkey-Restrictions on Imports 
of Textile and Clothing Products, 58, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter Turkey Case] 
(appealing panel finding disallowing restrictions inconsistent with GATT1994), available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/turkey-textiles(ab).pdf. Perhaps of significance is 
that the DSB can address issues unresolved by the WTO members. An example is that it was 
long considered an issue as to whether Article XXIV merely provided an exception to Article I 





as each Member belongs to at least one RTA. The number of RTAs is more than the number of 
WTO members or even the number of countries that exist. 
Additionally, Article XXIV is looked down upon due the lacking relationship between (1) 
Paragraph 4 and 2, and Paragraphs 5 through 9. Paragraph 4 notes:  
“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of trade 
by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration between 
the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also recognize that 
the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate trade 
between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties with such territories. The most important way comes from the 
1999 WTO Appellate Body Report on Turkey Textiles. In its Report, the Appellate 
Body clarified the “purpose” test suggested by Paragraph 4 is relevant to interpret 
the rules of Article XXIV.”121 
2.8. Choosing FTA Partners 
In the 1950s, during the early history of GATT, CUs and FTAs did not have much importance 
in the international trade arena. In the age of trade liberalization RTAs continue to boom rapidly. 
As of June 2016, upon the notification of the RTA between Mongolia and Japan, all WTO 
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members have an RTA in force.122 The two main leaders of the WTO, the U.S.123 and the European 
Communities (EC),124 are increasing their existing networks of RTAs and forming new ones. The 
continued rise of RTAs is not an accurate indicator of global economic efficiency and welfare. 
This rise does not make regionalism a necessary stepping stone to multilateralism. If the rise of 
RTA accomplished these goals, the world would take positive notice. As of August 29, 2017, 445 
notified RTAs are in force mentioning date to GATT or the WTO, most of which occurred in the 
past twenty years (Annexure 2:1 enclosed).125 There are some essential factors to consider in a 
FTA, such as economics, politics, national security, cultural voice, and strategy. National security 
for example, is the basis of the U.S. FTA with Peru and Columbia. This FTA protects against 
narcotics traffickers, counters narcotics terrorism, spreads democracy to those countries, and offers 
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no preferential access for Canada. The formation of some FTAs is due to political criteria for 
example, the FTA between Taiwan and Panama.126   
KORUS is one of the most successful FTAs in the world, and links Korea and the U.S. 
KORUS illustrates the importance of political and financial factors in forging an FTA relationship. 
In June 2006, KORUS formal arrangements began, it was approved by the U.S. Congress in 
October 2011, and commenced operations in March 2012. Korea had to make 22 legal changes in 
its system. This arrangement shows how obtrusive an FTA can be regarding the breadth of its 
scope, and how it influences change in the domestic countries of one or more of the member 
nations. Both parties influenced the accompanying Korean guidelines: Copyright Act; Patent Act; 
Design Protection Act; Trademark Act; Enforcement Regulation on Electrical Appliances Safety 
Control Act; Individual Consumption Tax Act; Regulation on Health Care Insurance Benefit; 
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act; Local Tax Act; Enforcement Regulation on Clean Air Act; Notice on 
the Recognition Criteria for Equivalence for Motor Vehicle Standards; and Utility Model Act. For 
Korea, KORUS implied Korea developed scope through its system of FTAs to 44 nations, 27 of 
which were EU states. 
 Since NAFTA, KORUS is the most vital FTA actualized by the U.S. Korea is the sixth 
major administrations merchant, seventh biggest products exporter and shipper, tenth biggest 
administrations exporter, eleventh biggest market, and thirteenth biggest economy. Korea became 
U.S.'s seventh biggest exchanging accomplice in 2005 (the trade extends up to $72 billion in two-
way exports of goods, and $14 billion in two-way service exchange). It is also the sixth biggest 
                                                 




market for U.S. farming products. The U.S. is Korea's third biggest market by bringing in 17% of 
Korea's worldwide exports. In sum, trade exchange represents about 2/3 of Korea's GDP. 
 
2.9. Trade Facilitation in Regional Trade Agreements 
 All WTO members has experienced RTAs contain obligations reflecting the creation of 
essential trade help at the regional level.127 The counselling of trade help at the WTO, prescribes 
the need to examine the link between the trade help duties in RTAs and the future course of action 
of WTO counselling. The issues WTO people stand up to, regarding differences between trades 
help duties at the commonplace and multilateral levels, is discussed in the present audit review. 
The report similarly analyses steps to take to minimize negative effects.  
 GATT Article XXIV is an exception to the MFN principle of GATT Article I. According 
Article I "any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity" granted by any contracting party to any 
product originating from other contracting parties shall be extended to like products originating 
from other contracting parties. The MFN principle is the ambit of the GATT/WTO system leading 
to the multilateralisation of preferences accorded bilaterally. GATT Article XXIV prevents this 
multilateralisation from operating in a circumscribed setting.   
 
2.10. FTAs in the Multilateral Trade Regime  
 Competitive liberalization means improving universal aggressiveness as the basis 
of a domestic economy. Three levels of trade liberalization are needed to achieve this objective- 
                                                 




regional, bilateral, and multilateral. Liberalization can also occur through the WTO on a 
multilateral level by creating FTAs and traditions unions, on a local or two-sided premise.128 
In summary, competitive liberalization could be achieved by pursuing trade liberalization on the 
three levels of trade and simultaneously moving with reasonable force towards the objective of 
worldwide unhindered commerce. The policy for competitive liberalization presumes shared 
interests in the three levels of trade between and among countries. It assumes that domestic policies 
and country roles determine shared or correlative forms of interests of each nation in the trading 
framework. Competitive liberalization suffers from conceptual and practical problems.  
In contemporary times methodology makers, trade strategists, and scholastics on the whole 
agree that the scourge of fabricated trade obstructions for shielding protectionism twists overall 
trade among sovereign substances and opposes trade affecting overall moneys related welfare. 
Taxes are a weight on the private customers because they pay a higher amount of money for 
imported items and endeavors. 
The obliging government does not have a pay yield from the NTBs. In case duties and 
NTBs cannot buy imported stock or organizations in perspective of prohibitive limits to cross-
edge trade, both may follow up on determinations of buyers. Clearing blocks to unhindered 
business is thought to be the best decision to open up overall welfare through all-inclusive trade 
plainly due to each one of these reasons. However, from time to time, restrictions on imports may 
have non-money thinking mannerisms. Imports may be kept for catering to any common, natural 
prosperity, national or social security interests, etc. On the positive side, less restrictive national 
controls passage are attractive because they make payments for the creators of the conveying 
                                                 





country while creating cross-edge trade.  Notwithstanding, in specific enterprises, arms, atomic 
innovation, natural gear, etc. account for key reasons why governments ordinarily force export 
limitations.129 Diplomats and officials usually boast about business appearances after a trade 
settlement is complete. While worldwide trade can be a fundamental instrument in progressing 
money related headway, it is only a slight of the huge scale fiscal parts of broader budgetary 
change. 
 
2.11. Motivations for FTAs in South Asia 
 An FTA may ensure new market entry and, by lifting an administrative impediment 
blocking endeavors, can open entryways for new a hypothesis. Apart from the impact of 
regionalism on the WTO's multilateralism and their position on this issue, given the nonattendance 
of monetary, political, and key clout of South Asian countries, the WTO is not in a position to 
oversee overall trade exchanges. Thus, South Asian countries should fall behind in building sub-
neighborhood cooperation among themselves, when so many other countries outside South Asia 
are eagerly establishing new, and broadening and deepening, existing FTAs. Thus, SAARC has 
not finished to the extent ensuring fiscal joint exertion among party countries. The execution of 
SAFTA could not return much in financial terms, and it unclear how much SAFTA could return. 
In the Declaration of the eleventh SAARC Summit, SAARC party countries mooted the likelihood 
of moving towards a plan for a South Asian Economic Union.130 The same has been underlined in 
the subsequent summit declarations. 
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 Special game plan, including incomplete inter-member taxes, are totally 
prohibited by the General Agreement aside from seeing that the granddad statements of 
Article I absolved particular assertions already in existence. As a result, GATT Article 
XXIV states that isolation is prohibited unless it is 100% effective.131 
 
2.12. Conclusion 
 GATT Article XXIV mentions also so-called "interim agreements,” which are nothing 
more than agreements which do not fulfill all the requisites for a fully-fledged FTA or CU but 
which should, in the end, lead to a RTA. A CU represents a more developed FTA where the 
member countries apply a common external tariff. In principle, GATT law does not know further 
forms of regional integration. The extreme free-trade possibility is immediate elimination of all 
tariff and non-tariff barriers on all goods and services. Static gains, profiled in neo-classical 
economic analysis of RTAs, emphasize increased imports and exports. Additionally, dynamic 
gains may be achieved. For example, if a FTA creates a better business climate and stimulates 
foreign and domestic investment, then capital formation and productivity may increase.132 Under 
SAFTA the elaborate list of contracting parties reduces the intricacy of tariff liberalization. 
Members of WTO that have forgone their responsibilities of reporting to the WTO regarding the 
ending decision of SAFTA are part of the individual contracting parties. The incorporation of the 
condition of having to inform the WTO as soon as possible was to improve transparency. Under 
the GATT/WTO rules and regulations the South Asian countries signed SAARC Agreement in 
1983 and SAFTA Agreement in 2004, Enforced in 2006 for increasing volume of intra and 
                                                 
131 Kenneth W.  Dam, 'Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATI: The Legacy of a Misconception' 
(1963) 30 University of Chicago Law Review 615, 632-33. 




building good relationship with member states. The following chapters will discuss about both the 


















Chapter 3.1: SAARC: Its agenda, expansion and impending challenges 






South Asia is a densely populated and highly heterogeneous region. Across the core 
group of countries typically designated as South Asia, more than 30 official languages are 
spoken. The region is also diverse in terms of religion, culture and ethnicity.133 
All South Asian countries share their domestic attributes and characteristics. 
However, SAARC member countries’ per capita income is very low.134 It is debated that in 
the late 1940s the U.S. State Department coined the name South Asia as a distinctive 
geopolitical concept following the independence of countries in the Indian 
subcontinent.135After 1947, South Asia began to be viewed as an entity that was distinct from 
the geographic unit under British colonial power. As such, early academic usage of the term 
South Asia (or Southern Asia) highlighted a sense of disconnection between a new 
conception of the region and its previous configuration. Writing in 1950, one author argued, 
''South Asia of today is the child of revolution, of destructive energy, in contradistinction to 
the South Asia of yesterday, the child of the Suez Canal and the outcome of constructive 
effort.''136 
3.1.2. Beginning of SAARC 
Considerable scholarly disagreement exists as to the origins of the idea of establishing 
a framework for regional cooperation in South Asia. Some authors have suggested that the 
idea for the creation of an institution for regional cooperation was mulled over, prior to India 
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and Pakistan's independence, at the March-April 1947 Inter-Asian Relations conference in 
New Delhi, India.137 During the post-colonial realignment phase, one of the most concrete 
proposals for multilateral regional cooperation in Asia was the presentation of the Colombo 
Plan for Cooperative and Social Development. Due to the inclusion of many South Asian 
countries in its inception, the Colombo Plan provided a model for the possibilities offered by 
multilateral engagement.138The Colombo Plan, however, was subsumed under the aegis of a 
larger institutional project, namely the Commonwealth.139As the nations of South Asia began 
to assert a more distinctive foreign policy different from their colonial masters, 
Commonwealth-inspired institutions began to lose their appeal. 
The third phase in the creation of a South Asia regional cooperation organization took 
place in the late 1970s. At the time, emphasis was placed on the creation of a regional 
organization with a distinctive South Asian character and without direct links to all-
encompassing institutions like the Commonwealth. Between 1977 and 1980, Bangladesh's 
president Ziaur Rahman took several trips to India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka to discuss creating a South Asian regional cooperation. In December 1977, while 
visiting Nepal, India, and Pakistan, President Zia presented a proposal for regional 
cooperation between Bangladesh and its neighbors, including an overland trade link between 
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Bangladesh and Pakistan.140 The Bangladeshi press observed that President Zia built strong 
affinity with King Birendra of Nepal. For instance, an editorial in the Bangladesh Times 
commented that President Zia “viewed the evolution of an environment of peace as a 
necessary precondition to welfare in the region.''141 
During his December 1977 visit to India, President Zia substantively discussed the 
idea with India's Prime Minister Morarji Desai and foreign minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. 
The Indian government had been quite receptive to President Zia's call for greater regional 
integration, mainly because Prime Minister Desai had been elected to head a loose coalition 
government in India. To cement the legitimacy of this coalition government in the region, the 
Indian government launched a diplomatic offensive to improve India's relations with her 
neighbors. At the conclusion of the visit, a joint communiqué stressed the prospect for wider 
cooperation between the two countries.142In the midst of a proposal to declare the Indian 
Ocean a “peace zone,” President Zia instead urged that the entire South Asian region be 
declared a “peace zone.”143 
During a period of martial law and consistent press censorship in Bangladesh, 
President Zia's proposal for greater regional integration was widely praised in the leading 
Bangladeshi press. Bangladeshi newspapers uncritically labelled the visit a great success 
because it had opened up the possibility of wider regional cooperation. For instance, the 
Bangladesh Times commented that President Zia's visit to India “... had given new 
opportunities to work concertedly for peace and the reduction of armaments.''144A few days 
later, another editorial in the same newspaper claimed that President Zia “…has proven 
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himself a successful advocate of regional peace and stability, good neighbor lines and 
unhindered national development following his visit to India, Pakistan and Nepal.''145 The 
Bangladesh Observer, another of Bangladesh's leading daily Newspapers, also lavished praise 
on President Zia's accomplishments. 
The Indian press, however, questioned the true motives for President Zia's tour of the 
South Asian countries in December 1977. President Zia rose to power in April 1977, 
following a series of abortive military coups d’état in Bangladesh.146 What President Zia 
seemed to be seeking was more than formal acceptance of his position as Head of State; 
presumably, he wanted to be recognized as a South Asian leader with as much credibility as 
anyone else.147  President Zia, however, was not alone in voicing the need for closer regional 
cooperation in South Asia. Likewise, King Birendra of Nepal echoed this theme in numerous 
public appearances, including in an inaugural speech to the Colombo Plan Consultative 
Committee, of a new regional institution. The subject was later mentioned during King 
Birendra's visit to Bangladesh in January 1978. 
In 1979, President Zia also discussed the idea of creating a South Asian regional 
cooperation organization during the Commonwealth summit in Lusaka, Zambia, and at the 
Non-Aligned Movement summit in Havana, Cuba.148 It is clear that the heads of state of 
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several South Asian Countries, notably Nepal and Bangladesh, believed a regional 
cooperation organization for South Asia was a desirable option. Ultimately, though, the 
proposal for the creation of a South Asian regional forum was partially motivated by a 
number of internal considerations in Bangladesh. In an effort to reorient Bangladesh's foreign 
policy from an overt reliance on India, President Zia wished to diversify and increase the 
country's allies and strategic partners. To that effect, he was drawn to the idea of Bangladesh 
joining ASEAN, and he took steps to make that possible. Intellectually, the seminal proposal 
for the creation of SAARC on the basis of economic integration, as formulated by President 
Zia, was also influenced by an initiative from Shah A.M.S. Kibria, Bangladesh's Foreign 
Secretary from 1978 to 1981. Having served as a founding director of the Regional 
Cooperation for Development (RCD), a regional developmental agency established between 
Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in July 1964, Kibria wanted to replicate this organization in South 
Asia.149 According to Syed Moazzem Ali, Bangladesh's foreign secretary from 1999 to 2001, 
Kibria drafted the initial proposal outlining the justification for the launching of a South 
Asian regional association.150 President Zia dispatched special envoys to all the heads of state 
and governments in South Asia in a letter dated May 2, 1980.151In this letter, he urged them 
to strongly consider the idea of creating a regional institution akin to ASEAN serving as an 
economic cooperation zone for the region.iSouth Asia's regional leaders provided detailed 
responses to President Zia's proposals, which were in turn evaluated by Bangladesh's 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By November 1980, a document that was entitled “Paper on the 
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Proposal for Regional Cooperation in South Asia” had been prepared and circulated.  In 
response to this, the Sri Lankan government agreed to convene a meeting of all the South 
Asian foreign secretaries, which duly took place on February 13, 1981. 
At the first SAARC summit in 1985, Bangladesh's Foreign Secretary Faruq 
Choudhury looked back at the evolution of the association and noted that ''the first indication 
of the encouraging response of the six governments was available at an informal meeting of 
the Foreign Ministers of the seven countries during the non-aligned foreign ministers' 
meeting in New Delhi in 1981.''152Two months later, the foreign secretaries of all seven 
countries in South Asia met again in Colombo, Sri Lanka from April 21-23, 1981, just a 
month before President Zia's assassination. India's foreign secretary, R.D. Sathe, was reported 
to have suggested that India ''approached the proposal for a summit rather cautiously voicing 
the opinion that considerable side work would have to be done before this by identifying 
areas of co-operation.'' Contrary to expectations, the meeting turned out to be one of the most 
important to take place prior to the creation of SAARC. A joint announcement issued at the 
end of the meeting set out concrete areas of cooperation that were mutually acceptable to all 
parties. 
One commentator at the meeting observed that ''despite the constraints of different 
kinds besetting the foreign secretaries it needs to be noted that the proceedings of the 
conference were marked by an extraordinary degree of mutual accommodation and 
appreciation of each other's point of view.''153 The foreign secretaries' meeting led to a foreign 
ministers' meeting in New Delhi from August 1-2, 1983. According to one observer, the 1983 
South Asian foreign minister' meeting—the “first of its kind in the region”—was “remarkable 
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for the atmosphere of cordiality and comradeship that pervaded it.”154 The 1983 Declaration 
on South Asian Regional Cooperation outlined seven objectives, three principles, and two 
general provisions.155 As other authors have noted, the 1983 foreign ministers' meeting is 
significant because it was in this setting that the aims and objectives of that which evolved 
into SAARC were framed.156For instance, many sections of the 1983 Declaration were 
eventually replicated verbatim in the SAARC Charter. 
3.1.2.1 Responses of South Asian States: 
Initially, the idea of a regional forum in South Asia seemed to present more threats 
and concerns than opportunities to India. The basic fear was that neighboring countries would 
become a united front against India to resolve their bilateral issues. In this era, the key 
challenge for India and Pakistan was to maintain their relations with their extra-regional 
partners, namely the Soviet Union and the U.S. during the war in Afghanistan. 
 
3.1.3. Launch of SAARC 
Following the 1983 foreign ministers' meeting in New Delhi, leaders from South Asia 
committed themselves to forming a regional institution. Consequently, the first SAARC 
summit was held from December 7-8, 1985.157 The Annexure 3:1 Map shows the member of 
SAARC Countries at present. SAARC provides a stage where South Asian people may work 
together in a spirit of friendship, trust and understanding. SAARC aims to promote the 
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welfare of the inhabitants of South Asia and to improve their quality of life through faster 
economic growth, social development, and cultural improvement in the area.158 
 
3.1.4. SAARC Charter: 
The first SAARC summit included the heads of state from seven South Asian 
countries: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The 
Charter’s fundamental principle can be summed up by the following statement that explains 
that SAARC: ''…will create an atmosphere which will reverse the process injected into South 
Asia by colonial powers and intensified by the countries themselves after those powers had 
left.”159 For instance, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi read verses (in Bengali) from Kazi Nazrul 
Ialam's poem, “Chalo re chalo re chalo” (“Let's go, let's go, let's go”). According to press 
reports, Rajiv Gandhi's reading of the poem drew “heavy applause from those assembled.”160 
Not to be outdone, President Ershad released a poem entitled “Seven Perfumed Prospects.”161 
An editorial in the Hindustan Times argued: “Pakistan leaders have hardly ever missed an 
opportunity to raise the question of Kashmir whenever they can.”162 The delegates at the first 
SAARC summit formally adopted the SAARC Charter, the association's principal governing 
document. The SAARC Charter is divided into 10 articles and includes a preamble. In the 
preamble, the signatories to the Charter pledged to promote “. . . peace, stability, amity and 
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progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and Non-Alignment.”163 
The preamble to the SAARC Charter also embraced general principles of “... 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, non-use of force and non-
interference in the internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes.”164 
 
3.1.5. Agenda and Areas of Cooperation: 
The Association works in the following areas: agriculture and rural development; 
health and population activities; women, youth and children; environment and forestry; 
science and technology; transport and human resource development; biotechnology; and 
tourism and energy. The leaders of the member countries stated in the SAARC Charter that 
they were: 
“Desirous of promoting peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through 
strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and Non-Alignment, 
particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
national independence, non-use of force and non-interference in the internal affairs of 
other states and peaceful settlement of all disputes.”165 
As soon as SAARC was established, the U.N., and the European Economic 
Community (E.E.C.) were eager to promote regional cooperation in South Asia, and their 
interest was welcomed by the SAARC member states. External sources of funding, as per the 
Charter, are considered a last resort to support SAARC programs. There has been a strong 
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commitment of the political leadership of the member states on this matter, as was reflected 
in the declaration of the Sixth SAARC Summit (Colombo, 1991). The heads of state or 
government resolved to encourage consultations among delegations of SAARC countries at 
all international fora and to promote articulation of joint positions where such action would 
be in the interest of all. They felt that the development of a collective position in international 
fora would accord them greater credibility and enhance the international profile of South 
Asia.166 
The SAARC Charter was designed with the existing symmetry among the member 
states in mind in terms of size, population, economic status and military strength, especially 
with reference to India and the rest of the region. This was not only reflected in the key 
principles of the organization, but also in the central objectives focusing on the Association 
contributing to “mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another's 
problems.”167By recognizing the significance of cooperation at all levels, the SAARC Charter 
encourages all other mechanisms of regionalism. There is a provision in the SAARC Charter 
for sub-regionalism, as mentioned by a divisional head. 
The charter reflects the functionalist approach to regionalism. The limitations of the 
SAARC Charter are a reflection of the nature of bilateral relations among the SAARC 
members and this fact is reflected somewhat in the area of cooperation among the members. 
However, the process has been flexible enough for cooperation beyond the charter, especially 
through working together in sensitive areas, such as terrorism and transnational crime. 
 
3.1.6. SAARC Concurrence: 
                                                 
166Id. at art. 1. 




SAARC has maintained some of its key features since its commencement, but over 
time it has been modified, and changed as well. The fundamental purposes and principles are 
as follows: 
3.1.6.1. Purposes 
• Promotion of peace, stability and amity within the region 
• Advancement of social welfare and improvement of quality of life 
• National and collective self-reliance 
• Acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
• Mutual assistance in economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields 
• Cooperation with other developing countries 
• Cooperation between member states in international forums on matters of common 
interest 
• Cooperation to bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region 
 
3.1.6.2. Principles 
• Respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political 
independence 
• Renunciation of the use or threat of force 
• Non-interference in the internal affairs of other member states 
• Peaceful settlement of all disputes 
• Complement to bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the region168 
 
3.1.7. Structure of SAARC and institutional cost sharing for regional 
centers: 
                                                 




SAARC covers almost all crucial areas that are of relevance to its members, except 
for conflict resolution. With certain developments in the region and beyond, SAARC's 
structure has experienced transformation. Every two years, the head of SAARC countries sit 
together and discuss main issues of the organization. The SAARC summit is usually held in a 
nation determined by alphabetical order and program costs are shared as follows.169 
 
TABLE 3: 1 PROGRAMING COST SHARING (EFFECTIVE SINCE DECEMBER 2006) 
Country Equal Share of 24% Assessed Share of 76% Total Share % 
1 2 3 4=2+3 
Afghanistan 3% 2% 5 
Bangladesh 3% 7.72% 10.72 
Bhutan 3% 2% 5 
India 3% 27.32% 30.32 
Maldives 3% 2% 5 
Nepal 3% 7.72% 10.72 
Pakistan 3% 19.52% 22.52 
Sri Lanka 3% 7.72% 10.72 
 
Every Member is equally obliged to bear 3% of total program expenses first and then 
the remainder of the 76% expenses are divided as per the figures in column 3, above. Finally, 
Afghanistan, Bhutan and Maldives bear only 5% of the expenses each; Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka and Nepal bear only 10.72% each; Pakistan 22.52 and rest 30.32% of expenses bear by 
India. 
                                                 






The SAARC Secretariat has established some regional centers for promoting member 
states’ regional cooperation. Regional Centers are governed and run by Governing Boards 
comprising of representatives from all the Member States, the SAARC Secretary-General, 
and the Ministry of Foreign/External Affairs of the Host Government. Respective directors of 
the Centre act as Member Secretary to the Governing Board, which reports to the 
Programming Committee of the SAARC Secretariat.170The main objective of the SAARC 
organization is the lasting peace and prosperity of its member nations.171These Regional 
Centers are as follows: 


















2007 Promotion of agricultural 
Research &Development 
(R&D) as well as 
technology dissemination 
initiatives for sustainable 
agricultural development 












2015 SEDMC main mission is 
providing policy advice and 
facilitating capacity 
building services including 
strategic learning, research, 
training, system 
development, expertise 
promotion and exchange of 
information for effective 
disaster risk reduction and 
for planning and 
coordinating a rapid 
regional response 
Merge with the 
SAARC Coastal Zone 
Management Centre 
(SCZMC) in the 





Forestry Centre (SFC) 
in Bhutan, and the 
SAARC Disaster 
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mechanism to disasters 
within the region. 
Management Centre 









1992 Goal of SAARC TB and 
HIV/AIDS Centre is to 
minimize the mortality and 
morbidity due to TB and 
HIV/AIDS in the Region 
and to minimize the 
transmission of both 
infections until TB and 
HIV/AIDS cease to be 
major public health 










1994 It acts as depository of 
information including 
regional and international 
databases on various 
disciplines as well as 
development matters. The 
Centre conducts training 
courses in the area of 














1999 Research, impart training, 
disseminate information on 
HRD related issues, and 
advise the Member states on 

















Nepal  SAARC Information Centre 
(SIC) is making concerted 
efforts to take the activities 





 SAARC to the wider 
audience within and outside 
region. For this the SIC is 
working towards creating a 
strong network of 
communication both inside 









2006 Centre will provide 
technical inputs to the 
SAARC working group 
















 Centre intended to cater to 
all forms of art such as 
performing arts (e.g. dance, 
music, drama, theatre, 
puppetry and folk culture), 
visual art (e.g. painting, 
sculpture, film making, 
photography) and literature 
as per the provisions made 










Dhaka   Abolished in 
December 31, 2015 
 
The SAARC Member States agreed to a set of rules for how the organization shall 
work. Through an agreed SAARC schema, it is clear that a country hosting a center is 




divided according to the following ratios. For instance, Pakistan is hosting an institution then 
the cost divided by the following share percentag 
TABLE 3: 3 INSTITUTIONAL COST SHARING (EFFECTIVE SINCE DECEMBER 2006) 
Country 
Equal share of 
14.40% 





1 2 3 4 = (2+3) 
Afghanistan 1.80% 1.20 3 
Bangladesh 1.80% 4.63 6.43 
Bhutan 1.80% 1.20 3 
India 1.80% 16.40 18.20 
Maldives 1.80% 1.20 3 
Nepal 1.80% 4.63 6.43 
Pakistan (40%) 1.80% 11.71 53.51 
Sri Lanka 1.80% 4.63 6.43 
                                                 



































Agriculture & Rural Development (ARD) 
Division  
Environment, Biotechnology (EBO) Div. 
Economic, Trade & Finance (ETE) 
Division  
Social Affairs Division  
Information & Poverty Alleviation (IPA) 
Division  
Energy, Tourism & Science (ETS) 
Division 
Human Resource Development, Security 

















• Decisions at all levels based on unanimity 
• Bilateral and contentious issues are excluded from deliberations 
• Meeting of the Heads of States or Government (summits) as highest level of decision-
making.173 
3.1.8. Discussion of Specific Articles: SAARC Organization 
Article X of the SAARC Charter delineates only two general provisions. The first 
provision is that “decisions at all levels shall be taken on the basis of unanimity.”174 In a 
region where sharp disagreements on a wide number of issues are prevalent, the SAARC 
Charter provides that “bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from the 
deliberations.”175 Article III of the SAARC Charter specifies that the heads of state or 
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(Director Generals of Foreign Ministries) 
Working Groups  




government of the entire SAARC member states must meet at least once a year or more as 
deemed necessary by the member states.176 Article IV provides that this Council be composed 
of the foreign ministers of all the member states. The SAARC Charter also specifies that this 
body is responsible for formulating policies, reviewing progress, deciding on new areas of 
cooperation, establishing additional mechanisms as deemed necessary, and deciding on other 
matters of general interest to the association.177 At the secondary level, a Standing Committee 
assists the Council of Ministers in executing the Council’s duties.178 According to Article V, 
membership in the Standing Committee is to be provided to all the foreign secretaries of the 
SAARC member states. Article V also requires that the Standing Committee have the 
following functions: 
• Overall monitoring and coordination of programs of cooperation; 
• Approval of projects and programs, and the modalities of their financing; 
• Determination of inter-sectoral priorities; 
• Mobilization of regional and external resources; and 
• Identification of new areas of cooperation based on appropriate studies179 
 
Article V also states that the Standing Committee “shall meet as often as deemed 
necessary.”180 Moreover, it specifies that the remit of the Standing Committee shall be to 
“submit periodic reports to the Council of Ministers and make reference to it as and when 
necessary for decision on policy matters.”181 Article VI provides that the Technical 
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Committees “shall be responsible for the implementation, cooperation and monitoring of the 
programs in their respective areas of cooperation.”182 
The terms of reference of the Technical Committees is outlined in Article VI of the 
SAARC Charter. These include: 
• Determination of the potential and the scope of regional cooperation in agreed 
areas; 
• Formulation of programs and preparation of projects; 
• Determination of financial implications of sectoral programs; 
• Formulation of recommendations regarding apportionment of costs; 
• Implementation and cooperation of sectoral programs; and 
• Monitoring of progress in implementation183 
 
The SAARC Charter mandates that the Technical Committees submit periodic reports 
to the Standing Committee.184To fulfill its mandate, the SAARC Charter enables the 
Technical Committees to use a wide range of mechanisms and modalities, including: 
• Meetings of heads of national technical agencies; 
• Meeting of experts in specific fields; and 
• Contact among recognized centers of excellence in the region. 
Moreover, the SAARC Charter enables the Technical Committees to set up ad hoc 
Action Committees “comprising Member States concerned with implementation of projects 
involving more than two but not all Member States.”185 The Technical Committees formulate 
programs and prepare projects in their respective fields of expertise. 
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On a day-to-day basis, much of the actual work involving SAARC is directed from its 
Secretariat. 186 











Article VIII of the SAARC Charter merely states, rather parsimoniously, that “there 
shall be a Secretariat of the Association.”187 The Standing Committee of Foreign Secretaries 
informally mulled over the idea of establishing a permanent secretariat in Nepal or 
Bangladesh. 
Based on the provisions of the 1986 Memorandum of Understanding, a permanent 
SAARC Secretariat was to be established in Kathmandu, Nepal. A few months after the 
signing of the 1986 MoU, the SAARC Secretariat was inaugurated on January 16, 1987 by 
King Birendra of Nepal and was attended by all the foreign ministers of the SAARC Member 
States.188 
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Article VIII of the 1986 MoU on the Establishment of the Secretariat outlines the 
functions and powers of the SAARC Secretary General and provides a more precise 
structural framework for the composition and aims of the SAARC Secretariat. Broadly, the 
secretary general's powers are circumscribed by the Standing Committee and by the Council 
of Ministers. For instance, the secretary general is expected to report regularly to the Standing 
Committee for approval by the Council of Ministers.189 
One of the striking structural features of the association is its financing mechanism. 
Article IX of the SAARC Charter provides for the financial arrangements of the association. 
In this financial set-up, “the contribution of each Member State towards financing of the 
activities of the Association shall be voluntary.”190 The SAARC Charter entrusts each 
Technical Committee to “make recommendations for the apportionment of costs of 
implementing the programs proposed by it.”191 In the operational functioning of the 
association, the SAARC Secretary General plays an important role. 
However, as Article VIII specifies, the Secretary General “shall be guided by the 
decision of the Council of Ministers that initiatives for collaboration with external agencies 
should stem from SAARC itself based on its own determination of priorities and keeping in 
mind the relevant provisions of the SAARC Charter.”192 
 
3.1.9. SAARC Summits 
Between the inaugural SAARC 1985 summit and the 2014 summit, a total of 18 
summits193 have been held (see annexure 3.2) in different member countries. Both the 
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SAARC Secretariat and the Working Divisions play a particularly important role in the 
design of each summit. The Secretariat selects potential issues of interest to be discussed at 
the summit and advises the country convening the summit on its precise framework. 
Eventually, the Secretariat provides guidance to a programming committee that is set up in 
advance of the actual summit. 
The standing committee then draws up a draft of the agenda to be discussed at the 
summit and presents it at the foreign secretaries meeting that precedes all SAARC summits. 
Subsequently, a meeting of foreign ministers takes place at which the proposed agenda is 
evaluated. Ministers have the option to approve the agenda in its entirety or to refer some 
issues. 
3.1.10. The Enlargement of SAARC 
SAARC, like other regional and multilateral institutions, has struggled to enlarge its 
membership. This phenomenon should not be surprising to students of institutions. On the 
one hand, rationalist and public choice theoretical approaches to the study of institutions 
would suggest that distributional conflicts and political tensions are likely to arise during and 
enlargement process based on the expected redistribution of enlargement gains and relative 
losses after expansion. At the same time, although governments may be expected to pursue 
self-interested preferences and goals, it is also possible to understand the association's 
enlargement process from a more informal desire to expand common regional values and 
norms. So far, SAARC has expanded its membership once, but as we will see, there are 
continuing pressures from other countries to join this regional body. 
3.1.11. Regionalism and Multilateralism 
Given the location of the member countries, it is logical to portray SAARC as a 
regional institution. John Ruggie defines a multilateral organization as one that is “defined by 
such generalized decision-making rules as voting for consensus procedures,” and this 




conceptualized within the international relations theories. A regional and multilateral 
institution cannot be differentiated on the basis of a voting system which exists in most 
multilateral systems-some institutions do not have them only-since the procedure is neither 
elaborate nor thorough enough to articulate the distinctiveness of each system. For instance, 
the voting procedures of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) have dwindled over the years even though they had an intricate start. On that 
note, since the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea did not involve an alternative to voting, 
it was considered a major step in decision making by approval. The initial stages of 
institutionalization result in an inherent tension between the existing institutional 
arrangements (e.g. the constituent colonial administrative units prior to the end of the colonial 
period) and the transforming institutional modalities (e.g., the post-independence landscape 
in South Asia after 1947). 
Institutions like SAARC, which do not require the destruction or replacement of 
existing institutions, face the added challenge of legitimizing the emerging institution with 
the presence of already existing competing institutions. A transitional phase enables emerging 
institutions to be viewed through the prism of existing institutions. Principally, an 
International institutional theory tends to at best oversimplify institutional distinctiveness to a 
lone identity, thus undermining their uniqueness. However, in the case of SAARC, the 
prominent effect of multilateralism has to be considered in order to build a regional identity. 
From the constructivist perspective, identity is viewed as a mechanism to explain state 
practice, interests, and interactions internationally. According to Hopf, constructivism 
assumes that "the selves, or identities, of states are a variable; they likely depend on 
historical, cultural, political, and social context.  "In this framework, identity is understood to 
be a "particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular 





3.1.12. SAARC: Relation with intergovernmental organizations 
SAARC has linked up with quite a few intergovernmental organizations. 23 
Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) were signed with myriads of intergovernmental 
organizations namely, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO, 2008); two UN agencies (UNDP, 1995 & UNODC 1995); the United Nations 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR, 2008); and other UN agencies such 
as (UNESCAP 1994; UNDP 1995; UNODC 1995; UNIFEM 2001; UNAIDS 2004; & UNEP 
2007), between 1993 and 2010 alone. 
SAARC also signed more MoUs with the World Health Organization (WHO, 2000), 
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU, 1997), Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO, 2004), and the World Bank (WB, 2004). Even though it is difficult to pin 
point any initiatives undergone with respect to these associations, SAARC considers the 
association with UNs major agencies a kinship with UN 
To endorse their developmental goals, SAARC joined forces with agencies for development 
on a regional, environmental and national scale. Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA, 1997), Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and the Pacific (CIRDAP, 
2007), Asia Pacific Tele-community (APT, 1994), South Asia Cooperation Environment 
Program (SACEP, 2004), Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2004), Japan Special Fund (JSF, 
2006), the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC, 2006) are a few of the organizations 
MoUs have been signed with by SAARC. SAARC also collaborates with multiple 
organizations on different projects without the signing MoUs. A few examples of 
organizations in this category are, the German Society for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit, GTZ), the International Standards 
Organization (ISO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and the 




plainly expressions of interests. So, whether or not it was rather beneficial or not remains a 
question.194 
 
3.1.13. Accession of Afghanistan 
In sum, according to the constructivist understanding, state identity formation and 
state interest are inherently linked.  As mentioned earlier, one of the biggest and most 
important challenges faced by SAARC has been its proposed enlargement of the association 
beyond its seven founding members. Ever since its inception only one additional country has 
been granted membership in the association. In November 2005, Afghanistan formally 
requested that it be permitted to join SAARC. Naturally, the inclusion of a new member 
resulted in significant public debate which centered on the expected benefits to be derived 
from adding an unstable, war-torn country in to an already volatile regional cooperation 
framework. The question of dilution of the South Asian identity was also raised. 
After some initial reluctance and considerable internal debates, the inclusion of 
Afghanistan as the eighth member of SAARC was announced during the 13th SAARC 
summit held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on November 12-13, 2005. In an interview, the Indian 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared, "we have agreed to admit Afghanistan as a 
member of the SAARC."195 Bangladesh's Ex-prime minister Begum Khaleda Zia declared 
that she was happy to announce that the SAARC leaders have admitted Afghanistan as a full 
member of SAARC, subject to completion of formalities.196 Subsequently, officials from the 
government of Afghanistan were invited to attend SAARC meetings and the draft modalities 
were finalized at the 27th SAARC Council of Minister's meeting held on 31 July -2 August 
                                                 
194SAEZ, The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC): An emerging collaboration 
architecture. 2011. 
195Nasreen, “Inclusion of Afghanistan in SAARC: From Reluctance to Sudden Rush.” 




2006 in Dhaka. Eventually, Afghanistan was formally inducted into the association's 
declaration, agreements, and legal documents, during the 14th SAARC summit held in Delhi, 
India, on 3-4 April 2007. 
 
3.1.14. SAARC Observers 
SAARC observers who are also multilateral organizations are the prime reason 
SAARC could not expand its tentacles. The People’s Republic of Japan and China were two 
of the first countries approved for the status of an observer. India opposed China’s inclusion 
as an observer as noted by the Pakistani media, but this was not the only incongruity that had 
formed between the participating nations on the topic of who could receive the observer 
status. Hence a meeting of Council of Ministers was arranged in Dhaka on August 2006, 
where 27 of them partook. United States, South Korea, and EU applications or observer 
status at SAARC was also reviewed in the meeting. In 2008, the 15th SAARC Summit was 
organized in Colombo, Sri Lanka and there the members developed with the observers, a 
Guidelines for Cooperation. As of today, the SAARC observer status lies with only one 
international organization and eight nations. 
TABLE 3: 4 LISTS OF SAARC OBSERVERS 
Country or Multilateral Institutions197 Date of Joining198 
China 2005 
Japan 2005 
European Union 2005 
South Korea 2006 
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Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) 2008 
 
There are varying degrees of interest and motivation regarding participating in 
SAARC summits as an observer, but the underlying assumption is that South Asia is an 
important economic and political hub. This is made clearer in the opinion of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, which notes that SAARC is “an association significant for its ability 
to provide a platform for the stability and development of the South Asia region". Australia 
has also issued official statements to reiterate its desire to engage with SAARC in order to 
enhance closer ties with individual SAARC nations on issues of trade, education, science and 
technology cooperation and counter-terrorism.199 
In official statements, Australia has also reiterated the benefit of engaging with 
SAARC in order to enhance closer ties with individual SAARC nations on the issues of trade, 
education, science and technology cooperation and counter-terrorism. It is to be understood 
that a growing number of SAARC observes represents both challenges and opportunities 
regarding the sustainability of the association. There is a risk of the dilution of the core 
functions of the institutions due to the involvement of too many international observers with 
great political and economic influence in the region. Special attention from China is 
particularly understandable because of the country’s commercial interest in South Asia. 
                                                 
199 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia, “Australia invited as observer to the South Asian 




China has begun to see SAARC as a potential instrument to facilitate and consolidate Chinese 
engagement in South Asia. 
In recent years, other countries have expressed active interest in achieving full 
membership in SAARC. In 2008, Myanmar requested an application for full membership in 
SAARC. 200Iran also has studied the possibility of accession to SAARC. 201 Myanmar's 
unconvincing bid to become a SAARC member failed, but China and Iran attempted to join 
SAARC in 2010 using a rather understated approach. 
 
3.1.15. The Major Challenges Facing SAARC 
The history of SAARC since its foundation to the present day has not been smooth. 
Deep-rooted mistrust and disbelief among some of the neighboring countries motivated by 
perceptions of the region’s history, has impeded collective progress. The SAARC process has 
often faltered for various reasons, leading to postponements or cancellations of summit 
meetings, in some cases painfully, at the last minute. This has caused frustration and 
disillusionment.202. 
3.1.15.1. Political Challenges 
SAARC was born at a time when there were domestic and interstate security crises in 
the region; this caused SAARC to shy out as an organization.203 (Naik, 1999:334 in Ahmed, 
2000).  Due to their negative national attitudes towards SAARC, India and Pakistan half-
heartedly welcomed SAARC. Therefore, in the earlier years, regional cooperation was almost 
paralyzed. Each member state of SAARC follows a rigid foreign policy. For example, 
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Pakistan has returned to its traditional position on SAARC vis-a-vis India, which is linked to 
the resolution of the Kashmir dispute - "the core issue", as stated by a Pakistan representative 
at the SAARC Secretariat. 
However, formulation of a foreign policy relating to national policy aims is not just 
limited to South Asia because this is the general practice in international organizations (Haas 
1956:241). According to a delegate at the SAARC Secretariat, in any regional cooperation 
there are competing interests among the member states. That has been the case of SAARC. 
Therefore, it has even been difficult for SAARC to take action in certain areas because each 
country has its own priorities. 
A renowned Nepali political analyst argued: 
“Each country has different images. Each country has different capabilities 
and also each country has different perceptions of the other neighbors and they 
have different intentions. Unless, they are harmonized into a common regional 
identity, no matter size varies, no matter histories differ, and we cannot cope with 
the future challenges until we come together.”204 
The SAARC process was initiated on the basic assumption of functionalism, i.e. that 
economic cooperation leading to economic integration would pave the way for peace and 
stability in the region; therefore, there is a need to evaluate the progress of SAARC in a wide 
range of so-called uncontroversial areas to test the success of the functionalist approach. 
3.1.15.2. Institutional Challenges 
For SAARC to be more active, the Secretariat needs to have a direct and efficient 
mechanism of communication with its member states. SAARC intended to provide for the 
welfare of South Asians, but its target group is hardly aware of its role. A high-ranking 
official from the SAARC Secretariat at Maldives stated, “caution with the media” as a reason 
                                                 




for poor communication, suggesting limited outreach in the mainstream media; though there 
was a decision at the Thirty-sixth Programme to overturn this situation.  Since emerging and 
third world countries constitute to the South Asian region they tend to prioritize national 
welfare to regional development. Some countries do not pay much attention to regional 
cooperation because they are fully occupied with their domestic affairs, development issues. 
For instance, for Bhutan, the country's infrastructural development is a prime concern and for 
Afghanistan, the obligations towards SAARC are difficult, due to the country's persistent 
instability. 
For some SAARC member states, it has been hard to commit financially to every 
initiative of the organization. A SAARC Secretariat representative disclosed that Bhutan, the 
Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka have already expressed several times that there might be 
difficulties for them to financially contribute towards the South Asian University (SAU). 
Another SAARC official admitted that, being a member state of SAARC involves certain 
financial implications as Afghanistan has to contribute five per cent towards the overall 
budget of SAARC. 
3.1.16. Conclusion 
The enlargement of SAARC, the inclusion of Afghanistan despite reservations by the 
largest member state of SAARC, India, demonstrates that the landscape of South Asia can be 
flexible in opening itself up to other countries. It is not implausible that countries with strong 
historical roots on the Indian subcontinent such as Myanmar and, even, country’s like 
Mauritius, might become member countries of SAARC. However, the reservations and the 
controversy surrounding the inclusion of Afghanistan have highlighted the question of the 














The Committee of Experts (COE) was set up at the 10th South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit. The COE comprised of a nominee of each Member 
State, whose job was to draft a comprehensive treaty framework for establishing a free trade 
agreement (FTA) among the members of the SAARC, taking into consideration, inter alia, the 
irregularities in development within it. The COE was, mandated by member States, to draw up a 
treaty that is compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The treaty was 
to be drawn in particular with the rules relating to regional integration.205 The SAFTA was 
signed on 6 January 2004 during the 12th SAARC Summit in Islamabad and was effective after 
1 January 2006. 206 Among the members was an important and apparent realization regarding the 
vital importance of intra-SAARC trade? This dream was the SAFTA. The purpose of this dream 
was to make it the South Asian counterpart of NAFTA.207 
Alongside a regional PTA, the member States of SAARC were exploring the options of 
bilateral trade agreements. As a result of this exploration the India-Sri Lanka FTA was signed in 
1998. 208 Additionally, the Pakistan-Sri Lanka FTA was signed in 2002.209 Perhaps, similarities 
can be drawn with the Uruguay rounds where the member countries of the GATT were 
negotiating for bi partisan PTAs alongside the negotiations of the WTO. The binding factor in 
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both cases is the apprehensiveness of the member parties regarding the effectiveness of the larger 
trade agreement, namely WTO or SAFTA. Similar to the trend of difference between WTO 
concessions and concessions in most PTAs, these bilateral deals in theory offers better prospects 
than what the SAFTA does. Besides direct trade effects and administrative complications of 
these bilateral PTAs among the member states of the SAFTA, member states are likely to raise 
the institutional challenge that PTAs raise for the WTO. Member states are likely to hinder and 
weaken the trade liberalization framework of the SAARC in the same way that many observers 
believe that PTAs hinder and weaken the WTO.  
 
3.2.2. Objectives and Main Principles of the Agreement: 
Textually, the SAFTA aspires to advance trade and economic cooperation among the 
member states by, inter alia: 
“(I)  dismantling trade barriers and facilitating the cross-border movement of goods 
between their respective territories; 
(II) Promoting fair competition in the free trade area and ensuring equitable benefits 
to each signatory with due consideration to respective levels and pattern of economic 
development; 
(III) Creating useful means for the implementation and application of the Agreement 
and for the resolution of any disputes that may arise under it; and 
(IV) Setting up a structure for more regional cooperation to augment the mutual 
benefits of the Agreement.”210 
                                                 




“This Agreement supersedes the Agreement on SAARC Preferential Trading 
Arrangement (SAPTA).”211 “Each party to the SAFTA have agreed to grant national treatment to 
imports from another signatory to the Agreement in consonant with the national treatment 
provisions as enshrined in Article III of the GATT.”212 This is only applicable for the non-WTO 
members of SAFTA as the member states are already eligible for this treatment due to the 
national treatment rules of GATT. 
 
3.2.3. Tariff Reduction Scheme 
Article 7 of the Agreement provides for the modality of tariff reduction called ‘Trade 
Liberalization Programme’ (TLP). The TLP provides a distinction between developing and Least 
Developed Country (LDC) contracting parties of the SAFTA. The LDC are those that are 
classified as such by the UN.213 They are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and 
Nepal. The Maldives has been granted a special concession that even if it graduates from the 
LDC to developing country status in the UN, it will continue to be accorded LDC status under 
the SAFTA as well as all subsequent contractual arrangements framed under it.214 All Member 
States but Nepal and Sri Lanka had commenced the TLP on 1 July 2006 and Nepal and Sri 
Lanka did this with effect from 1 August 2006 and 16 September 2006, respectively.215 
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TABLE 3: 5 TARIFF LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM UNDER SAFTA 
Serial 
No. 
Country Date of 
implementation 
Percentage of Tariff Reduction  
1 All member states July 01, 2006 TLP Start  
2 All Member States By 2016 0%-5%  
3 Developing Countries By 2013 0%-5%  
4 Sri Lanka By 2014 0%-5%  
5 Non-LDCs By 2008 from existing tariff rates to 20%  




The TLP sets the target of reduction of tariffs to 0%–5% within ten years of coming into 
force of the Agreement, that is, by 2016. The SAFTA aims at reduction of tariffs to 20% (30% 
for LDCs) by 2008 and between 0% and 5% before 2013 by developing contracting parties (for 
Sri Lanka, it is 2014) but allows the LDC contracting parties to reduce tariffs to 0%–5% by 
2016.216 
Tariff cuts through PTAs only have any commercial effect when there is a gap between 
applied MFN217 tariff rate and the preferential tariff rate. As the initial tariff cut was too shallow, 
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preferential tariff cut of only 20% or 30% in the initial two years could have made preferential 
tariff rate higher than applied MFN tariff for some goods. For those products, preferential tariff 
would have made no sense. To address this anomaly, a special rule has been created for those 
products for which applied tariff rate in developing contacting parties at the time of the entry into 
force of the Agreement was below 20% (below 30% in LDC contracting parties). In the case of 
those products for which applied MFN tariff rates of respective non- LDCs were below 20% 
when the preferential tariff treatment commenced, tariffs were to be reduced on actual margin of 
preference basis of 10% on the applied rate for each of the initial two years.218 In the case of 
those products for which applied MFN tariff rates of respective LDCs were below 30% when the 
preferential tariff treatment commenced, tariffs were to be reduced on actual margin of 
preference basis of 5% on the applied rate for each of the initial two years.219 A dismaying aspect 
of the TLP is that there is no obligation to reduce to zero or even reduce below 5% in all areas 
over time. This lack of stipulation on the total elimination of tariffs significantly limits the 
intensity of the tariff concessions. 
The SAFTA allows member countries to notify the sensitive or negative list. This is a list 
of products that will not enjoy concessional import duties. Whereas under the SAPTA, tariffs 
were reduced only in cases of goods specified in the Agreement, under the SAFTA, tariffs are 
removed or reduced for all products apart from those falling on each country’s sensitive products 
list. Textually, this is a step forward. However, the efficacy of this negative list approach has 
been severely limited by the very long list of products in the sensitive category of individual 
countries. Initially, Afghanistan had a single sensitive list of 1,072 tariff lines for LDCs and non-
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LDCs alike; Bangladesh had a sensitive list of 1,249 tariff lines for the LDC members and 1,254 
tariff lines for non-LDC members; Bhutan had a consolidated list of 157 tariff lines; India had 
744 tariff lines for LDCs and 884 tariff lines for non-LDCs; the Maldives had a consolidated list 
of 681 tariff lines; Nepal had 1,299 tariff lines for LDCs and 1,335 tariff lines for non-LDCs; 
Pakistan had a single list of 1,191 tariff lines; and Sri Lanka had a consolidated list of 1,071 tariff 
lines.220 
The sensitive list of member countries will be assessed every four years or earlier as the 
SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC) may decide with a view to trimming them, but there is no 
condition of any compulsory cutback.221 Agricultural products take priority in the sensitive list. 
Despite the non-existence of a binding provision for trimming the sensitive list in the Agreement, 
the experience of the first round of revision of the sensitive list is modestly positive. First, it has 
been conducted before the treaty requirement of four years. Second, all contracting parties except 
Afghanistan and the Maldives have pruned their respective sensitive list. 
Under this revised scheme, currently Bangladesh has tariff lines for 1,231 LDCs and 
1,240 tariff lines for non-LDCs; Bhutan has a consolidated list of 150 tariff lines; India has 480 
tariff lines for LDCs and 868 tariff lines for non-LDCs; Nepal has a list of 1,257 tariff lines for 
LDCs and 1,295 tariff lines for non-LDCs; Pakistan has a consolidated list of 1,169 tariff lines; 
and Sri Lanka has a consolidated list of 1,065 tariff lines.222 However, it is evident that there 
have not been any noticeable changes in the number of products in the sensitive list for imports 
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from developing countries. Even for LDCs, significant reduction has only been offered by India 
alone. The reductions by the other developing members are nominal. While there is no specific 
requirement in the SAFTA that member countries must maintain separate sensitive list of 
products for developing members and LDCs, arguably there is an implicit recognition that they 
should do so. Several factors support this connotation. 
Preamble of the SAFTA underscores that LDC members need to be granted special and 
differential S&D treatment proportionate to their development needs. Article 3(f) of the SAFTA 
provides that one of the governing principle of the SAFTA is that the particular needs of the 
LDCs must be visibly accommodated by non-reciprocal concrete preferential measures in their 
favor.223 Article 11 provides for a special set of S&D treatment for the LDCs. It may appear that 
this article wanes the persuasiveness of the argument that LDCs may deserve a shorter sensitive 
list as it sets out what special rights they may be accorded. However, use of the words ‘In 
addition to other provisions of this Agreement’ placed at the beginning of the Article 
unequivocally indicates that it is not an exhaustive list. Above all, the tariff liberalization scheme 
of the SAFTA itself draws a distinction between developing countries and LDCs. If there is an 
implicit obligation to maintain a trimmed list of sensitive products for LDCs, the next question 
would arise to on whom this obligation is imposed. In other words, does an LDC member need 
to have a separate sensitive list for other LDCs? This seems to be having a relatively 
uncomplicated answer. 
The Preamble refers to the aspirations of the ‘The Governments of the SAARC’ and does 
not make any distinction among member countries. Neither Article 3(f) nor Article 11 does 
contain any expression that will limit the onus of according Special & differential treatment 
                                                 




obligation to the developing member countries. In the light of these arguments, it appears that by 
providing an identical list for all members of the SAFTA, Afghanistan, Bhutan, the Maldives, 
Pakistan, and Sri Lanka have not adhered to the principle of Special & differential treatment for 
LDCs as contained in the SAFTA. 
 
3.2.4. Administration of the Agreement 
Article 10 of the Agreement provides for the establishment of the SMC consisting of the 
Ministers of Commerce/Trade of each contracting party and performing the responsibilities of 
the highest decision-making body of the SAFTA. The role of the SMC with respect to the 
SAFTA is analogous to the role of the Ministerial Council with respect to the WTO. It has a 
supervisory role of administering and implementing the SAFTA and all decisions and 
arrangements that may be made within its legal framework.224 The SMC must hold meeting at 
least annually or more often as the contracting parties may deem necessary.225 In order to assist 
the SMC, there is a COE, comprising of one nominee from each contracting party at the level of 
a senior economic official who have expertise in trade issues.226 There is no explanation of the 
phrase senior economic official, but presumably it refers to senior government officials with 
expertise in trade matters. The COE is entrusted with the duty of monitoring, reviewing, and 
facilitating implementation of the provisions of the Agreement and performing any other 
assignment that may be assigned to it by the SMC.227 It must meet at least biannually and shall 
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submit its report to the SMC twice a year.228One of the key functions of the COE is to carry out 
the role of the Dispute Settlement Body under the Agreement.229 
 
3.2.5. Trade Remedy Measures 
There is no undertaking in the Agreement to abolish the adoption of trade remedy 
measures in the trade among the parties. The Agreement allows contracting parties to resort to 
safeguard measures to protect domestic industry from surge in imports from other contracting 
parties. A contracting state may provisionally suspend concessions granted under the SAFTA 
when, in accordance with an investigation conducted by a public authority, it finds that imported 
products cause or threatens to cause like or directly competitive products in the importing 
country.230 The investigation by domestic authority must comply with Article XIX of the GATT 
and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards.231 Resembling Article XIX of the GATT, three 
conditions must be fulfilled for the adoption of a safeguard measure. There must be a surge of 
imported product from the other contracting parties; the import must cause serious injury to 
producers of like or directly competitive products; and there must be a causal link between the 
injury and imports from producers within the region.232 The drafters of the SAFTA have done 
away with the requirement of Article XIX GATT that the surge in import must be unforeseen. 
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This would help get rid of the interpretative difficulty that has surrounded the wording in the 
WTO.233 
A corollary of this omission and simplification would, however, be that it would be easier 
for contracting parties to resort to safeguard measures. This would be unfortunate because 
inherently safeguard measure is a response to fair trade practice and should therefore be used 
very sparingly. A safeguard measure under the SAFTA cannot be applied against imports from 
an LDC contracting party unless its share of the total import of the product is more than 
5%.234Where a safeguard measure is applied against a product that is exported from more than 
one LDC contracting parties, the LDC producers will be exempted from the measure unless their 
collective share of import is more than 15% of total import.235 Other than this special exemption 
for imports from LDCs, a safeguard measure must be applied indiscriminately.236 A safeguard 
measure can be maintained for up to three years.237 Unlike Article XIX(3) of the GATT, there is 
no provision for the exporting countries affected by a safeguard measure to suspend comparable 
trade concessions to the exports from the contracting party that resort to a safeguard measure. In 
practice, this absence of scope for retaliation is likely to lead any aggrieved exporting country 
with the only option of going for challenging the measure in the dispute settlement forum of the 
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Agreement. When a contracting party takes recourse to a safeguard measure, it must instantly 
notify the exporting contracting state/s and the COE.238 Although the Article does not provide for 
any consultation between the importing and exporting countries, it is conceivable that the 
purpose of notification is to provide scope for consultation for finding any alternative trade 
compensation in lieu of those withdrawn on account of the import surge. 
 
3.2.6. Dispute settlement mechanism in the SAFTA 
Any FTA is subject to various forms of disagreements and/or dispute amongst the 
member countries. As a result, it is imperative that the FTA incorporates a form of dispute 
settlement so as to avoid controversy and roadblocks in implementation of the FTA objectives. 
It is generally considered safest to have a rule based dispute settlement system in place, 
so as to mitigate the power disparity amongst the member countries of the FTA. At the 
multilateral forum, perhaps GATT contracting parties recognized that diplomatic negotiation-
based soft approach to dispute settlement was not sufficiently capable of adequately protecting 
all contracting parties trading interests. Therefore, to protect the trading rights of all Member 
States irrespective of their clout, the WTO adopted a rule based system. Maybe this same reason 
explains why both the EC and NAFTA state parties have adopted this type of formal, rule-based 
dispute settlement system. Developments in these comparable institutions reinforce the 
desirability of having a rule-based dispute settlement system in place in any FTA. However, in 
the SAFTA, there is no strong rule-based dispute settlement mechanism in place. It appears that 
the SAFTA aims to provide for a minimalist and consultation focused procedure that would let 
the disputing parties to resolve their disputes. These disputes are resolved through consultation 
                                                 




and allowing maximum flexibility and control over the dispute settlement process, should 
consultation fail. The dispute settlement system in its current form is sketchy. It enacts that any 
dispute among the state parties would be settled amicably.239 Any contracting party that have any 
grievance against another contracting party is required to make a request for consultation in 
writing to the other party setting out the measures at issue.240 
 
3.2.7. Rules of Origin 
Like other FTAs, the SAFTA seeks to limit favorable tariff treatment to its parties so that 
producers from non-member countries cannot benefit from the treaty through transshipment of 
their products through one of the countries. To ensure this objective, the treaty adopts a 
preferential Rules of Origin, which forms an integral part of the SAFTA.241 Rules of Origin of 
the Agreement provides that a product that is wholly produced or obtained in the territory of a 
particular exporting contacting country would be eligible for preferential treatment under the 
Agreement.242 A product that is not wholly produced or obtained within a member country will 
be eligible for preferential treatment if they have undergone substantial manufacturing process in 
the exporting country.243 This substantial manufacturing criterion can be fulfilled by meeting two 
conditions. The total value of the materials, parts, or other inputs originating from non-Member 
States or of undetermined origin in the production of the exported product must not exceed 60% 
of the Free on Board (FOB) value and the final processing of the product must be performed 
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within the territory of the exporting Member State.244 Furthermore, the final product must change 
in tariff heading at four-digit Harmonized Coding System (HS), that is, it must take a different 
line from any of the third party originating materials used in the production.245 
LDCs have a further flexibility that in their case any non-member contents or contents of 
undefined origin can be up to 70%, and for Sri Lanka, non-member or undefined contents can be 
up to 65%.246The Rules of Origin is more liberal in cases of regional accumulation. Regional 
accumulation rules would apply when a product is worked or processed in any of the contracting 
parties using domestic inputs as well as that of one or more of the other contracting parties. In 
this case, a product would be eligible for preferential treatment if the domestic content of the 
territory where it is processed consists of at least 20% of the FOB value of the final product and 
domestic content plus other contents from partner countries is at least 50% of the FOB value.247 
Additionally, the rule of change in tariff heading would be applicable.248 Aside from these 
general rules, there is Product Specific Rules applicable to 191 tariff lines.249 The Product 
Specific Rules slightly vary in domestic content requirement from the general Rules of Origin.  
The rules of Origin of SAFTA was drafted in the Twelfth Committee of Experts on South 
Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which was held in Kathmandu from 29 November to 1st of 
December, in 2005. There are Seventeen (17) Rules which cater to a wide range of topics such as 
the category of product and the subsequent treatment of such products. The following section 
aims to summarize the rules drafted. The major discussion points of the Rules of Origin are: 
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Wholly obtained, originating materials, Non-Qualifying Operations, Value added test, Hybrid, 
Assemble, and Specific Process. 
3.2.7.1. Wholly Obtained:  
The wholly obtained rules of origin are the produce that are obtained or produced in the 
territory of the Exporting Contracting State. 
3.2.7.2. Originating Materials:  
The originating materials refers to the products that, upon obtaining eligibility pertaining 
to specific Rules of the Rules of Origin; can be imported into the territory of a contracting state 
from another contracting state. 
3.2.7.3. Non-Qualifying Operations:  
Rule 7 refers to the alterations that makes any product ineligible to be labelled as 
originating product. The guidelines explicitly mention guidelines regarding the conditions which 
would render such products ineligible to be considered originating goods. The annexure provides 
a comprehensive list of the conditions that are to be met in order for the products to be qualified. 
For example, in case of assembly, labelling parts of product as a complete product will result in 
disqualification of originating product and won’t be granted originating status. 250 
3.2.7.4. Value Added Test:  
The following condition is one of the two primary conditions which are to be met in order 
for the products to be considered eligible for originating status: The final product is classified in 
a heading at the four-digit level of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System 
differently from those in which all the non-originating materials used in its manufacture are 
                                                 




classified.251 Products worked on or processed as a result of which the total value of the 
materials, parts or produce originating from other countries or of undetermined origin used does 
not exceed 60% of the FOB value of the products produced or obtained and the final process of 
manufacture is performed within the territory of the exporting Contracting State.252 
3.2.7.5. Regional Value Content: 
 The regional value content refers to the products manufactured or processes in a specific 
contracting state with inputs coming from any contracting state within the free trade zone is 
eligible for preferential treatment, provided the following condition is met: The aggregate 
content (value of such inputs plus domestic value addition in further manufacture) is not less 
than 50 percent of the FOB value.253 
 
3.2.8. Technical Assistance for LDC members and Trade Facilitation Measures 
In Article 8 of the SAFTA, lofty objectives have been set up to facilitate intra-SAARC 
trade. These are transit facilities for efficient intra-SAARC trade, removal of barriers to intra-
SAARC investments, simplification and harmonization of import licensing and registration 
procedures, and harmonization of standards and mutual recognition of test results. These are all 
critical issues deserving attention of the signatories. However, it remains to be seen how these 
goals would be achieved as no concrete and region-wide concerted steps have yet followed to 
make them happen. The developing contracting parties have undertaken to expand technical 
assistance to LDC contracting parties for the development of their trade-related capacity.254 The 
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Agreement sets the objective of technical assistance for trade capacity building, development and 
improvement of tax and tariff policy and laws, and improvement of national expertise on 
different Agreements of the WTO, undertaking studies on improving trade-related infrastructure, 
support for export, and investment promotion.255 
 
3.2.9. SAFTA: Existing Status and Prospects 
South Asian countries, which had open economies in the immediate post-independence 
period in the 1940s, had become some of the most highly protectionist economies in the world 
by the 1970s. Tariff and, even more important, nontariff barriers were extremely high, state 
interventions in economic activity had become pervasive, attitudes to foreign investments were 
negative, often hostile, and stringent exchange controls were in place. This started to change in 
the late 1970s, however. In 1977, Sri Lanka initiated a process of policy liberalization, and other 
countries followed in the 1980s. The liberalization process, however, was often rather hesitant 
and was uneven across countries. It was from the early 1990s, with the start of a major reform 
process in India that the region as a whole really started to liberalize. By the end of the decade, 
although important policy barriers to trade and foreign investment remained, enormous progress 
had been made throughout the region in this direction (World Bank 2004). 
The changes to the trade policy regime in South Asia have been driven primarily by 
across-the-board, unilateral liberalization by individual countries. However, a process of 
preferential trade liberalization also has been ongoing since the establishment in 1985 of the 
SAARC. South Asia was fairly late in embracing the concept of regional economic 
cooperation—it took a decade after the initial establishment of SAARC for the region to turn its 
                                                 




attention to the promotion of trade through a regional agreement. Nevertheless, having accepted 
the concept of regional economic cooperation, SAARC was quick to set itself an ambitious 
agenda. The proposal to set up a SAPTA was accepted and came into formal operation in 
December 1995. 
In 1996, SAARC member countries agreed in principle to go a step further and attempt to 
enact a SAFTA by 2000, but not later than 2005. With the apparent progress of three rounds of 
negotiations under SAPTA completed by 1998, it was proposed that the date for establishing 
SAFTA be brought forward to 2001. The momentum of economic cooperation in South Asia 
suffered a setback from late 1998, however, with the deterioration in bilateral relations between 
India and Pakistan that saw the consequent postponement of SAARC Heads of State Summits for 
the next three years. With the resumption of official contact in January 2002, negotiations on a 
Framework Treaty on SAFTA were initiated and the framework was adopted in January 2004. 
Outstanding issues in key areas of the tariff liberalization program, rules of origin, 
sensitive lists, and so on, were completed on schedule by January 2006 to allow the 
implementation of SAFTA to begin in July 2006. Under the proposed TLP, SAFTA will become 
fully effective for non–LDC member countries of SAARC by 2013 (and by 2016 for LDC 
member states). The SAFTA process has generated only limited enthusiasm. It suffers from 
significant shortcomings, primarily on account of a cautious approach adopted to achieve the 
ultimate objective of free trade within the South Asian region. Concerns about the very 
usefulness of SAFTA have been mounting in light of more liberal bilateral FTAs as well as 
preferential access that could conceivably be granted through alternative trading arrangements 
among SAARC countries. The dynamics of regional integration in South Asia have also changed 




emerging world economic power. With India looking increasingly to strengthen economic 
relations with the wider Asian region through initiatives such as Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN+3+India), the strategic interests of the smaller South Asian economies are 
likely to become inextricably linked to successful integration with the Indian economy. The 
evidence to date suggests that economic integration of the South Asian region is gathering pace, 
but that SAFTA remains fairly marginal in that process.  
 
3.2.10. SAPTA to SAFTA: WILL “Free” Trade in South Asia yield Benefits? 
Despite few empirical studies that have looked at the prospects for regional integration in 
South Asia, the results remain inconclusive. The quantitative assessments have used a variety of 
methodologies, including gravity models, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, and 
partial equilibrium studies. Early studies predicted pessimistic outcomes for the most part. They 
concluded that most of the preconditions required for a successful trading arrangement were not 
present in South Asia, and that the region would be better off liberalizing trade unilaterally. 
Others argued strongly that regional trade integration initiatives in South Asia will yield a net 
welfare loss and slow unilateral liberalization. Indeed, it has long been recognized that the fact 
that South Asian countries share some basic similarities (low income, relatively abundant labor, 
comparative advantage in similar commodities, such as tea and garments) reduces the potential 
for comparative advantage driven trade. Nevertheless, it has been argued that increased 
economic integration would carry with it the ability not only to secure new and larger markets 
for traditional products, but also to enable the diversification of domestic economic structures. 
More topical studies have highlighted benefits to be had from pursuing economic 
integration in South Asia, not only in trade in goods but also in services and investment.  




regional trade integration can create spillover effects that would strengthen economic and 
political ties between South Asian countries has persisted. SAPTA was intended as the initial 
step in the process to support regional economic integration. However, the SAPTA process was 
rather ineffective. Three rounds of negotiations were completed under SAPTA where the 
consolidated list of concessions covered 3,857 tariff lines, including special concessions (2,762 
tariff lines) offered to LDCs. 
The most limiting factor of SAPTA was the actual trade coverage of preferential access 
granted. In fact, it has been estimated that on average only 8.4 percent of tariff lines in the case 
of imports from non-LDCs (and 6.2 percent in the case of imports from the LDCs) were covered 
In reality, products imported under SAPTA concessions translated to only 15 percent of total 
imports between SAARC member countries. Thus, SAPTA had little or no impact in changing 
the existing trade patterns in South Asia. Intra-SAARC trade continued to stagnate in the region 
of 05 percent of total trade with the rest of the world, one of the lowest volumes of intraregional 
trade of any major geographic region. SAFTA was intended to provide a fresh boost to the 
integration process. Unlike SAPTA, SAFTA adopted a negative list approach with the intention 
that South Asian countries would phase out import tariffs to other member countries on all goods 
apart from those items reserved under a “sensitive” list. The key features of the Agreement 
related to the modalities of the TLP, the treatment of sensitive goods, and the rules of origin. 
3.2.11. SAFTA: Multilateral Agreement versus Bilateral Agreement 
As far as the TLP is concerned, the approach adopted makes a commitment toward a top 
down reduction of tariffs in which non-LDC member states are required to reduce existing tariffs 
to 20 percent within 2 years of implementation of the agreement, and thereafter to further reduce 
tariffs to a range of 0–5 percent in the next 5 years. 3 LDC member countries are required to 




percent in the next 8 years. One criticism that may be made of this formula is that it may allow 
back-loading in the tariff-reduction process. That is, those countries whose tariffs are well below 
20 percent may not have to commit to substantial reductions until the last minute. The agreement 
only requires a 10 percent margin of preference reduction in each of the two years and 
recommends a 15 percent reduction each year in the second phase. However, the formula 
adopted unlike the alternative of a progressive linear reduction formula is not without its 
benefits. It is likely to be more efficient if convergence is achieved initially by all countries 
lowering their tariffs to a maximum rate and then proceeding further. An alternative of an 
annualized percentage reduction, on the other hand, would have meant that countries with high 
tariffs still continue to benefit in relation to the other regional partners. 
TABLE 3: 6 COMPARATIVE TLP ACROSS FTAS IN SOUTH ASIA 
 
SAFTA ISFTA PSFTA 
Immediate 0% Not Applicable India: 1,351 items Pakistan: 206 items 
 
Sri Lanka: 319 items Sri Lanka: 102 items 
TLP for others Non-LDCs reduce 
tariffs to 20 percent 
over 2 years (LDCs 3 
years) 
India: duty on balance 
items to be phased out 
over 3 years 
Pakistan: duty on 
balance items to be 
phased out over 3 years 
Non-LDCS: reduce 0-
5 percent over next 5 
years (LDCs 7 years) 
Sri Lanka: duty on 
balance items to be 
phased out over 8 years 
Sri Lanka: duty on 
balance items to be 





Date of Full 
Implementation 
2016 2008 2010 
Source: Respective Agreements 
Note FTP = Free Trade Agreement; ISFTA = India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; 
PSFTA = Pakistan–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; SAFTA = South Asian Free 
Trade Agreement; TLP = Tariff Liberalization Program. 
 
International experience of regional blocs generally, finds clauses that favor convergence 
as in SAFTA to be more successful in ensuring that benefits of tariff reduction are extended to 
all member countries. Another key area is rules of origin (ROO), which is an important provision 
in any FTA. Within trade arrangements, ROO have a number of functions. The most important 
are to limit the benefit of preferences to countries within the agreement, and related to that, to 
encourage industrial development within the member countries. ROO can have positive as well 
as negative effects. Positive effects of properly constituted ROO requirements generally include 
prevention of trade deflection, facilitating value addition, and augmenting the volume of 
intraregional trade. On the negative side, it is often argued that ROO might inhibit intraregional 
trade and favor high cost and inefficient production. Ideally ROO should, therefore, be open, 
transparent, predictable, and consistent in application, as simple as possible and leave little room 
for administrative discretion. 
Three criteria are generally used to determine whether ‘substantial transformation’ of 
goods that is, the final product should be distinct from its constituents has taken place. Each rule 
could be applied in isolation, in the alternative, or in tandem. The rules are: (1) A percentage test 




on the basis of domestic inputs; (2) a change in tariff heading (CTH) test whereby the tariff 
heading of the final product is different from the tariff headings of its components; and 
(3) a specified process tests that require a product to undergo certain stipulated processes. 
The SAFTA agreement requires DVA of 40 percent for India and Pakistan (as non-LDC 
member countries), 35 percent for Sri Lanka (as a small economy), and 30 percent for LDCs, in 
combination with a change of tariff heading (CTH) at classified at the four-digit Harmonized 
Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) code. However, derogation from the General 
Rule has been permitted under SAFTA because some products may undergo substantial 
transformation and allow the DVA criteria to be met without CTH at the four-digit code and vice 
versa. Besides the single-country ROO, there is also provision for cumulative ROO with a 
minimum aggregate content of 50 percent with the proviso that the minimum input from the 
exporting country should be 20 percent. The SAFTA ROO is more or less the same as those 
under the bilateral FTAs in the region.  One of the most critical provisions in SAFTA is the one 
that deals with sensitive sectors. 
TABLE 3: 7 COMPARATIVE RULES OF ORIGIN ACROSS FTAS IN SOUTH ASIA 
 
SAFTA ISFTA PSFTA 
Single Country ROO 
   
DVA (% of FOB) 
   
India and Pakistan 40% 35% 35% 
Sri Lanka 35% 35% 35% 
LDCs 30% 
  
CTH 4-digit 4-digit 4-digit 
Cumulative ROO 




Minimum Aggregate Content 50% 35% 35% 
Input from Exporting Country 20% 25% 25% 
Derogation from General Rule DVA: 25, 30, 40 or 
 
NA 
60% CTH: at 4- or 
  
6-digit Process: PSR 
  
Source Respective agreements 
Note CTH = Change of Tariff Heading; DVA = Domestic Value Addition; FTP = Free 
Trade Agreement; ISFTA = India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; LDC = Least 
Developed Country; PSFTA = Pakistan–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; ROO = 
Rules of Origin; SAFTA = South Asian Free Trade Agreement. 
 
It seems reasonable that each country has some Sensitive industries that should not face 
increased competition, even from relatively less competitive neighbors. An improvement in the 
SAFTA treaty compared with the bilateral FTAs in the region was that it provided room for 
negotiations to ensure a maximum ceiling on items that can be placed under the negative list by 
each member country. It appeared in the initial stages of negotiations that a fairly liberal 
approach would be adopted, perhaps limiting the negative list to 10 percent of tariff lines (of a 
total of 5,224 tariff lines at the HS six-digit level), but the final decision was to retain a negative 
list of 20 percent of tariff lines for non-LDC member states and a close approximation of that for 
the LDC member countries. 256 
                                                 





TABLE 3: 8 COMPARATIVE NEGATIVE LISTS ACROSS FTAS IN SOUTH ASIA (UP TO 2012) 
Country Name SAFTA ISFTA PSFTA 
Afghanistan 858   













Sri Lanka 837 (LDCs) &963 (NLDCs) 1180 697 
Source Respective agreements 
Notes FTA = Free Trade Agreement; ISFTA = India–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; 
PSFTA = Pakistan–Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement; SAFTA = South Asian Free 
Trade Agreement. * For LDCs 1,249. ** For LDCs 744. 
 
This means, in principle, that the actual trade coverage of the negative lists of each 
country could be quite high. Perhaps of more concern is that there is no formal and binding 
provision in the framework agreement requiring that negative lists are pruned down over time. In 
contrast, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) requires explicitly that its negative list 
products—the corresponding Temporary Exclusion List—be phased out in five equal 
installments. The only provision that the SAFTA treaty has made is for a “review” of the 
negative list at least every four years “with a view to reducing the number of items” (Agreement 
of South Asian Free Trade Area, Article 7(3b), p. 5). The underlying intention may be to prune 




position of member countries. Given that SAFTA has left the issue of negative lists fairly open 
ended—even four years is a fairly long-time horizon to wait for any improvement in the 
agreement—there is always the danger that the agreement will fall short of free trade even in the 
long term. By comparison to SAFTA, the negative lists of existing bilateral FTAs in the region 
are more limited. Indeed, mapping the sensitive list of each country to their imports from the rest 
of South Asia reveals that nearly 53 percent of total import trade among South Asian countries 
by value (at the time negotiations were initiated in 2004) is excluded from the liberalization of 
tariffs proposed under the SAFTA treaty. The LDC member countries such as Bangladesh, 
Maldives, and Nepal have sought to “protect” 65–75 percent of their imports from South Asia by 
excluding them from being subject to tariff liberalization. Sri Lanka (51.7 percent) and India 
(38.4 percent) also have restricted a fairly high share of imports from being subject to tariff cuts. 
At first glance, it appears that Pakistan has been fairly generous in restricting only around 17 
percent of its current imports to the sensitive list, despite the fact that it has the largest number of 
items in the sensitive list of non-LDC members. However, Pakistan maintains a positive list of 
items in regard to its trade with India that, in theory, can limit the potential trade volumes to a 
great extent. 
TABLE 3: 9 TRADE RESTRICTION UNDER SAFTA 
 
Value of imports from SAARC subject 
to SL (%) 
Value of exports to SAARC subject to 
SL (%) 
Bangladesh 65 22 
India 38.4 56.5 
Maldives 74.5 57.6 




Pakistan 17.2 34 
Sri Lanka 51.7 47 
Total 52.9 
 
Source: Weeakoon and Thennakoon 2008 
 
Note SAARC= South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; SL= Sensitive List 
 
3.2.12. Non-tariff Barriers within SAFTA 
Another area of concern in the SAFTA treaty is the lack of an explicit commitment to 
deal with the issue of nontariff barriers (NTBs). In identifying NTBs, a distinction can be made 
between those that have to be eliminated and those that have to be harmonized, such as measures 
relating to technical standards, plant and animal health, and environmental protection and safety. 
If any quantitative restrictions exist, these can more easily be converted to tariffs and 
subsequently reduced. Generally, the experience of FTAs has been that customs surcharges, 
technical measures and product characteristic requirements, and monopolistic measures 
(particularly in relation to exclusive import rights of state-controlled enterprises) are the most 
difficult to identify and eliminate. While South Asia has made significant progress in eliminating 
quantitative restrictions (QRs), nontariff measures do exist that can act as a barrier to the free 
flow of goods between SAARC countries. The SAFTA framework agreement has provisions to 
deal with para-tariffs and NTBs, but no explicit commitment is required of countries. In 
particular, there is no commitment in the SAFTA framework agreement to eliminate NTBs on 
items for which tariff reductions are to be made. By contrast, an important feature in AFTA, for 
example, is that member countries are required to eliminate QRs on products on which they 




What is contained in the SAFTA treaty appears to be merely an understanding that NTB-related 
issues will be subject to continuous negotiations. 
The SAFTA treaty has been confined to trade in goods, which is viewed as a limiting 
factor. Globally, the trends governing bilateral and regional trade initiatives are toward 
implementing broader economic partnership agreements that include trade in services and 
investment, and areas of economic cooperation. SAARC has taken some initial steps to 
incorporate services and investment into the SAFTA framework agreement by commissioning a 
joint study to examine the issues that need to be addressed. Thus, it is clear that SAFTA as it 
stands contains certain limitations. Nonetheless, implementation is progressing per the terms of 
the agreement, subject to the early dispute that arose with regard to the application of Pakistan’s 
Positive List to trade with India regarding the implementation of SAFTA. However, the required 
initial tariff liberalization (for example, to achieve a threshold of 20 percent) is quite minimal 
given that most South Asian economies have been unilaterally lowering Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) tariffs quite substantially over time. For instance, if the liberalization formula is applied 
to the Sri Lankan context, leaving aside those items in Sri Lanka’s SAFTA sensitive list, it is 
clear that the only commitment required is to reduce tariffs from 28 percent to 20 percent on 
approximately 300 tariff lines (at HS six-digit) in three installments over a 2-year period. 
The other main area of progress is perhaps that of pruning sensitive lists. But here again, 
it is confined largely to a voluntary exercise, with India taking the initiative with an offer to 
unilaterally prune its sensitive list ahead of schedule by removing an additional 264 items 
applicable to LDCs. India has long been viewed as the key to enabling a successful regional 
economic integration effort in South Asia, given the significantly asymmetric nature of economic 




pattern of trade and investment linkages across the wider Asian region—the prospects for 
integration in South Asia have to be viewed from a broader perspective. Such a perspective 
would include an assessment not only of India’s own economic interests and how they relate to 
the South Asian region, but also how other South Asian economies respond to new challenges. 
 
3.2.13. Conclusion 
South Asia in the twenty-first century has an opportunity to lead the world by addressing 
the challenges of poverty, peace, and environmental degradation through cooperation in a region 
where these challenges are manifest in their most intense form. Regional cooperation in South 
Asia could enable a new form of equitable and sustainable economic growth.257 There are clear 
implications for South Asia. A fully functional SAFTA would be good for all countries in the 
region. The smaller countries in the region can in fact gain more from unhindered trade. There 
are clear gains for consumers and exporters, and even for those producers serving the domestic 
market.258 A fully functioning SAFTA is an essential first step in the vision of an economic 
union. Leaders should complete SAFTA with the right mix of reforms so that the benefits of 
deeper integration can begin to be seen on the horizon.259 
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Services are one of the basic and most important components of almost every economy in 
the world. They account (as of October 2010) for 1/3 to ½ of aggregate world trade. Across all the 
services accounts are developed countries 74% (April 2013), OECD Countries 75% (May 2014), 
APEC 50%, Developing Countries 51% (April 2013) of total GDP.260 This issue arose in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, which led to the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS). It is an WTO Uruguay Round agreement which aims to increase transparency and 
predictability by framing clear rules and regulations for the trade in services. Further, it deals with 
the signatories’ obligations. The design of these obligations is specifically to eliminate trade 
restrictions and create a unified legal structure. Moreover, it calls for ongoing round negotiations 
for progressive liberalization of trade in services.261  
The GATT, of course, is a treaty for multilateral trade that specifically deals with 
merchandise trade. The GATS came into force in January 1995 with the conclusion of the Uruguay 
round of WTO trade agreements, through which the new World Trade Organization was born on 
1 January 1995 with a revised GATT and GATS.  
“Doha round services dialogs truly pre-date the Round. At the November 2001 Doha 
Ministerial Conference, they were incorporated into the single undertaking scheme of the round 
and the basic goal of service talks is to improve and clarify rules and regulations on services trade, 
with a view to opening markets while at the same time giving poor countries flexibilities.262 After 
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all, services account for over two-thirds of global GDP, and for over 50 percent of employment in 
developed countries.263 
South Asian countries are working to maximize economic cooperation by exploring their 
potential trade opportunities within the region with the spirit of mutual accommodation. But they 
are doing this without compromising the sovereign equality and territorial independence of each 
of the countries. Inter-regional investments and expansion of production opportunities are of key 
importance for developing the economic growth in this region.264 In April 2010, parties signed the 
SAARC agreement on Free Trade in Services (SATIS) in Thimpu and it came into effect in 
November 2012. From its onset, the agreement struggled with regulatory red tape and the slow 
motion of trade and service pattern in South Asian countries. This chapter shall make a critical 
analysis of the frameworks of SATIS and GATS. 
 
4.1.2. Legal Framework and coverage of GATS 
The definition of services trade in GATS depends upon the territorial presence and 
residence of the supplier and customer at the transaction time. GATS identify four modes of trading 
services, namely, cross border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of 
natural persons.265 Briefly, each mode for the cross-border supply of services is as follows: 
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• Mode 1: Cross border supply: This Mode covers cross-territory services. For 
example, trade across borders through mail and electronic media (i.e. airfreight of 
lab samples, medical education, internet consultations, and others).  
 
• Mode 2: Consumption abroad: This Mode focuses on consumer services required 
when travelling to other countries. For example, patients travelling to other 
countries for medical services.  
 
• Mode 3: Commercial presence: This Mode covers situations where the 
establishment of one country establishes a territorial presence in another country’s 
territory to provide services. Opening subsidiary companies or foreign companies 
in another jurisdiction mainly do this. 
 
• Mode 4: Presence of natural persons: This Mode concerns situations where the 
natural persons of one country enter another country to provide a service (e.g. 
lawyers, doctors, teachers, engineers etc.). This Mode also covers self-employed 
persons and the persons who are on temporary assignment. Here, the term ‘natural 
person’ is deliberately inserted to differentiate individuals from the generic 
‘persons’ that covers individuals, partnerships, companies, branches, associations, 
estates, trusts, government agencies and others.266 
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Governmental authority services designed for the public in the exercise of government 
authorities fall outside of the jurisdiction of GATS. Similarly excluded are traffic rights and all 
associated services. Further, issues like fiscal policy, taxation measures, management of exchange 
rates, and immigration rules regarding temporary business entry fall outside of GATS’s 
jurisdiction. For streamlining the commitments, WTO’s Services Sector Classification is called 
the W120, which is drawn under the following U.N. Central Product Classification (CPC) list into 
a) Sectors; b) Sub-sectors, and c) Sub-sub-sectors.267  
There are 11 Standard Sectors are including in core services.268 
i. Business services (Accountancy, legal, Midwife, Engineering services etc.) 
ii. Communication services (Couriar, Postal etc.). 
iii. Construction and related engineering services. 
iv. Distribution services. 
v. Educational services. 
vi. Environmental services (Sanitation, Waste Disposal, etc.) 
vii. Financial services (including insurance and banking). 
viii. Health and Social service (including Nursing and health related services) 
ix. Tourism and travel-related services. 
x. Recreational, cultural, and sporting services (Library, Museums, 
entertainments, etc.) 
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xi. Transport services (includes Air and maritime service) 
Under this categorization, Members can include any service sector to the schedule of 
commitments with specific market access and national treatment obligations. Each WTO Member 
has submitted to such a schedule under GATS.269  
 
4.1.3. Procedure of SATIS 
The most important WTO agreements are GATT, GATS, Dispute settlement, and the 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). GATS are the first set 
of enforceable rules governing international trade in services. Under GATS the ‘supply of 
service’ includes production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery of that service. SATIS 
followed GATS and provided a ‘positive list’ of trade liberalization.270 Under SATIS, WTO 
Members created ‘offer list’ containing GATS commitments. Amongst South Asian countries, 
Bhutan is not a WTO Member. As a result, Bhutan enjoys flexibility in preparing the ‘offer list.’ 
Further, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka are obligated to comply with the Doha Development 
Agenda. A meticulous analysis of the offer-lists shows that many ‘offer list’ do not contain the 
basic ingredients of GATS plus. Further, there are many services in GATS plus that are not 
available to other SAARC member states.271 For example, Mode 4 focuses on cross-border 
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delivery of services by natural persons. Under this scheme, a lawyer may go to a foreign country 
to represent or assist their client by temporarily moving there.272  
Mode 4 provisions were highly debated in the Doha Development Round of 
Negotiations.273 These negotiations caused the streamlining of Mode 4 provisions. For example, 
GATS Article 1 defines Mode 4 as “the supply of a service by a server of one member through 
presences of natural person of a member in the territory of any other member.” The Annex of the 
Movement of Natural Persons Supplying Services talks about two measure categories. The first 
is measures that have an impact on natural persons who are “service suppliers of a member” (i.e. 
self-employed individuals who receives their remuneration directly from the end-customers). 
The second is measures concerned about natural persons of a member state who are “employed 
by a service supplier of a member in respect of the supply of a service.”274 
To enhance trade in services SATIS takes different steps. These steps include developing 
regulatory capacity through exchange of experiences and best practices among the contracting 
state’s regulatory bodies. Additionally, SATIS takes steps to incorporate various working groups 
designated for specifies sectors of interest comprising of national authorities and stockholders. 
SATIS ensure effective amalgamation and coordination with WTO/GATS negotiations and by 
forming a working group under the heads of SAARC Statistical Organizations (SAARCSTAT) to 
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collect and exchange statistics and regulations to improve collection of trade statistics in 
services.275  
 
4.1.4. SATIS Objectives  
The core SATIS objectives are promoting trade in services within SAARC countries “in a 
beneficial and equitable manner by establishing a framework for liberalizing and promoting trade 
in services with the region,” liberalizing trade in services with “broad-based and deeper coverage 
of majority of server sector/sub-sectors;” and engaging in negotiations on “specific commitments 
for progress liberalizing based on “request-and-offer approach.”276 However, SATIS excludes 
areas like government procurement of services designated for exercising governmental duties. 
Similarly, SATIS excludes transportation including transportation through air. Whereas, areas like 
repairing, maintaining, sales, marketing, and logistic support to transportation industries are 
included.277  
 
4.1.5. SATIS Obligations  
SATIS identifies the importance of service sectors, and to strengthen them SATIS focuses 
on potential intra-regional trade services. TLP’s approval bolsters this step by stating that under 
otherwise mentioned in the “Schedule of Specific Commitments’ no measures shall: 
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• Be maintained and adopted to limit the service suppliers by using quotas or 
monopolies; 
• Restrain any form of numerical quotas on the value of service transactions or 
assets; 
• Enforce quota on service operation, on the total quantity of services; and 
• Control the emergence of foreign capital in terms of maximum percentage 
limits on foreign shareholders or by aggregating foreign investment.  
To ensure transparency, SAARC members, by SATIS, must publish relevant measures relating to 
the agreement within fourteen days of entry into force unless there is an emergency. 
 
4.1.6. Trade in Services Role in South Asia 
SATIS receives mixed responses within the SAARC community. Many argue that to get 
the full benefit of SATIS, proper implementation of SAFTA is mandatory. Studies reveal that in 
South Asian service have higher complementarities than goods. The trade imbalances with India 
and other South Asian countries are much lower in services than in goods.278 
Recently, there has been a shift from dependence on agriculture in this area. Nonetheless, 
agriculture provides for more than half of total employment in 2010. Since the 1970’s, there has 
been a noticeable shift in the service sector. For example, in 2011 the service sector provided for 
56% of the GDP while it was 38% in 1970.279 Further, this region has the fastest growing exports 
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of services. For example, from 1995 to 2010 the commercial service exports of this region 
escalated around 13 times.280 On the contrary, the agricultural value added declined sharply from 
40% to 18% from 1970 to 2011. However, the industry value added remained constant because of 
manufacturing sectors especially textile and clothing.281  
This region has a higher potential for the intra-regional trade in services especially in the 
areas of tourism, education, health services, and other business activities. For example, if 0.5% of 
the people in this region travel within the region it would result in 8 million tourists. This can 
significantly bloom the tourism industry of the countries within this region. Additionally, it will 
open new doors for exchange of views and cultural diversification and advance a shared 
understanding. To attract such tourists, steps are necessary to ease visa processing within the 
countries, effective transport, and communication links attracting foreign investments and 
streamline trade facilitation.282  
Currently, the service sector contributes more than 50% of the GDP in South Asia. 
However, SAFTA overlooks this important point. Statistics reveal that trade in services has a better 
prospect for sustainable growth in this region than trade of manufactured goods (Ghani, 2010). 
According to WTO Statistic, Service sector is the vibrant contributor to the national GDPs, around 
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36% in 2017.283 In addition, service sectors contributed 57.6% to the overall GDP of Sri Lanka in 
2014. 284  
It is the view of the World Bank and multilateral donor agencies that cross-border gas and 
electric supply can play a crucial role in fulfilling the regional demand. SATIS promises to play a 
key role in achieving this goal.285  
FIGURE 4: 1 SOUTH ASIAN TRADE BALANCE IN SERVICE286 
 
 
4.1.7. Barriers to Trade in Services Raises Costs 
The key barriers to trade in services do not concern territorial borders within the countries. 
Rather, the principal impediments involve legal and regulatory frameworks of the government 
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specifically designed to discriminate between foreign and domestic services or suppliers (GATS 
Article XVII: National Treatment). Such barriers may also be non-discriminatory, such as, limiting 
or restricting the total number of service suppliers or operations, determining the value of the 
transactions, or by defining the ambit within which a legal entity can lawfully provide services 
(GATS Article XVI: Market Access). The schemes for market access and the government 
measures are indicators of contestability and competition within the service market.  
Across modes of supply, barriers to trade service may include monopolies, discretionary 
foreign investment screening, foreign equity limits, capping the number of licenses, restraining 
temporary movement of natural persons who are supplying services, and imposing additional 
licensing requirements and subsidies. Such policies also include measures relating to supply of 
services by foreign suppliers, whether cross-borders through establishment or by natural persons 
moving to supply services. The restrictive nature of policy often leads to economic isolation that 
hinders economic developments. The impact of such policies goes to the very root of a country’s 
economy that may engender significant costs and limiting connectivity and other associated 
economic benefits. Further, as services include input to merchandise trade, they are crucial 
determinant of trade costs for goods. Despite this, there is considerable amount of restrictions and 
cross-border trades in services remain high and widespread.287  
In practice, the costs of trade in services are significantly higher than trade in goods. Recent 
statistics reveal that for final services trade costs were 277%288 ad valorem and 194% for 
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intermediate services.289 Concerning costs of goods, all the trade costs such as distance, consumer 
preferences, and regulatory divergence have come down significantly. However, these do not 
represent measures of protection, barriers to trade in services contribute significantly to estimate 
services trade costs.290  
 
4.1.8. Conclusion 
 Services play an important role in the global economy. They impact trade in goods, and 
contribute to the economic growth, employment, and sustainable development. As a result, 
restrictive measures in services affects both physical and digital connectivity. In this regard, the 
government can take initiatives to provide aid for improving connectivity by reforming their 
service market policies. This initiative can help reduce costs and promote competition in the 
service sectors, and enhance regulatory frameworks transparency. Ensuring an environment 
friendly to services sectors can work as a catalyst in attracting more investments in 
infrastructure. Further, governments can work to enhance the performance of services sectors, so 
as to boost the capacity of services supply, and ensure services suppliers meet the diversity of 
societal needs, with a view to exporting both goods and services.291
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The provisions of RTAs are indefinite. Moreover, the SAFTA is nothing like 
alteration than others FTA. The success of a RTA depends on various aspects such as 
member countries attitudes, existing inter-regional trade facilities between countries, each 
country’s trade statistics viewed in light of the global competition, trade policies designed 
and implemented to facilitate a RTA, etc. Preferential trade agreements do not always bring 
the member countries positive change, and even if they achieve positive trade, its distribution 
is often unequal among member countries. It is important to study the RTA benefits of 
multilateral liberalization and trade to gain a better understanding of the benefits of trading 
agreements. In multilateral trade negotiations, the primary source of gain from trade 
liberalization is the reduction of home tariffs. However, in a RTA the country’s gains arise 
from the other country’s reduction of the tariffs.292This chapter is dedicated to critically 
evaluating SAARC and SAFTA agreement. 
 
4.2.2 Overall SAFTA Advancement 
RTAs advancement within South Asia is difficult. Both developing, and least 
developed countries have a poor record of accomplishing RTAs. However, statistics reveal 
that poor countries struggle the most. International trade expert Mohammad A. Razzaque 
found that, 
“In fact, countries that form an RTA are usually heterogeneous, as reflected in 
their (a) size in terms of geographic area and population as well as gross 
national output, (b) economic structure as manifested in the composition of 
goods and services produced and traded, and (c) policy intervention 
mechanisms in place by way of fiscal, financial, and trade related measures, 
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which influence domestic production and trading activities. These varied 
characteristics of the members greatly influence their gains from an RTA.”293 
 
Various researches strived to find out the impact of preferential agreements on low-
income countries. The research depicts that low-income countries sufferer from regional 
integrations.294 SAFTA provides preferential treatment to the LDCs. This treatment should 
ensure equal distribution and equal opportunity within SAARC countries. 
In its forty-first session, the SAARC Standing Committee approved the Special 
Meeting of SAFTA Committee of Experts to convene after the Eighteenth SAARC Summit. 
In making this decision, they considered the proposals from India, Pakistan, Bhutan, and 
Maldives that promised to reduce the peak of tariffs from 0% to 5% by 2020. However, the 
proposals excluded around 100 tariff lines reserved as the Sensitive Lists of the Member 
States.295 Following the approval, on 4th July 2015 a Special Meeting assembled in Islamabad 
to consider various aspects of this proposal. The provisional/confirmed position to future 
trade liberalization and reduction of the sensitive lists created in that meeting follows: 
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TABLE 4: 1 TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEME 
Member State To Reduce Sensitive Lists up to To reduce Tariff to Positions 
Afghanistan 235 by 2030 0 to 5% by 2030 Confirmed 
Bangladesh 450 by 2030 0 to 5% by 2030 PROVISIONAL 
Bhutan 100 by 2020 0 to 5% by 2020 Confirmed 
India 100 by 2020 (for NLDCs) 0 to 5% by 2020 Confirmed 
Maldives 100 by 2020 0 to 5% by 2020 Confirmed 
Nepal 500 by 2030 0 to 5% by 2030 PROVISIONAL 
Pakistan 100 by 2020 0 to 5% by 2020 Confirmed 
Sri Lanka To give position by October 2015 after consulting stakeholders 
 
 
4.2.3 Tariff Reduction Scheme 
Prior to SAFTA, there was no inter-regional tariff framework. The tariff schedules 
depended on the country’s own mechanisms. However, under the aegis of SAFTA, the Trade 
Liberalization Program required contracting states prepare a ‘schedule of tariff reductions.’ 
The tariff reduction schedule has distinct features. For example, it purpose is the reduction of 
import tariffs specifically for the LDCs as opposed to non-LDCs through implementing a 
two-phase procedure for tariff elimination. Under the first phase, by 2008 the non-LDC 
countries such as India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka had to reduce their import tariff by 20%, 
whereas the LDCs such as Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal had to 
reduce their import tariff by 30%. In the second phase, the tariffs within the LDCs like India 
and Pakistan had to reduce to 0%-5% by January 2013. The smaller non-LDCs have to do 




the LCDs in the association. Another important feature of the tariff reduction scheme is it 
provided for an annual review by the Committee of Experts of all the Contracting States.296 
 
4.2.4 Sensitive Lists: 
On 6th July 2015, the third meeting of the Working Group on Reduction in the 
Sensitive Lists under SAFTA (Phase III) convened in Islamabad. The meeting was dedicated 
to reducing the Sensitive Lists under SAFTA. In that meeting the delegates of the Member 
States agreed on the following reduction of their Sensitive lists under Phase-III.297 
TABLE 4: 2 SENSITIVE LISTS 
                                                 
296 Id. art. 7(4); id. art. 10 (“The SMC shall be supported by a Committee of Experts (hereinafter referred to as 
COE) . . . . The COE shall monitor, review and facilitate implementation [of SAFTA’s provisions] and undertake 
any task assigned to it by the SMC. The COE shall submit its report to SMC every six months. The COE will also 
act as SAFTA’s Dispute Settlement Body.”); id. art. 1(6) (“Para-tariffs mean border charges and fees, other than 
‘tariffs’, on foreign trade transactions of a tariff-like effect which are levied solely on imports, but not those 
indirect taxes and charges, which are levied in the same manner on like domestic products. Import charges 
corresponding to specific services rendered are not considered as para tariff measures[.]”); id. art. 1(5) (“Non-
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LDCs NLDCs LDCs NLDCs LDCs NLDCs 
 
Afghanistan 1072 850 20 % Not received 
Bangladesh 1233 1241 987 993 20 % Received 
Bhutan 150 156 Not Applicable Received 
India 480 868 25 614 0% 20 % Received 
Maldives 681 154 Not Applicable Received 
Nepal 1257 1295 998 1036 20 % Received 
Pakistan 1169 936 20 % Received 




Further, under SAFTA countries are required to prepare a list of sensitive items exempt from 
tariff elimination. The purpose of these lists is to protect the interests of domestic 
stakeholders. Typically, these lists are subject to review every 4 years or earlier to reduce the 
number of items on the list. India has two separate sensitive list, one for non-LDCs, and one 
for LDCs of other SAARC countries. The later list contains fewer items. SAFTA Article 11 
provides for special and differential treatment for regional LDCs. These measures allow 
LDCs to benefit from the cooperative arrangements with non-LDCs. Generally, issues like 
technical assistance by non-LDCs, trade measures taken by non-LDCs to facilitate export of 
LDCs, and compensation by non-LDCs for the loss of customs revenue followed by tariff 
reductions.298 The Asian business environment is unstable due to shifting trade policies. In 
order to have a clear understanding of SAFTA and its potential limitation, it is necessary to 
incorporate the background cultural, historical and societal contexts of the past trade policies. 
Logistical restrains cause further hindrance in international trade. However, in recent times 
tariff barriers have gradually declined in South Asia. Despite this, other factors contribute to 
the higher trade costs. These factors include high border transactions, poor institutional 
facilities, inadequate infrastructure, and lack of effective regional transit trade.299 
 
4.2.5 Regional Connectivity Development 
The Eighteenth SAARC Summit marked significant progress towards finalization of 
SAARC Motor Vehicles Agreement and SAARC Regional Railways Agreement. During this 
Summit, the heads of state planned to hold meetings in three months to approve the final 
agreement. The goal was to ensure a seamless regional connectivity through building roads, 
railways, waterways, energy grids, infrastructures, and air links, ensuring free movement of 
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goods, services, capital, technology, and people. Further, the leaders expressed their concerns 
regarding connecting the contiguous regions of South and Central Asia. The leaders 
committed to taking requisite measures to ensure national, regional, and sub-regional 
connectivity.300 
On 12-13 April 2017, the Third SAARC-ADB Special Meeting on Regional 
Economic Integration Study (Phase II) convened in Islamabad, Pakistan. This was 
specifically dedicated to ‘Transport Connectivity.’ The purpose of this meeting was the Role 
of Transport Connectivity in Trade Facilitation for moving towards South Asian Economic 
Union (SAEU): Review of Progress in launching Indian Ocean Cargo and Passenger Ferry 
Service. Asian Development Bank submitted Feasibility Study Report for SAARC Cargo and 
passenger Ferry Service.  A meeting gathered in Colombo in 1-2 December 2015 to analysis 
the report. Representatives of India, Sri Lanka, Asian Development Bank, and SAARC 
Development Fund attended the meeting. At the meeting, the parties decided to explore the 
prospects of the Ferry and Cargo Services between Sri Lanka and India. Afterwards, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Maldives may also join this service.301 
 
4.2.6 Increasing Bilateral Border Trade 
To facilitate border trade between farmers at the border India and Bangladesh decided 
to open more border markets. These border markets should provide a common trading 
platform, encourage people to do business, and reduce the smuggling in this area. The 2011 
pilot project was highly successful and there are plans to open eight more duty free haats. 
Presently, haats play a ceremonial role where border people engage in informal trades. 
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However, these haats have a potential for marketplace interaction.302 Due to the 
infrastructural differences and different service requirements, it is difficult to ascertain 
governing principles of good practices. As a result, governing principles are broad so the 
other countries can accommodate their requirements in light of those principles. Those 
governing principles cover the issues such as transparency, competition, non-discrimination 
that are very crucial for enhancing both infrastructural and service facilities.  
 
4.2.7 SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme 
SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme is another important step towards liberation of 
trade. This scheme came into operation in 1992 following the Fourth Summit, held in 
Islamabad, in December 1988. However, it was limited to special travel document for certain 
dignitaries. The Council of Ministers regularly reviews the list of the people entitled under 
this category. Presently, the list consists 24 categories of personnel such as Judges of the 
higher courts, Parliamentarians, Businessmen, Journalists, Sportsmen, senior officials of the 
government, and others.303 However, this model is far different from the EU free movement 
of persons provision. In the EU, any citizen can freely travel to any other European country 
with ease. Tourist coming from outside the EU can travel through Europe if they obtain a visa 
from any European countries. 
However, visa schemes strictly apply in Asia, especially between India and Pakistan. 
Travelers from both countries are required to report to the police station, return through the 
same port of entry, and use the same transport means. This means that within these territories 
a passenger cannot come by railway and go back by airway. The regulatory scheme of 
Bangladesh and Nepal is stricter. Therefore, in practice SAARC fails to provide visa-free 
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travel. Visa-free travel could have promoted goodwill and peace amongst neighboring 
countries.304 
Despite the concerns about the free movement of persons, SAARC countries only 
provided for dignitaries. Therefore, the idea of free movement does not work.305 Further, 
Vikramjit Singh, the president of SAARC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), in a 
call to the Chamber of Commerce Presidents and Vice Presidents, suggested extending the 
visa tenure program from 3 months to 1 year. The Member States have decided to implement 
Visa Stickers to the entitled people that will last for 1 year.306 The Immigration Authorities of 
SAARC Member States regularly review this implementation. Vikramjit observed that the 
lack of trade largely hinders the integration and growth of the South Asian region. He further 
stressed the role of private sectors in this region. 
 
4.2.8 Progress or Stagnation: Comparing other FTAs 
Most South Asian countries trade with outer regions as opposed to neighboring 
nations. The trade price index, which is unavailable for South Asian countries, reflects the 
influences of countries outside of the region.307 Productivity growth can be determined by 
using a time trend and regional dummy. The time trend focuses on the average shift over the 
sample period of the production frontier whereas the regional dummy helps to identify the 
regional shift of the frontier in the pre-SAFTA and post- SAFTA regime.308 
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In the last two decades, there were some notable Economic Integration Agreements (EIAs). 
Empirical studies reveal that EIAs can promote member trade 420%.309South Asia has the 
fastest economic growth in the world.310 In 2014, the growth rate of South Asia was 6.9%, 
and it growth projection is 7.1% by 2015.311 On the other hand, it is one of the poorest 
regions of the world because over 40% of 400 million people are living on less than $1.25 a 
day.312 This region suffers from rapid unplanned urbanization and uneven development, 200 
million of people live in slums, and over half a billion have no access to electricity.313 
SAARC trade bloc has great potential to alleviate trade conditions. However, the region fails 
to prosper due to ineffective implementation of a regional trading bloc. The nature of the 
population, economic strength, and overall progress of development varies between 
countries. Moreover, countries like India and Pakistan are historically in a hostile relationship 
hindering trade between these countries. A recent study conducted by Geo TV, analyzed 
various regional trade agreements statistics provided by the WTO. The study shows that 
SAARC only boosted 5-10 % of regional business. However, the EU facilitate 66% of trade, 
NAFTA 3% of trade, the ASEAN 25% of trade, and Asian Pacific regional generates 32% of 
trade.314 In the SAARC region 43% of the people live below the poverty line and food and 
security issues pose a great threat. This relates to SAARC’s disparity and lack of 
coordination. SAARC is not effectively addressing the region’s economic needs. Since its 
inception, there have only been 18 summits and their functions were moot on development 
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and progress. Although SAARC countries broadly talk, about integration and cooperation 
within member states infrastructural development and policy formulation to build this region 
as an effective commercial bloc are lacking. 
 
4.2.9 The South Asian Century: Progressing Towards Regional 
Integration 
In recent times, global competition has substantially increased due to various 
unilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral trade liberalizations. However, placing orders and 
paying for goods significantly hinder competition within the market and thus affect a 
country’s economy. These obstacles are cumbersome for consumers and governments. In 
light of modern commerce, which is premised on production fragmentation and low lead 
times, delay in the borders and complex paperwork in harbors and docs adds to the 
difficulties in conducting business. Additionally, the hidden trade cost is hindering business. 
In 2002, by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
conducted a study revealing that trade transactions constitute 2-15% of the overall value of 
global trade.315 
For sustainable economic development, South Asian countries should focus on 
manufacturing, importing, and exporting cross border goods. However, intra SAARC trade 
only contributes a nominal amount in projected total trade within this region. There are 
several bilateral and regional trade agreements between countries, but they are insufficient to 
cross border trade. This is due to weaknesses in those treaties. SAARC members should work 
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together to improve trade amongst SAARC members and convert illegal cross-border trade 
into legal channels.316 
 
4.2.10 SAEU 
SAARC countries leaders stressed the commitment of regional integration, cooperation, 
and the importance of annual Summits in furthering core objectives by applying common 
strategies envisaged by the association’s charter. Moreover, they took a pledge to strengthen 
the association by being pro-active, result oriented, and adopting new strategies. The SAEU’s 
aspiration is to create a more prosperous South Asia. The SAEU’s purpose is to eradicate 
non-tariff barriers and other infrastructural constraints hindering regional integration and 
cooperation.317 In forming, the SAEU leaders need to look to other international forums like 
the EU, ASEAN, and other notable international organizations. They need to amalgamate 
these lessons with the Regional Cooperation and Integration (RCI) through creating binding 
agreements as envisaged by SAFTA, open-regionalism, and voluntary principles adopted by 
SAARC and ASEAN. Additionally, SAEU needs to create a bottom up market driven 
approach. The base of this approach must be global value chains, cross border production, 
and distribution according to cost, time effectiveness, location, and geographically focused 
programs and projects ensuring cross border connectivity (i.e. providing transport 
corridors).318 
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4.2.11 SAARC Apex Body Associate Organizations 
Since its inception, SAARC established various bodies for facilitating regional trade 
integration.319 These Apex Associate Organizations help many ways to make effective South 
Asian Trade. Some of the notable ones are as follows: 
4.2.11.1 SAARC Chamber of Commerce & Industry (SCCI) 
SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry formed in 1992. It coordinates the chamber 
of commerce and industry of eight SAARC countries. The camber encourages and promotes 
strong business amongst the entrepreneurs of this region. 
4.2. 11.2 SAARCLAW 
SAARCLAW, established in 1991, consists of legal profession members from South 
Asia. Its objective is to provide a platform for the legal communities to work closely and 
make laws more functional within the region. 
4.2. 11.3.  South Asia Foundation (SAF) 
In 2000, UNESCO goodwill Ambassador Madanjeet Singh formed SAF. It is a secular 
non-political organization, which focuses on promoting regional co-operation within SAARC 
countries. It became an Apex Body in August 2006 and its headquarters in India. 
4.2. 11.4. South Asian Federation of Accountants (SAFA) 
SAFA, established in 1984, coordinates the accountancy profession in the region. In 
1997, it became a SAARC body and subsequently in 2002 became a SAARC Apex Body. Its 
Secretariat is in India. 
4.2. 11.5. Foundation of SAARC Writers and Literature (FOSWAL) 
This organization is consisting of writers and intellectuals within this region. It is 
responsible for promoting art and culture. FOSWAL’s headquarters are in New Delhi. In 
2007, this organization gained SAARC Apex body status. 





4.2. 11.6 South Asia Initiative to End Violence against Children (SAIEVAC) 
SAILEVAC formed in 2012 to institutionalize the framework of ending violence against 
children. This organization works to eliminate all violence, abuse, exploitation, 
discrimination, and child labor. It gained status as a SAARC Apex Body in 2011 and its 
headquarters is in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
 
4.2.12 SAARC Recognized Bodies: 
At this time, Some Associate Recognized bodies are working within the SAARC umbrella. 
Most of them are professional organizations. These are as follows: 
4.2.12.1. Association of Management and Development Institutions in South Asia 
(AMDISA) 
AMDISA is a network of Management Education and Management Development 
Institutions in South Asia. Its purpose is the management of education, economic, and 
cultural development. It received SAARC recognition in 1997 and its headquarters are 
located in Hyderabad, India. 
4.2.12.2. South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation of Architects (SAARCH) 
The SAARCH was established in 1991, facilitates the national architectural bodies within the 
region. It received SAARC recognition in 1997.This is the platform, where member countries 
architecture can share their creative or innovative ideas. 
4.2.12.3 Federation of State Insurance Organizations of SAARC Countries (FSIO) 
FSIO received SAARC recognition in 2002. Its aim is strengthening cooperation among state 
sector insurers in the SAARC region. It also helps to prevent fraudulent activities by 




4.2.12.4 SAARC Diploma Engineers Forum (SDEF) 
SDEF received SAARC recognition in 2002. Its goal is to create a platform for 
exchanging technical information and experiences. Its headquarters are located in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
4.2.12.5 Radiological Society of SAARC Countries (RSSC) 
RSSC received recognition as SAARC body in 2002. This society’s goal is 
advancement of science through education and scientific research. 
4.2. 12.6 SAARC Teachers Federation (STF) 
STF received SAARC recognition in 2002. This forum’s goal is education and welfare. Its 
financial support comes from the Education International (EI). 
4.2. 12.7 SAARC Surgical Care Society (SSCS) 
SSCS received SAARC recognition in 2002. The goal of this forum is to develop a 
sound understanding between surgeons through exchanging information and experiences. 
4.2. 12.8 South Asia Free Media Association (SAFMA) 
SAFMA received SAARC recognition in 2004. The members of this association are 
mainstream media practitioners. It aims to promote networking and connectivity among the 
media community and thus improve media and professional standards. It carries out media 
training and undertakes joint media productions. 
4.2. 12.9 SAARC Women’s Association (SWA) 
SWA received SAARC recognition in November 2005. It aims is furthering friendship 




4.2. 12.10 Hindukush Himalayan Grassroots Women’s Natural Resources Management 
(HIMAWANTI) 
HIMAWANTI received SAARC recognition in 2007. This body specifically aimed at 
making policies in relation to the rural women. This organization advocates for women rights 
and works to provide moral strength to them. 
4.2. 12.11 Federation of Association of Paediatric Surgeons of SAARC Countries (FAPSS) 
FAPSS received SAARC recognition in 2007. This body’s objective is promoting children’s 
health and facilitating the exchange of information and cooperation. Additionally, it promotes 
paediatric surgery in countries where facilities are not available. Its coordination office is in 
Chittagong, Bangladesh. 
4.2. 12.12 South Asian Federation of Exchanges (SAFE) 
SAFE received SAARC recognition in 2007. It provides securities markets effective 
coordination and harmonization. This is the only regional platform for capital markets. 
SAFE’s Secretariat is in Islamabad, Pakistan. 
4.2. 12.13 SAARC Federation of Oncologists (SFO) 
SFO received SAARC recognition in 2009. Its purpose is promoting education and 
science of oncology. It further facilitates socio-economic aspect of practice and deals with 
methods of improving and continuing education in applied professional fields. 
4.2. 12.14 South Asia Association of National Scout Organization (SAANSO) 
SAANSO, established in 2011, is dedicated to promoting the values and ethos of scouting. It 
works to improve the National Scout Organizations (NSOs) overall organizational 




4.2. 12.15 South Asian Network of Economic Research Institute (SANEI) 
SANEI got recognition from SAARC in 2011. It promotes networking amongst economic 
research institutes. Its initiative is to interlink broader concerns of development. Its office is 
in Kathmandu, Nepal. 
4.2. 12.16 SAARC Academy of Ophthalmology (SAO)  
SAO is an association of ophthalmologists who are the members of ophthalmology in 
SAARC countries. It aims to promote peace, solidarity, and ocular health. Its headquarters 
are in India. 
4.2. 12.17 South Asian Women Development Forum (SAWDF) 
SAWDF works for socio economic empowerment of South Asian women. It arranges 
dialogues, advocacy, connections, and networking. It is a non-profit autonomous body based 
in Kathmandu, Nepal. It gained SAARC recognition in 2014. 
4.2. 12.18 Self Employed Women Association (SEWA) 
SEWA received SAARC recognition in 2016. It focuses on women small business owners 
who do not have regular salaried employment. It aims to promote issues like work, income, 
food, and social security. 
4.2. 12.19 South Asia Forum: 
This forum developed following the sixteenth SAARC Summit in 2010. This forum consists 
of eminent personalities and provides a ‘Vision Statement’ for exchanging ideas. This 
concept arose in the Informal Meeting of SAARC Council of Ministers in India (New York, 
28 September 2010). The first meeting of this forum occurred in Delhi, with the theme of 
“Integration in South Asia: Moving towards a South Asian Economic Union.” This forum 
aims to promote culture, connectivity, energy, environmental issues, and strengthening the 




4.2. 12.20 SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians Association 
In 1992, this association formed in Kathmandu. The Seventh SAARC Summit, held in 
Dhaka in April 1993, welcomed this initiative. The association aims to provide a platform for 
exchanging ideas and information on parliamentary practices and procedures. This 
association transcends the message of mutual understanding, trust, and friendship with 
SAARC countries. It also helps share experiences amongst parliamentarians. 
 
4.2.13 Conclusion 
Regional organizations across the globe have gained importance in economic and 
political interaction. These regional blocs have emerged as platforms which influence world 
affairs. Despite failures, SAARC has made some achievements. Trade liberalization and 
effective cooperation within the region have been hindered by global, regional, and domestic 
turbulences. However, there has been progress in SAARC states relationships. Mutual 
interest between courts acts as a triggering factor for regional cooperation and integration. 
SAARC member countries use SAFTA to promote their interest in global trade negotiations. 
Member states collectively can improve representation and trade negotiation. Member states 
can advocate and protect traditional knowledge, geographical prodcut indication, and fight 












Chapter 4.3: South Asian Transit and Border Trade: A Comprehensive 





The world trading system has become increasingly open textured over the last few 
decades. The triggering factors for this have been the reduction of Tariff rates and elimination of 
quantitative restrictions (quotas), e.g. Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA).320 South Asia is looking to 
attain the goal of CUs and Economic Union by 2020. In light of this, in 2006 SAPTA converted 
to SAFTA. Despite their suitable geographical position, the South Asian countries fail to perform 
according to their trade potentials. One of the vitiating factors is the lack of regional transit trade 
unlike European countries. Nonetheless, partial transit exits between Afghanistan, Bhutan, and 
Nepal. To integrate the regional connectivity the South Asian countries are incorporating various 
regional transit agreements and reducing regional and multilateral trade transportation costs. 
Generally, regional transit means stronger multilateral transit. However, there are 
numerous challenges. Regional transit agreements potentially benefiting economies with 
geographical contiguity can eradicate barriers to trade and transport. Typically, South Asian 
countries have various bilateral transit agreements that are based on the priorities and necessities 
of the contracting parties. But, the terms are not consistent with each other, and thus fail to 
achieve the broader goal of reducing the trade barriers within the region. To improve the 
situation and facilitate free trade the countries should design and develop regional transit 
agreement in addition to the existing bilateral arrangements321. 
 
4.3.2. GATT Articles and WTO provisions on Transit trade 
In November 2001, the Doha Ministerial Conference called for negotiations on trade 
facilitation after the 2003 WTO Ministerial and subject to agreement on the modalities of 
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negotiation. The current mandate of the Negotiating Group for Trade Facilitation (NGTF) 
established in 2004 is mainly to clarify and improve Articles V (freedom of transit), Article VIII 
(fees and formalities connected with import and export) and Article X (publication and 
administration of trade regulations) of the GATT 1994. The NGTF also pointed out the special 
and differential treatment for developing and least-developed countries apart from exploring 
areas for technical assistance and support for capacity building for the developing and the least 
developed country members. The most relevant articles of the GATT are discussed as follows. 
4.3.2.1. Freedom of Transit (GATT Article V) 
The freedom of transit through the most convenient route has been enshrined in Article V 
of the GATT intended at non-discrimination on the grounds of vessel, place of origin, entry, 
departure, exist or destination. The core objectives of the Article were to prevent hindering of 
traffic in transit caused by unnecessary delays and imposing unreasonable charges and also to 
provide MFN treatment to all the transit of goods of the WTO Member States. 
4.3.2.2. Fees and formalities (Article VIII) 
Article VIII of the GATT imposes limits on the costs and complexities. It imposes 
specific legal obligations on the member states in regard to fees and charges relating to import 
and export of the goods and also deals with the penalties that may be imposed for breaches of 
standard custom procedures. 
4.3.2.3. Transparency (Article X) 
Under Article X the WTO Member States have an obligation to publish trade reports in a 
prompt and accessible manner. Further, the Member states have to set up tribunals and devise 




publishing the reports and data the Member States should use modern technology (i.e. the 
internet). 
 
4.3.3. Regional Transit Arrangements 
Although Article V focuses on the national transit schemes it is silent on transit at a 
regional basis. But the regional cooperation is vital in enhancing the texture of existing 
international and regional transit agreement. Some of the notable ones are the TIR Convention; 
the European Convention on common transit; the ASEAN Framework agreement on the 
facilitation of goods in transit, and UN instruments relating to transit. Members can set up 
various regional co-operation schemes within the spirit of Article V. 
India plays a dual role, in that it provides transit facilities from Nepal and seeks the same 
from Bangladesh. It is done by bilateral agreements between these countries. However, 
Bangladesh is concerned and thus reluctant to provide transit facilities to India because it fears 
leakage of Indian goods into the markets of Bangladesh. It is thought that it will distort the 
market and thus will significantly hinder the economy. To prevent this, there can be further 
inspection of the goods and also request the importing states to publish a list of sensitive items. 
Bangladesh and India can incorporate such terms in their bilateral agreement. 
 
4.3.4. Relevance of the Revised Kyoto Convention 
WTO Members can look for various international instruments of transit.  The Revised 
Kyoto Convention contains provision for a safe, secure, and standard procedure of transit. The 
World Customs Organization (WCO) endorses the international regimes relating to transit such 
as the TIR Convention and instruments. The Member States are encouraged to accede to the TIR 
Conventions when drawing up customs transit bilateral agreements under the standards and 




4.3.5. Trade Facilitation and Regional Cooperation 
The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is working to alleviate the transit trade 
facilities. Such facilities include transport infrastructure, friendly legal framework, setting up 
proper administration, human resource management, and requisite ICT capacity. This is 
particularly important for the land-locked countries. The perception is that the bilateral and 
regional transit arrangements should be consistent with the broader objectives of the relevant 
internationally agreed conventions.322 
Bangladesh is a beneficiary of GATT Article V, because of its potential to offer transit to 
neighboring landlocked countries. For example, both Nepal and Bhutan show keen interests to 
use the transits in Chittagong and Mongolia. However, there is no clear information about the 
Bangladesh’s strategy relating to adopting the guidelines envisaged by GATT Article V.323 
In light of GATT Article V, India provides transit facilities to landlocked countries like 
Bhutan and Nepal. At present, the Indian custom authority requires a declaration of all the goods 
in transit. Furthermore, customs are working to enhance coordination amongst various border 
agencies. In addition, they are working to simplify the procedures involved in transit. In India, 
there is no charge duty or tax on transit goods, and there is no requirement of cash deposit for 
goods in transit nor any securities and guarantees.324 
Generally, India provides transit facilities through bilateral trade and transit treaties 
regulated by the Directorate General of Foreign Trade in light with the International 
Conventions. To prevent abuse of the customs transit corridors, India issues a list of sensitive 
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commodities at periodic intervals. Additionally, many elements of GATT Article V are not 
applicable to Nepal since it is a landlocked country. Therefore, Nepal made a transit treaty with 
India for easy access to Kolkata and Haldia seaports. 
Nepal and Bhutan are dependent on the Indian seaports for their exports and imports. 
whereas, Afghanistan relies heavily on Pakistan ports. When a 20-foot container transported 
from Delhi to Dhaka reaches Chittagong through Mumbai, Colombo, Singapore it costs 2500 
USD and has to cover some distance by railways from Chittagong to Dhaka. Further, it takes 
around 30-35 days. On the other hand, if the same container directly reaches Dhaka by rail, it 
will take only 4-5 days and the cost will be only around 850 USD.325 
TABLE 4:  3 LANDLOCKED COUNTRIES IN SOUTH ASIA AND TRANSSHIPMENT POINTS 
Landlocked Country  Transshipment Seaport    Transshipment Country 
Afghanistan    Karachi       Pakistan 
Bhutan    Kolkata, Haldia     India 
Nepal     Kolkata, Haldia     India 
 
4.3.6. Overall Transport Issues in South Asia 
Harmonization of the transport facilities plays an important role in facilitating 
international trade. In this respect, the UN offered seven international conventions categorically 
developed under the auspices of the EC for Europe.326 These legal regimes provide a basic 
framework for the cross-border movement of goods and vehicles such as: 
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✓ The Convention on Road Traffic, 1968. 
✓ The Convention on Road Signs and Signals, 1968. 
✓ The Customs Convention on the International Transport of Goods under Cover of 
TIR Carnets (TIR Convention), 1975. 
✓ The Customs Convention on the Temporary Importation of Commercial Road 
Vehicles, 1956. 
✓ The Customs Convention on Containers, 1972. 
✓ The International Convention on the Harmonization of Frontier Controls of Goods, 
1982. 
✓ The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 
(CMR), 1956. 
Further, on April 23, 1992, the Untied Nation Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UNESCAP) adopted Resolution 48/11 on roads and rail transport modes in 
relation to facilitation of measures. This called for consideration of the international conventions 
regarding facilitating transportation. However, the Member States of South Asia seem reluctant 
to adhere to the UNs norms. The Member South Asian countries have ratified the conventions 
for the cross-border movements of goods and vehicles.327 
Amongst South Asian countries, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka have signed the Convention 
on Road Traffic and India and Pakistan have signed both Convention on Road Traffic and 
Convention on Road Sign and Signals. Yet, Bhutan, Maldives, and Nepal did not sign any of the 
seven UN conventions. Moreover, only Afghanistan signed the Customs Convention on the 
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Temporary Importation of Commercial Road Vehicles or the Convention on the International 
Transport of Goods under TIR Carnet. Furthermore, there are different versions of these 
conventions that may create anomalies. Some countries are party to the 1949 Convention on 
Road Traffic, but they did not ratify the 1968 version. In these scenarios, the Convention on 
Road Traffic 1949 remains valid in relation to those contracting parties. The ethos of the 
Customs Transit Procedures, covered in detail in Specific Annexure E, Chapter E.I of the 
Revised Kyoto Convention facilitates a safe and secure standard transit procedure. 
 
4.3.7. Transit of Passenger Vehicles Across Borders 
Topmost bureaucrats from India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Bhutan have decided to meet to 
take forward the sub-regional transport agreement for seamless movement of passengers’ 
vehicles across the countries. Already, the passenger bus service has started between India and 
Nepal.328 Officials said that the focus is to start phase launching similar movement of passenger 
services on routes between other countries in the region. "We will work out the protocols for 
operation and movement. Recently we undertook a trial run of bus service between Guwahati 
and Dhaka. We want to formalize the agreements for better vehicular movement," said a 
government official.329 
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4.3.8. Present Conditions of Land Customs Stations (LCS) 
As part of their obligation under GATT Article V: Freedom of Transit and the 
facilitation, Bangladesh-India selected border-crossing corridors in eastern South Asia. As part 
of this process, both countries selected five land border-crossing corridors and corresponding 
land customs stations for connecting four countries. These five border-crossing corridors are the 
potential transit point falling within the Asian Highway (AH) and/or SAARC Regional 
Multimodal Transport corridors. 
There are both similarities and dissimilarities between the LCSs of India and Bangladesh. 
For example, the operational hours of customs and immigration amongst the LCs are the same. 
However, the days of operation are different. Apart from the basic facilities of immigration, 
customs, security, and the other facilities, are different in both physical and non-physical 
categories. There are stark differences between the e-governance of customs between these two 
countries. The Benapole and the Birganj border use the ASYCUDA world software, whereas, the 
few others use the ICEGATE software for customs and immigration. The performances of other 
custom formalities are typically manual. Furthermore, the existing Electronic Data Interchange 
(EDI) suffers from many shortcomings adding a further layer of costs. For example, the filing of 
declaration may be possible online. Nonetheless, the system generates a hard copy of the 
declaration and signing for a variety of legal and other requirements. This requirement vitiates 
the overall requirement of the online declaration form. 
In addition to these, most of the LCSs have limited warehouse capacity and lack banking and 
foreign exchange facilities. In some cases, like Burimari, Panitanki, and Karkabitta, the local 
banks are several kilometers away from the LCSs. Further, foreign exchange capacities are not 
available at the borders. However, apart from the Kolkata and Haldia seaports there are adequate 




the Member States need to cooperate and coordinate in designing and applying bilateral and 
regional transit. In this regard, India took the following initiative. India opened Land Port 
Authority of India (LPIA) whose function is to oversee the establishment of 13 Integrated Check 
Posts (ICPs) along with the international borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and 
Myanmar. The LPIA’s objective is to equip border crossings with all the modern facilities to 
alleviate cross-border trade. These facilities are immigration points, cargo inspection sheds, 
scanners, quarantine laboratories, custom clearances, banks, currency exchange, warehouses/cold 
storage, parking facilities, and hotels/restaurants. In 2011, the first ICP began at the Indo-Pak 
border. This ICP is an   institution for inter-agency coordination between the neighboring 
countries.330 
 
4.3.9. Open Border Markets (Haat between In-Bd) 
Following the success of India’s pilot projects in 2011, the neighboring countries have 
decided to operate a weekly market (Haat) at the shared frontier. Succeeding this, Bangladesh 
and India have decided to open eight duty free weekly markets at border crossings. These Haats 
will ensure remote area farmers will get a fair price of for products and improve interaction 
between neighboring country citizens. Presently, Haats operate at the Baliamari, Bangladesh, 
Kaliachar, Meghalaya, India, and the Dolora, Bangladesh-Balat crossings. 
These Haats benefit people on both sides of the border and create a harmonious 
relationship between them. A report of the Ministry of Commerce of Bangladesh, submitted to a 
parliamentary watchdog, observed that,” The border Haat enables the local people to sell their 
products without duty and buy their daily necessities.” As per the bilateral agreement, local 
                                                 





authorities in each country enlist 25 traders living within the 5-kilometer radius of the Haat to 
operation it. A local management committee headed by a magistrate regulates the Haat. At 
present, the Haat occurs on Tuesdays on each part of the border. The border guards of each 
country adequately guard the Haat. 
 
4.3.10. Improved Transit Facilities and Alternative Routes 
Nepal and Bhutan are highly dependent on the Chittagong and Mongla ports. Chittagong 
ports are the world’s least productive container port.331 Alternatively, Mongla is a more viable 
option for Nepal. In 1976, there was a bilateral agreement between Bangladesh and Nepal, which 
gave transit rights to Nepal, in order to have access to the overseas markets through Bangladesh. 
However, due to India’s non-cooperation in providing transit facility to Nepal for third-country 
trade via Bangladesh, Nepal cannot effectively utilize this agreement. In comparison to the 
Kolkata port, Mongla is more user friendly because of the shorter turnaround time, lower 
detention, and demurrage. However, this port is under-utilized. Further, Bangladesh provided a 
50% discount on port handling charges for Nepali trade handled through Mongla port, with 
possible further extension if Nepal can trade through the port. 
 
4.3.11. SAARC Nations opt for Motor Vehicle Deal for Connectivity 
In 2015 four SAARC Countries (India, Bhutan, Nepal, and Bangladesh) are considering 
signing an agreement to establish a seamless transit across borders of passengers, personal, and 
cargo vehicles.332 These four nations have drafted a motor vehicle agreement for cargoes and 
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passengers with contemplating connecting these countries’ roads and highways.333 This 
agreement should significantly reduce the loading and unloading of passengers and make cross 
border trade more efficient. If this agreement happens then passengers and cargos will move 
freely without the need for trans-shipment border crossings. 
This agreement’s implementation will be through protocols negotiated separately by 
neighboring countries under the umbrella of this agreement. The official release says, “They 
agreed to set up individual national committees and a sub-regional joint committee for overall 
facilitation of land transport and to coordinate and monitor the agreement’s implementation, it 
added.”334 This arrangement is a parallel initiative to the proposed SAARC transport agreements. 
The draft agreement is a motor vehicle agreement for the regulation of passenger and 
cargo vehicular traffic between and among the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, the Kingdom of 
Bhutan, the Republic of India, and Nepal (BBIN). This agreement outlines the broad features on 
vehicular movement as “there will be authorized routes and immigration checkpoints and land 
custom stations. All the vehicles of a BBIN country will require permits from plying through the 
other BBIN countries.”335 The draft copy, obtained by New Age, states, “Non-regular passenger 
vehicles will be permitted temporary admission on a case-to-case basis for a period for up to 30 
days, permits for regular passenger transportation and regular cargo transportation will be 
multiple entries, valid for one year and renewable every year subject to a maximum of five 
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years.”336 Despite the draft agreement promises, senior officials of the transport and bridge 
ministry have observed no tangible progress in the SAARC motor vehicle agreement. 337 
 
4.3.12. Economic Impact of Transit Trade 
Rehman Sobhan found that in order to enhance and develop production Bangladesh needs 
to have access to the wider South Asian market, mainly through India, via SAFTA. Bangladesh’s 
exports account for around 12% of its GDP. This amount has risen in the past quarter of a 
century. However, it is only two-thirds of the amount obtained by other low-income countries.338 
Around 80% of Bangladesh’s trade is with OECD members. Further, there is a noticeable 
amount of smuggling at the Indo-Bangladesh border. This is mainly because the trade and 
customs tariffs are significantly more that the smuggling risks.339 The assumption is that 
dissolving barriers will increase trade prospects regarding GDP, promote geographic border 
dissolution and territorial expansion, and increase tax incomes by not pressuring people to adhere 
to strict rules. 
Various factors influenced illegal cross-border trade. One factor is the high transaction 
costs including the cost of information, search, and risk in formal trade. To carry out trade in an 
effective manner a degree of trade related information is necessary such as product requirement, 
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technology, expertise, knowledge, price, tariffs, industrial trends, trade regulations, and 
procedures. Further, there is no mechanism ensuring effective exchange of trade information 
between SAARC countries. Furthermore, it is very difficult to analyze the goods suitable for the 
business. These factors impose high costs on cross-border trade. But, the informal trading 
partners provide all the necessary information and significantly reduce the overall costs. As a 
result, the low transaction cost of informal trading diverts the stream in the cross-border trade.340 
Bangladesh has a huge trade deficit with India.341 This bilateral imbalance results in 
cargo trains carrying exports from India to Bangladesh via the Singhabad-Rohanpur 
interchanging point, the nearest operative point to Nepal’s two major economic hubs through 
which 87 % of Nepal’s foreign trade passes, return with empty wagons.342 Bangladesh might 
take part in competitive railway tariff if it can properly utilize these empty wagons for Nepal’s 
import from Bangladesh.343 In 1980, there was a transit agreement between Bhutan and 
Bangladesh. However, it did not come into practical use because there was no tripartite 
agreement between Bhutan, India, and Bangladesh facilitating Bhutan’s use of Bangladesh 
seaports.344 A study based on the eastern sub-region of South Asia comprising of Bangladesh, 
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Bhutan, India, and Nepal suggests that the texture of the overall regional trade would enhance if 
there were regional transit arrangement between these countries.345 
The above discussions demonstrate that high trade transaction costs result in complex and 
cumbersome cross border trading practices. This also hinders harmonization of technological 
standards. In 2005, ADB conducted study on SAARC Regional Multimodal Transport Study 
(SRMTS) suggests that decrease of 10% transaction costs may facilitate around 3% of exports of 
a region.346 It takes around 30-45 days for a 20 feet container to move between New Delhi and 
Dhaka. This cost around 2500 USD. The container travels the maritime route to Chittagong via 
Mumbai and Singapore/Colombo. After arriving in Chittagong, the container transports via train 
to Dhaka. Creating a direct train connectivity would reduce the time taken to 4-5 days at a cost 
around 850 USD.347 
The scarcity of direct train lines, goods from Punjab, India must travel 3,000 km via sea 
route to reach Punjab, Pakistan. Creating a direct rail route would reduce the distance to around 
300 km. Furthermore, the distance between Dhaka and Lahore is around 2,300 km. However, 
any of these transactions of goods must travel 7,162 km by sea because India does not provide 
direct transit facilities. Further, it is possible to transit to Afghanistan through Pakistan. As a 
result, India is trying to develop an alternative route in collaboration with Iran to Kabul and 
Central Asia through using the Iranian Chaubahar port. 
Moreover, goods from Agartala, Tripura, to India must travel 1,645 km through the 
Kolkata port to Chittagong. However, the direct distance between Agartala and Chittagong is 
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only 75 km. Similarly, tea from Assam must travel 1,400 km to reach Kolkata port. Creating 
direct transportation facilities would reduce travel to around 400 km between Kolkata and 
Bangladesh. Due to lack of adequate transit facilities with Bangladesh, India in collaboration 
with Myanmar is trying to create an alternative route to connect the northeast India to Sittwe port 
of Myanmar.348 
Due to geographic conditions, Meghalaya is dependent on Bangladesh instead of India’s 
northeastern states. This decency is because Meghalaya cuts through the rough terrain within this 
part of India. As a result, the business leaders are eager to build good business relationship with 
Bangladesh. Dolly Khonglah, the Meghalaya International Exporters Chamber of Commerce 
Secretary observed, “Exports to Bangladesh, if infrastructure is improved, could be beneficial for 
the local economy.”349 Moreover, India and Bangladesh are working to make the border Haat 
scheme successful by opening one test site at Kaliarchar in the west of Garo Hills in 2011.350 It is 
likely the trade volume between India and Bangladesh will significantly increase if there is 
development in the existing infrastructure at the border.351 
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4.3.13. Border Management in South Asia: Volatile, Violent and Porous 
The borders within the South Asian countries are artificial in nature and specifically 
designed to serve the colonial purposes of imperial power. As a result, such demarcation did not 
take into account the practical needs and circumstances of the geographic conditions. The 
borders between these countries are result of the escapist mentality of the British rulers. 
However, in order to get the fuller picture of the border disputes it is necessary to discuss time 
prior to the East India Company arrival. At that time, Mughals ruled this land. However, they 
were politically diverse and had religious barriers. Moreover, there were many different 
monarchies, kingdoms, tribes, and clans. Despite this diversity, the Silk Route connected China 
with Russia and the Grand Trunk Road connected the Bengal with Kabul. These trade roads 
demonstrate that, despite their political differences goods and peoples moved freely within the 
different kingdoms and monarchies. At that time, divisions and political boundaries were 
unstable and occurrences of territories and boundaries over the game of cards or on a drunken 
gamble between the local rulers.352 
These examples illustrate that previous changes in territory did not affect goods in transit 
amongst these regions. Further, it points out the contemporary failure to realize the true essence 
of borders and border management. The contemporary concept of a border is a territorial line that 
has significant military importance. This analogy fails to understand that it is also a region as 
inhibited by people. Further, we have become protective, insular, and negative about border 
issues and as a result, there are military troops, barbed wire fences, and border included in maps 
to protect and guard our borders. However, consideration of border issues may in less aggressive 
                                                 




way is beneficial.  Borders are an amalgamation between protection via military, social, and 
economic engagement between two neighboring regions. 
Border areas can transcend a great spirit of harmony and act as bridge between two 
different regions. Even in ancient times, countries built monumental borders such as the Great 
Wall of China and the Walls of the Rajputs of Rajasthan, but they were for preventing opposing 
armies. In those times, great flexibility for the free movement of people and goods existed. This 
granting of flexibility was to free the movement of people and the movement of goods and ideas. 
This ensures harmonization and amalgamation of different cultures, foods, religion, and other 
factors. As a result, trans-border movement can be an opportunity to bridge with the neighboring 
regions. Using them for the sole military purpose and making them insular will only raise 
tensions in the border area and trigger volatility and violence.353 The neighboring countries can 
establish one-stop border posts to enhance better cooperation between the border agencies.354 
Despite infrastructure, the transport connectivity between the South Asian countries is 
practically fragmented.355 The free transit for Bhutan and Nepal through India to access the 
markets of Bangladesh demonstrates how effective co-operation between the states can create a 
win-win situation for all. Furthermore, India seeks free transit through Bangladesh so that it can 
connect to the northeastern states of Assam, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, 
and Arunachal Pradesh collectively known as the “Seven Sisters.” Such transits were previously 
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operational through East Pakistan, which lasted up to the 1965 Indo-Pak war.356 However, such 
transit was not available to India after independent Bangladesh was born. Bangladesh provides 
India limited water transit. The goods transferred to the Seven Sisters go through the narrow strip 
of land popularly known as the chicken’s neck. A transit through Bangladesh might reduce 71% 
of the distance.357 As far as some of the Seven Sisters are concerned, the Chittagong port is 
significantly closer than the Kolkata port. As a result, using the Chittagong port would 
significantly reduce the import cost and alleviate the competition in the market. In bargaining for 
providing transit to India, Bangladesh may seek for transit facilities through India to connect to 
Bhutan and Nepal. If so, Bangladesh can transit goods in those countries by virtue of its bilateral 
agreements. A study conducted in 2005/2006 indicated that Bangladesh expected to get a profit 
of 430.79 million USD if it enters into transit arrangements with India, Bhutan, and Nepal. 
Additionally, Bangladesh can also benefit from direct business with Bhutan and Nepal. 
 
4.3.14. Security Issues 
Security concerns are one of the significant factors behind Bangladesh’s reluctance to 
allow transit facilities to India. These are legitimate concerns because India is not providing 
transit facilities to Nepal on the grounds of security concerns.358 In relation to this, Zaid Bakht 
the research director of the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) observed, 
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“Bangladesh has some competitive advantages in the northeastern states dues to its geographical 
proximity. The prices of the Indian products go up due to the higher transport cost.” Further, the 
modernization of the Akhaura-Agartala check-post is an added advantage for both Bangladesh 
and India.359 
The new border-crossing facilities on the Indo-Bangladeshi frontier promise to boost 
commerce and harmonization of business with the landlocked northeastern states. As part of this 
process, India set up the new ICP in the border of Agartala, India and Akhaura, Bangladesh. This 
check-post has passenger and cargo terminals, warehouse facilities, banking facilities, 
automotive services along with the common facilities of immigration and customs.360 Abdul 
Matlub Ahmed, the Ex-President of the India-Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
opined, ‘This will help us tremendously to do business with the northeastern states and create 
new opportunities for the businessmen of both countries.”361 
 
4.3.15. Seamless Transit 
Bangladesh is working to ensure seamless connectivity between India, Nepal, Bhutan, 
and Myanmar. In order to facilitate smooth operation of business, Bangladesh made available 
two airports in the north of the country for Bhutan use. Further, Bangladesh is working to 
intensify the shipping linkage with Sri Lanka. This will not only enhance bilateral trade between 
these countries but also open Bangladesh’s opportunities to other connected countries like the 
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Maldives. To alleviate the regional co-operation, Bangladesh is working towards a joint water 
resources management scheme with India, Nepal, and Bhutan.362 
 
4.3.16. Review of the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
Bangladesh signed a Bilateral Trade Agreement with India on 28 March 1972. By virtue 
of this agreement, both the countries provide MFN treatment to each other but do not grant 
transit facilities.363 Additionally, on 4 October 1999 Bangladesh signed a bilateral agreement 
titled Protocol on Inland Water Transport and Trade. In 2007, the renewing of this agreement 
was to provide transit facilities between these two States. This bilateral agreement is rooted to 
the India-Bangladesh Trade Agreement. Moreover, they also agreed for railways for trade and 
services. Under this agreement, both of mutually agreed to operate trains (goods/passengers) 
through three border routes.364 
India and Nepal signed a bilateral agreement on 6 December 1991 to control and 
supervise unauthorized trade and smuggling. Moreover, on 5 December 1999 the signing of the 
Treaty of Transit between these states commenced. Under this treaty, India provides maritime 
transit and supporting services to Nepal through Haldia and Kolkata ports. Further, a signed 
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Memorandum to the Protocol detailed the import and export procedures between India and 
Nepal. In addition, India and Nepal have a Rail Service Agreement for managing rail transit 
trade. The agreement specifies the transit trade between Kolkata/Haldia ports in India and 
Birgunj in Nepal, via Raxaul in India as well as between stations on Indian Railways and Birgunj 
via Raxaul, for bilateral trade. 
India and Bhutan signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1995. The objective this agreement 
was to ensure contour free trade between these two countries. The Protocol of this Agreement 
distinguished the trade routes including the transit and explained the detailed trading procedures. 
Further, there is a mutual understanding of free movement of vehicles through the routes 
although such provisions are implied. Bhutan has transit facilities to Haldia and Kolkata port of 
India. 
On 2 April 1976, Nepal and Bangladesh signed a transit agreement as opposed to a 
bilateral trade agreement. This transit agreement allows Nepal to have access to the overseas 
market i.e. the third-party markets. However, this agreement does not provide for bilateral inland 
trade between these two countries. To enable bilateral transit trade, Bangladesh and Nepal signed 
the Operational Modalities for an Additional Transit Route between Nepal and Bangladesh 
agreement. As part of this agreement Banglabandha (Bangladesh)-Phulbari (India)-Khakarbitta 
(Nepal) are the transit corridor for bilateral trade. India does not provide Bangladesh and Nepal 
any extra regional transit trade and limits only between the bilateral trades. 
On 12 May 2003, Bangladesh and Bhutan signed a bilateral trade agreement that granted 




(India)-Jaigaon (India)-Phuentsholing (Bhutan) transit routes for bilateral trade between Bhutan 
and Bangladesh. Both these countries have bilateral overland trade between India.365 
Although there are many individual bilateral trade agreements and transit agreements there is no 
unified broader regional transport and transit arrangements for across border movement of goods 
and vehicles. 
 
4.3.17. Recommendations for Transit in South Asia 
To have an integrated framework for trading and ensuring smooth movement of goods 
there is no alternative to establishing a national wide single window system. Such a scheme will 
operate as an integrated hub and facilitate the importers, exporters, and all facilities relating to 
goods in transit. Moreover, it provides a unified electronic gateway for information exchange 
will make the entire process streamlined. Further, such scheme shall accelerate revenue 
collection and improve trade compliances, transparency, and accountability. It will also help to 
maintain an improved coordination between customs and other government agencies, like plant 
quarantine, banks, chamber of commerce, export promotion council board, insurance companies, 
etc. 
For coordination of border management and inland locations, it is necessary to provide 
facilities for examination of goods, stuffing and sealing of the container in the ICDs under the 
supervision of customs and border agencies. Further, encouraging import clearance in inland 
locations can impose customs control. A national transit system through the Authorized 
                                                 




Economic Operators can efficiently implement this system. It is possible such schemes shall 
reduce both congestion charge and logistics charges for the goods in transit.366 
Increased accessibility of no-man’s land and endorsing it as a hub wherein the traders 
would meet their counterparts for dialogues, negotiations, and exchange of information across 
borders. It can act as an institutional arrangement for interactions and coordination and can act as 
the common meeting place of border region stakeholders. Further, it can act as a better way to 
resolve the local issues, and facilitate implementation of policies for mutual benefits, and 
interlink between the relationships between state and local bureaucrats. Implementing 
Harmonization of Standards and Conformity Assessment Procedures may further the regional 
integration. In order to boost the governmental agreements, agreements between the national 
certification institutions can be encouraged. Further, it is necessary to adopt a regional based 
approach rather than the present bilateral ones in order to facilitate transit facilities within the 
region. 
To develop the economy of the border area the border Haats and the Special Economic 
Zones need further encouragement. This will act as the bridge connecting trade corridors needing 
development in a manner that they form part of the seamless web of connectivity between the 
people. Last but not the least, the procedure for obtaining VISA within this region must be easy, 
flexible, and uniformed. 
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The econometric evidence raised in this segment emphasizes the existing linkage of the 
trade costs and trade flows. It identified that high transaction costs hinder the way of free trade. 
This article discovered that a drop in 10% transaction cost could increase 2% of the overall 
country’s export. Further, it appeared that electronic filling of customs documents at the borders 
accelerated the trade growth in the South Asian region. Contrarily, it also is apparent that not all 
border custom stations are adequately equipped with modern technologies. In South Asian region 
cross border transactions occur mainly through the bilateral agreement between the countries. 
For example, India provides overland transit facilities to Bangladesh, Nepal, and Bhutan for their 
bilateral trade, and maritime transit to Nepal and Bhutan for their international trade. However, 
promotion is necessary in order to get the full essence of the trade regional trade arrangements. 
Endorsement of border corridors and their effective utilization can play a vital role in a 
region’s competitiveness and trade prospects. Establishing highly equipped custom stations can 
abolish asymmetries between the corridors. Further, to improve their performances the border 
corridor management authorities (governments) need to evaluate regularly their operations and 
processes related to providing, marketing, and selling services to the users. There has to be a 
regional coordination of monitoring the performances. Further, the policies need revision in light 
of the changing global environment and regional trade. This will significantly improve 
competitiveness within the region. The development of the regional trade shall heavily rely upon 
evolution of the corridor services, introducing new performance standards, and implementation 
of policies both at the national and regional level.367 
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Transit is as important as trade liberalization. It is the most vital practical dimension in 
any cross-border movement of goods and vehicles. Transit plays an important role both in the 
national and regional economies. To reduce transaction costs and time there is no alternative to 
the seamless movement of the goods within the region. The broader regional transit agreement in 
South Asia is necessary because cross-border trading practices are expensive, cumbersome, and 
involves high-trade transaction costs. Further, the goods carried by roads in South Asia are 
subject to transshipment that significantly impedes the regional and multilateral trade. The 
regional transit agreement will facilitate the South Asian countries to integrate their businesses 
and boosts the globalization process. The issue of traffic in transit, as envisaged by GATT 
Article V is very crucial in the backdrop of ever developing businesses in South Asia. The WTO 
brings several lessons through which the South Asian transit system can operate.368 
 
 





























This chapter concentrates on the research design and data collection methods deployed in 
this study. Furthermore, the justification behind the data collection methods and procedures is 
explained in detail. Section 5.1.2 focuses on the nature of this study and elaborates the rationale 
of the preferred research design. Section 5.1.3 deals with the research design including 
justification of the research design, the preferred data collection method, and it mentions the data 
sources and the manner of collection. Section 5.1.4 focuses on the ethical considerations applied 
during this research work. Section 5.1.5 highlights the detailed description of data transcription 
and mentions the data analysis. Section 5.1.6 emphasizes how the findings of the data is 
objectively applied. Further, this chapter also points out the limitations of the preferred research 
methodology. 
 
5.1.2. Nature of the Study 
This research work is explanatory and analytical in nature. It aims to add a valuable 
means of investigating the subject matter of this research. Moreover, it delves into new insights 
and assesses phenomena in a new light.369 The current study attempts to understand the factors 
and consequences of unilateral liberalization (UL) and how UL influences a country to make 
multilateral commitments under the WTO. The lack of study on unilateral liberalization of the 
free trade or preferential trade sector, generally constrains the ability to gain a comprehensive 
picture of unilateral liberalization, and its impacts on trade peoples. 
                                                 





There is a shortage of knowledge about how a country’s unilateral liberalization in a trade 
sector influences its understanding of multilateral commitment (through submission of a 
schedule of commitments) in that sector. Therefore, it is logical to adopt an exploratory research 
design because this research approach provides greater understanding of a concept or crystallizes 
a problem rather than providing precise measurement of qualification.370 This study is 
appropriate for the current research because it helps explore substantive areas where little is 
known and requires novel understanding.371 This research approach satisfies three rationales of 
research: to diagnose a situation, to screen alternatives; and to discover new ideas. The findings 
of this research promise to contribute to the existing literature on this topic, that is, to provide a 
deep account about the experiential factors that are trade barriers within last 12 months, and the 
most pressing problems facing South Asian free trade. 
 
5.1.3. Research Design 
Typically, a research design is comprised of various elements such as data collection, 
analysis, and interpretation of the derived data. A properly planned research design helps to 
cover the situations which do not arise during the initial research questions.372 In preparing the 
research design, the researcher incrementally deployed knowledge and foresight to ascertain the 
issues relevant to the research questions, the required information for the research, and the 
sources to look for to conduct the research. The questionnaires were in English and KU qualtrics 
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website processed the data derived from the interviews. To ensure and maintain accuracy the 
researcher made daily computer data entry and regularly monitor it. 
The following paragraphs give a detailed insight into the research design. 
 
5.1.3.1. Case Study Approach and Justification 
The research question dictates the choice of research practice.373 In this research, the 
researcher adopted three research questions to investigate into the topic i.e. Legal and Non-Legal 
Barriers to free trade in South Asia. It is inevitable that the researcher has no control over the 
substantive issue of the research. As a result, the researcher adopted the “what,” “how,” and 
“why” approach to find the most relevant data to the research question. (Berg, 2007; Erikson & 
Kovalainen, 2008). Notably, according to Yin (2009) the purpose of the empirical studies is to 
investigate contemporary situations considering real life experiences.374 This is the best suitable 
method of case study in relation to this topic as it aims to make an objective analysis on the 
issues like liberalization, free trade, GATT and Article XXIV issues in connection to FTAs. 
Additionally, this case study method enabled the researcher to have a contemporary 
analysis regarding the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events (yin, 2009). Such 
views are analogous with the recommendations of Gibbert, Ruigrok and Wicki (2008) and Yin 
(2009). The adoption of this case study method considered the overall ambit of the research 
questions. 
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5.1.3.2. Selection of the Case 
Collis & Hussey (2009, P.117)375 define a “research question” as a specific question the 
research is designed to investigate and attempts to answer. This intention is the basis of this 
dissertation. The intention is for this question to gather information by an inductive approach as 
part of a qualitative research method. It is therefore more investigative than searching for a 
definitive answer. Blumberg et al (2005, p.61)376 describes investigative questions as questions 
the researcher must answer to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, by taking a general research 
question and breaking it into more specific questions about which to gather data or information. 
Legal and Non-Legal Barriers to South Asia free trade has been the central issue of this research. 
To have a practical insight about the study, the selection of the related stakeholders for case 
study are directly linked the research topic. This facilitated to overcome the perils of 
misrepresentation and non-representation in the existing field of study. 
 
5.1.3.3. Qualitative Research Approach in Case Studies 
The production of knowledge is through a “qualitative” research encounter best 
understood as the product of a specific interaction between researcher and informants.377 
Qualitative research method of data collection is used for the case study. This is because it 
enables the researcher to have a detailed understanding and knowledge by portraying all key 
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participants.378 Additionally, various documentary analysis, observations and professional 
interviews have used for refinement of the case study.379 There were three intriguing factors for 
selecting the qualitative research method. 
First, the qualitative approach facilitates understanding of a complex issue in certain 
contexts (Cresswell & Plano Clark, 2007).380 This research topic requires an in-depth knowledge 
and understanding about the South Asian free trade. To get the most relevant data for the 
research, the qualitative research method was helpful to gather first-hand information. In this 
research, the qualitative research method is more plausible than quantitative research method. 
This is because the qualitative research method ensures critical engagement of variable factors 
whereas the quantitative research method focuses of measurements and casual relationship with 
the variables. 
Second, this research method facilitates shining a light on the practical aspects of the 
research area and permits us to evaluate how the issues raised in the research question are varies 
keeping pace with the variable social interactions (Silverman, 2009). Finally, the pattern of 
qualitative case study design is a manner that accumulates concurrent data collection and 
analysis.381 
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TABLE 5: 1 OCCUPATION OF THE RESPONDENT 
Serial No. Profession No. of Respondents 
1 Law Maker/ Politician 4 
2 Academician 11 
3 Business Owner 9 
4 Business Leader 1 
5 Lawyer 4 
6 Law Executor 14 
7 Trade Related Support Service Provider 6 
8 Beneficiary 1 
9 Other 1 
10 Total 51 
 
Overview about Survey Questions (Annexure 5:1): Total Question 24 and part seven includes 
optional part of respondents ‘details. 
The researcher carefully selected the interviewees those have expertise in trade and WTO issues. 
Furthermore, the researcher selected the policy makers connected with free trade business. The 
researcher has over 11 years of public service experience in important public sectors which 
facilitated the researcher to have easy access to the interviewees who hold various key positions. 





5.1.3.4. Quantitative data collection and data sources 
According to Zikmund (2003, P.111) exploratory research provides greater understanding 
of a concept rather than providing precise measurement or quantification, and much, though 
certainly not all, exploratory research provides qualitative data.382 This research uses multiple 
sources such as interviews with the policy makers of the country, academicians, business owners 
and other people directly concerned about the research topic. Furthermore, there is a wide range 
of documents used for this research, including legal journals, articles, literature on South Asian 
Free Trade, SAARC Summit Report, and other contemporary online articles and journals. The 
basis of selecting the most relevant documents was their relevance with the SAFTA agreement, 
the effects of pricing, variables of market shares, transparency of the market, and issues of 
competition within the market and the role of the SAARC as the regulator of the concerned 
business. Additionally, extra care is given to incorporate herein the most authentic statistics. 
Regular monitoring was necessary to have the most up to date information electronic version of 
the newspapers such as The Daily Star, the New Age of Bangladesh, the Don of Pakistan, and 
the Hindu in India. A detailed discussion as to how the data were derived is as follows. 
 
5.1.3.5. Medium of Data Collection Process 
Taking interviews from the experts follows the semi-structured-in-depth interview 
design. Face to face interviews greatly facilitated the researcher to explore all the necessary 
issues of the research topic. The open textured questions enabled the interviewees to express 
their thoughts in a manner they perceived the material issue (Patton, 2002 and Sekaran, 1992). 
The research questions are based upon the unilateral linearization of the free trade with emphasis 
                                                 




on the Research Question 1 and 2. After that, the research questions were narrowed down and 
were directed precisely to the research questions by applying funnel technique of inquiry 
advanced by Ahlstrom, Young, Chan and Bruton (2004). During the interview process, it was not 
possible to maintain the sequences of the questionnaire which had to be subsequently slightly 
modified keeping in mind the central issues of the research topic. 
These semi-structured interviews were conducted both by email and in person. The interview 
began by a brief introduction of the researcher and follows with an explanatory statement to the 
respondents. During the entire process the researcher ensured strict adherence to the ethical 
obligations of the University of Kansas. In taking private face to face interviews ensured the 
confidentiality of the interview and the smooth operation of the interview. 
To ensure maximum output from the interview, in most of the occasions follow-up 
interviews were taken. In certain situations, conducting follow up communication over the 
telephone and email was necessary to ensure that the researcher accumulated all the data of the 
interview in the precise manner. On top of it, during the interview phase a dispassionate attempt 
was made by the researcher to double-check as to whether the researchers understanding matches 
with that of the respondent. Furthermore, the interviews were not deliberately recorded to 
provide the comfort-zone to the respondents to be enthusiastic and freely expressly their 
thoughts, ideas and personal experiences about the research topic. 
 
5.1.4. Ethical considerations 
According to Blumberg et al (2005, P.92) research ethics address not only the question of 
how to use methodology in a proper way to conduct sound research, but the question of how to 
use available methodology in the ‘right’ way. The research project was approved by the 




received the researcher embarked on outlining the aims and objectives of the research topic, the 
research methodology and data collection. Furthermore, the questionnaire used for the 
questionnaire through using tools of www.kuclas.qualtrics.com. After that the research 
communicated with the interviewees. The participants knew they could withdraw from the 
interview anytime the wanted. To protect the privacy and anonymity of the interviewees the 
name of the participants and their designation are not revealed. 
 
5.1.5. Data analysis 
“The researcher who adopts a grounded theory approach, does not follow a linear path of 
research progression. The process of coding and analysis are in operation throughout the research 
process.”383 The data analysis for this research project included coding, thematic classification, 
counting the frequency of the same theme and text data. The insights derived from the 
interviews, various transcripts and documentary evidences were the main resources of data. Due 
to the preferred qualitative research approach the researcher had to work with huge amount of 
textual information. The analysis of the data derived through the qualitative research method was 
highly cumbersome and a daunting task for the researcher because the researcher had to mix 
different approaches to fulfill the requirements of the study (Miller & Crabtree, 1999 and Yin, 
2009).384 
The main sources of the research are the interviews and questionnaire answers. As a 
result, the researcher had to go a wide range of written information and then had to narrow them 
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down to choose the most relevant one for the research questions. To do so, the content analysis 
method is effective in analyzing the interview data and the open-ended questions. On top of it, 
this technique is effective in extracting thematic information from qualitative materials 
(Tharenou, et al, 2007). There are two methods of content analysis such as i) template approach 
and ii) editing approach (Tharenous, et al, 2007). The researcher preferred the editing approach 
for this research. 
 
5.1.6. Editing approach 
In the editing analysis method, the researcher has the freedom to interpret and rearrange 
the texts of a material into meaningful portions that suit the objective and purpose of the study. It 
ensures cyclical analysis by an iterative process of data analysis (Thearenou, et al. 2007). The 
freedom of interpretation makes this method more plausible than template analysis as its leaves 
room open for subjective understanding and exploration of various factors (Tharenou, et al, 
2007). Furthermore, the subjective analogy regarding the issues like the free trade of good and 
service of the South Asia and its impact on the undertakings GATT Article XXIV enabled the 
researcher to focus in these areas and generate new insights on the topic which were less 
researched previously. To attain this objective the editing approach was highly useful to the 
researcher. The researcher adopted the inductive editing approach to analyze the data. 
Accordingly, the researcher categorized materials in meaningful codes. These codes were 
thematically organized in accordance with the broader questions of the research essay. Thematic 





5.1.6.1. Coding data 
To attain the broader objective of the research, a huge amount of data was collected from 
a wide range of resources. For coding and analyzing this data SPSS software was used. After that 
the researcher carefully went through the word-processed files to have a clear picture of the 
research theme and identify the key points raised during the interview sessions. Generally, theme 
means the inner meaning or the gist of the text (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). To precisely 
understand the theme, the researcher had been keen to distil the research questions, explored and 
extracted concepts and phrases from narrative text through editing approach and codes the 
themes as “free nodes” (QSR International, 2010). Further, the researcher used the inductive 
analysis methods to derive themes and patterns with the help of interviews and data collection 
methods Bailey, Price, Esders and McDonald (2010). For this research there was creation of 
around 500 free nodes. After that they have been organized in accordance with hierarchy as ‘tree 
nodes’ to put focus on the three research questions of the study. In this process, the texture of 
each theme such as the issues or related concepts were considered according to its relevancy to 
the research questions (Bazeley, 2007). After that, the queries option of the software generated 
the reports. 
 
5.1.7. Quality and rigor of the research method 
The qualitative research method is often subject to criticisms. The major attack comes 
when it is assessed considering the quantitative standards used. Furthermore, features like 
subjectivity, reliability, the generality of opinions and the academic integrity of the qualitative 
method are criticized (Janesick, 2000 and Anfara Brown & Mangione, 2002). Furthermore, it is 
thought that the qualitative research offers alternative ways “that more accurately capture[s] the 




been based upon the constructivist approach of qualitative research and the criteria for such 







Credibility denotes the confidence as to the quality of the data and the methods of 
analysis deployed to focus on the research.385 The enhancement of the credibility of any research 
occurs by citing the resources from the transcribed text. Further, to uphold credibility by 
ensuring that no useful information or data regarding the research area is withheld even 
unintentionally.386 The researcher had been extra cautious in this regard. To maintain credibility 
of the research, the researcher derived data in various phases. Moreover, to maintain credibility 
the data testing was amongst various types of members of the same group of interviews. It is 
apparent that this ‘member checking’ method is greatly beneficial for the credibility of the 
research.387 
Additionally, to assess the data, sharing of the summaries of the responses with the 
interviewees was necessary to get comments on the respective views of the interviewees. This 
approach greatly helped to refine the data and add credibility to the research. To scrutinize the 
data, the researcher conducted three follow up interviews with trade and regulatory experts of 
different countries of South Asia. These follow up interview helped to fill in the gaps that existed 
in the initial phase of the research. Further, it facilitated the addition of a wide range of resources 
and data to reduce any possibility of bias regarding the research work.388 The strategies that the 
researcher adopted to ensure the quality of the research are mentioned in Table 5.1.2. 
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TABLE 5: 2 TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO ENSURE THE TRUSTWORTHINESS (RESEARCH 



















Credibility Trustworthiness of the 
conclusion from the data 
set and the match of 
these conclusions with 
reality. Credibility 
depends less on sample 
size than on the richness 
of the information 
gathered and on the 
analytical abilities of the 
researcher  
-Prolonged 





-Transcripts reviewed by 
the participants/member 
check 
- Triangulation of data 











-thick description of 






The study is repeatable 












- Triangulation of 
interviews with Focus 
group discussion and 
documentary evidence 
- Inquiry audit 
-Informants kept 
anonymous 
-Purposive sampling for 
R.Q. 1 and 3 
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Generally, transferability refers to the shared usage of the findings of the research beyond 
the sphere of the study.391 Since this research is not based upon ‘sampling units’ generalization 
of the case study was never intended. The case study approach promises analytical generalization 
that critically evaluate previously developed theory into that area (Darke, et al, 1998; Yin, 
2009).392 This research took various attempts to alleviate the transferability of the study. First, 
the central issue of the research had been South Asia’s people with the objective of literal or 
theoretical replication as described in Yin (2009). To conduct the interviews, a wide range of 
people were carefully selected from free trade regulators, policy makers of the country, 
government officials and other key players who are directly involved in competition within the 
market. It is apparent the case study of the concerned players has significantly added to the 
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transferability of the findings of the research. Second, to maintain the integrity and intellectual 
rigor of the research, all the interviewees were of similar designations. 
5.1.7.3. Trustworthiness 
Generally, trustworthiness refers to whether the research can be used or repeated by 
others with the same results.393 A triangulation method had been applied to ensure the reliability 
of the research. The research had been elaborative as it included detailed information of various 
data resources, procedures and questionnaire of interviews, transcription and coding of data. 
Further, the researcher had been extra careful to maintain the dependability by arranging various 
follow-up interviews whenever has been divergent result. 
5.1.7.4. Conformability 
Conformability means the extent of neutrality that the researcher can attach to the 
research.394 To attain conformability the researcher took all reasonable steps to eradicate any real 
possibilities of bias. Throughout the research the researcher had been objective and dispassionate 
about the research issues and refrained influencing the interviewees by giving his personal 
opinions. The main objective of the interview sessions was to collect the data from the 
interviewees those are expert in the relevant field. The interviewees were people from a wide 
range of people that ensure in-depth and meticulous analysis of the research topic. The 
interviews were transcribed in a proper manner to maintain independence and with the focus of 
understanding the viewpoint of a particular group of people on a certain topic note, “Participants’ 
recognition of the findings can also be an aspect of credibility. It is not, however, a question of 
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verification but rather a question of conformability.”395 The researcher kept this on mind when 
summarizing the data of the interview. 
5.1.7.5. Triangulation 
Triangulation is defined as “a process of using multiple perspectives to clarify meaning 
and verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” by Stake (2005, p 454).396 
Generally, there are four kinds of triangulation such as data triangulation, investigator 
triangulation, methodological triangulation, and triangulation of theories (Hussey & Husey, 
1997, p 74). In this research data triangulation method was used. It refers to the method where 
the data collection is in different times from different sources about the same subject matter. Yin 
(2009) observes that collecting data from multiple sources about the same subject matter helps to 
refine the search terms and come up with accurate results. The qualitative research method 
enabled the researcher to explore various resources within the triangulation method. As per 
Perry’s (1998) view interviews of multiple people from a wide range of people, the data was 
rigorously monitored and the documents were meticulously scrutinized which significantly 
facilitated triangulation. Further, after finishing the draft essay the researcher further went for 
field visit to cross check the data and see as to whether there are recent developments in this 
area. According to the suggestion of Stake, to find and rectify the mistakes of gathered 
information the researcher engaged in various discussions with both critical insiders and 
outsiders.397 
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396 ROBERT .E. STAKE, MULTIPLE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS (THE GUILFORD PRESS. 2006) AND STAKE (2005, p 454) 





This dissertation attempts to address a broad set of topics relating to obstacles to free 
trade in South Asia. The topics could, of course, have been broader still. During the research, 
countless related topics and intriguing perspectives have presented to respondents. Given 
constraints of time and capacity, it is not possible to explain and develop them for inclusion in 
this dissertation. The thesis would be richer for them, but it could not be completed within a 
reasonable time or number of pages.398 
Many limitations were faced in conducting this research. This limitation is mainly due to 
the observation on the research question varies from person to person. As a result, to make an 
objective analysis of the issues the researcher included a wide range of people as interviewees. 
Further, the qualitative research method facilitated enhanced analytical generalization as opposed 
to drawing inferences on the chose sample. Further, the researcher faced difficulties such as 
personal bias, response bias and recall error during the interview phase (Patton, 2002 and Yin, 
2009). Furthermore, I would like to mention few things which are my limitations for primary 
data sources. Initially, I do not have similar number or type of respondents from each country, 
which makes it difficult to know if the picture you are getting of each country is comparable; 
Secondly, I should tell clearly that I did not attempt to find a "representative sample of specific 
numbers" of officials or others from each country, and mostly based on target categories of 
respondents. 
However, with the data triangulation method the researcher tried to reduce the errors. 
Moreover, when conducting the interview, the researcher faced difficulties with biased notions of 
some of the interviewees. These biases might be motivated by the conflict of interests’ situations 
                                                 




they may have been. Social desirability which ‘is the tendency of subjects to respond to test 
items in such a way as to present themselves in socially acceptable terms to gain the approval of 
others’ (King & Burner, 2000 p 81) was also observed by the researcher amongst the 
interviewees. This might have compromised their integrity towards the data they provided for the 
research. To minimize the impact of social desirability the interviewees were informed both 
verbally and in written form that their identity would remain anonymous and they will be de-


















Greater participation of all stakeholders in decision making may build the much needed 
support to make SAARC a viable and vibrant organisation accountable to the aspirations of its 
people.399  The researcher’s in depth questions ask for Respondents to reveal their judgments and 
feelings, including things that may be very personal to them.  This may be difficult for 
Respondents. From time-to-time the experiences being explored are fresh in the Respondents’ 
minds, whereas on other occasions recalling past involvements may be difficult.400 
The researcher posed survey questions to stakeholders who work in different categories 
of engagement with trade issues within the SAARC countries. Respondents most often replied 
within a range of defined prompts, but in some cases they provided additional comments.  
Although most of the survey questions were close-ended, the researcher posed some open-ended 
questions to respondent stakeholders in particular professions and locations.  Most of the 
respondents directly participate in international trade as professionals, often at the execution 
level,  so their opinions are very important sources of information for policy developers who 
seek to identify and overcome the barriers to free trade in SAFTA.  The data analysis in this 
chapter two parts:  the Primary Data analysis focuses on the Respondents’ opinions, and the 
Secondary Data analysis considers data taken from different international sources like World 
Bank, WTO, ADB, UNCTAD, etc., which provide valuable context for understanding the 
Primary Data. 
5.2.2. Collection of data from Primary sources: 
                                                 
399 FICCI, The South Asian Century: Progressing Towards Regional Integration - A Study  (January 2014). 
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At present, SAARC consists of eight countries: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. The accumulation of research data from engaged 
stakeholders in SAARC countries enables collection and analysis of relevant and reliable facts 
that reveal the barriers standing in the way of free trade among South Asian nations.   This 
presentation of such data preserves respondent confidentiality, and no respondents are identified 
by name or other identifying characteristic (including their specific responses) without their 
verbal or written consent. 
5.2.3. Primary Data analysis: 
5.2.3.1. Analysis of Respondents Answers: Country and Occupation 
The research data can be analyzed by both respondents’ countries of residence and their 
professions. 
5.2.3.1.1 Respondents’ Residence: 
Respondents’ motherlands or actual countries of residence fall within SAARC countries, 
even if respondents may have been physically located in different parts of the world at the time 




FIGURE 5: 1 RESPONDENTS’ RESIDENCE 
 
The first question asked of all respondents was their country of current residence. Figure 
1 shows that most of the respondents live in Bangladesh, making up 23/47 (48.9%) of the 
respondent population. Sri Lanka and Maldives produced the fewest Respondents, with only 1 





















5.2.3.1.2 Respondents’ Occupations (Multiple Response): 
FIGURE 5: 2 RESPONDENTS’ OCCUPATIONS 
 
Some respondents included themselves in more than one occupation category.  
Respondents’ occupations fall within the following 9 categories: Law Maker/Politician (8.5% of 
respondents), Academician (23.4%), Business Owner (19.1%), Business Leader (2.1%), Lawyer 
(8.5%), Law Executor (29.8%), Trade Related Support Service Provider (12.8%), Beneficiary 
(2.1%), and Other (2.1%). 
5.2.3.2. SAFTA Barriers to Trade Experience 



































TABLE 5: 3 TRADE EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS 
Serial Issues/Options Total Number 
1 Imports 12 
2 Exports 15 
3 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 4 
4 Government Service (Customs/Port) 16 
5 Trade Operations (Customs/Brokers/Bankers) 6 
6 Legislation of SAFTA 2 
7 Participation with SAFTA related Issues (e.g., Attending 
Seminar) 
6 
8 Others 6 
 
The respondents answered questions about their experience related to certain trade factors 
such as:  Imports, Exports, FDI, Government Service, Trade Operations, Legislation of SAFTA, 
Participation with SAFTA Related Issues, and Others. 
Import and Export are the most frequent form of trade activity irrespective of occupation. 
Policy level activity among respondents is not frequent, suggesting, that there is a lack of policy 
level exchange between SAARC countries; despite the need to address challenges in that area. 
The third most frequent trade activity is Government Services (Customs/Port). 
Figure 5-3 (below) breaks down the trade activities in relation to occupation, focusing on 
the three most frequent activities.  16 (Sixteen) Respondents have trade experience in 
Government Services, and 15 (fifteen) Respondents have experience in Exports.  Only 2 (Two) 




5.2.3.2.2 Trade Experience in the last 12 months: by Occupations 
FIGURE 5: 3 TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE LAST 12 MONTHS 
 
 
The above figure stated that majority involves with exports, in respond wise, 40% experienced 
with government service and imports related issues by Politicians/law maker. One-third 
academicians experienced by participate with SAFTA related issues, where as business owner 
experienced 44% through exports of their last 12 months trade experience.  
 
5.2.3.3. Trade Barriers: By Country 
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FIGURE 5: 4 TRADE BARRIERS EXPERIENCED BY COUNTRY 
 
Figure 5.4 gives a holistic overview of the trade barriers experienced in each SAAARC country 
in response of tariff, NTBs and others experience. India and Bangladesh face all sorts of NTBs 
and other barriers based on past 12 months trade experience. The volume of trade undertaken by 
the respective countries attests to the proportion of barriers experienced by their citizens., 
Maldives have exclusively Tariff Barriers, while Bhutan and Sri Lanka have exclusively Non-
Tariff Barriers. India and Pakistan have predominantly Non-Tariff Barriers, though in different 
proportions.  The overall predominance of NTB warrants further discussion on the types of 
















































5.2.3.4. Trade Barriers experienced by Occupation 
FIGURE 5: 5 BARRIERS EXPERIENCED BY OCCUPATION 
 
Figure 5.5 gives us a holistic overview of trade barriers experienced by respondents by 
occupation, reflecting the same TBs, NTBs, and other barriers as the section immediately above 
as they experienced directly or heard from others.  Significant factors include: 
✓ Law Makers, Business Owners, and Lawyers all experienced TB and NTBs at 50% each. 
✓ Academicians face 50% NTBs, 28.6% TB, and the rest Other barriers to trade. 
✓ Law Executors like Academicians face 55.6% NTB, 22.2% TB and 22.2% Other barriers. 
✓ Beneficiaries and Other occupation holders face 100% NTBs. 
5.2.3.5. Types of Non-Tariff Barriers of Respondents 







































NTBs make up most of trade barriers reported by SAARC states at 67.5%, whereas, TBs 
account for only 47.5%. Among the types of tariff barriers experienced are Ordinary Customs 
Duties at 64.3% and Other Customs Duties e.g., at 35.7%. The types and frequency of NTBs 
experienced by respondents give the impression in the bar chart above. These responses are 
almost evenly distributed among the categories. For instance, the most troublesome barriers are 
Bribery at 11%, Customs Documentation and Formalities at 11%, and Technical Barriers to 
Trade at 11%, following close is Others at 9% and 10% with Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties being 5% of the barriers. 
Comparison of survey results identifying types of NTBs by respondent occupation reveals 
the following: 
➢ Law Makers face most of their barriers in License Bars and TBTs at 20% each. This is the 




































barriers in TBTs. For the other categories, Law Makers face an average of 6.3% in each, and in 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 12.5%. 
➢ Academicians face most of their barriers in Tariff Rates Quotas, License Bars, and Bribery, at 
13.3% each and the least in Countervailing Duty at 3.3%. For Tariff Rates Quotas, they are the 
second highest compared to Business Owners who have a maximum of 13.6% barriers in this 
category. In the Other category they average a 6.7% barrier rate. 
➢ Business Owners face their highest barriers in Conventional Barriers, Tariff Rates Quotas, 
License Bars, Customs Documentation and Formalities, and Bribery all at 13.6%. For Tariff Rate 
Quotas, 13.6% is the highest in this category among all occupations. They do not face Anti-
Dumping Duty and Countervailing Duty barriers. 
➢ Lawyers face their highest barriers is Conventional Barriers, Tariff Rates Quotas, License Bars, 
TBTs, Customs Documentation and Formalities, Bribery, and Anti-Dumping Duty, all at 11.8%. 
In case of Anti-Dumping Duties, 11.8% is the highest percentage of NTB compared to all other 
occupations. However, Lawyers face no barriers in Countervailing Duty. 
➢ Law Executors face the largest number of barriers in Rules of Origins and Bribery at 11.7%. This 
is the highest percentage of barriers faced by Law Executors in comparison to any other 
occupation. Law Executors face the least number of barriers in Anti-Dumping Duty at 5%. 
➢ Trade related occupations face the most of their barriers in Conventional Barriers at 14.3%, 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures at 14.3%, Bribery at 14.3%, and Customs Documentation 
and Formalities at 28.6%. These are the maximums among all the other occupations. However, 
Trade related occupants face no barriers regarding Quotas, Tariff Rates Quotas, Rules of Origins, 




➢ Beneficiaries face barriers of 9.1% in all NTB categories listed. 9.1% is the maximum possible 
barrier in the Countervailing Duties Category. 
5.2.3.6. Impact of Other Trade Problems on SAARC Countries 
FIGURE 5: 7 MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS BY COUNTRY 
 
Figure 5:7 shows the various problems faced by SAARC countries that are not directly 
related to trade legislation or tax issues. The predominant problem, outside of non-tariff and 
tariff barriers, is lack of centralized testing standards. The lack of standards results in different 
testing procedures in each country, which in turn create various impositions, bans, and other 
problems hampering the flow of goods among SAARC countries. These problems are 
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uniform testing standard ensuring fair movement of goods and services among SAARC member 
countries. 
➢ The most significant problem in this miscellaneous category most commonly identified by 
respondents is Government Reluctance about SAFTA, identified by 15% of respondents.  Other 
commonly identified problems include Complexity of Foreign Legal Systems (xx% of 
responses), then Business People not being Aware of Opportunities Under Trade Agreements 
(13%), Lack of Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications (12%), 11% of respondents 
are in support of Imposition of National Standards, and Technical and Physical Barriers (9%). 
The Quality of Foreign Products is the least problematic issue with only 2% of respondents 
believing it is a problem. 
➢ With respect to immigration-related services, 29.6% of respondents are neutral about Visa 
Processing Time, 3% are satisfied with such services. With respect to Visa Staff, 37% are neutral 
about their service, and 44.8% are neutral about Immigration Service at the border. With respect 
to the overall immigration process, 41.7% of respondents are neutral. On average, about 15%of 
respondents are satisfied and the same percentage dissatisfied with immigration related services. 
➢ With respect to other trade-related services, 43.8% of respondents are dissatisfied with 
VAT/Income Tax Offices and 40% are dissatisfied with Trade License Issuing Authority. On the 
other hand, 40.6% are satisfied with and 43.8% are neutral about with Bank Services, and 53.1% 
are neutral about Import/Export Licensing Issuing. Neutrality among respondents stands at 
56.3% toward the Local Chambers of Commerce, 53.15% about Port Services, 50% about 
Transportation Services, and 40.6% neutral toward Trade Related Brokers. 
➢ Sixty-nine percent (69%) of respondents believe that Lack of Harmonization of Regulations 




➢ With respect to differences in regulatory standards among SAARC countries, 35.7% of 
respondents believe that Lack of Harmonization of Regulators Among Different Regions 
presents a barrier to trade. However, 64.3% believe that this is not a barrier to trade. Moreover, 
71.4% believe the Free Trade Agreement in South Asia Makes Trading Across Borders Easier. 
 
5.2.3.7. Other Trade Problems with Greatest Impact by Country 
➢ Among respondents who identify the category of Government Reluctance about SAFTA, 
Afghanistan has the maximum share of the problem at 28.6% followed by Pakistan at 22.2%. 
➢ When considering Imposition of National Standard and Testing Rules Bhutan and Sri Lanka are 
the most frequently identified as resistant at 25% of respondents and Nepal at 22.2%. 
Additionally, Bhutan and Sri Lanka pose barriers arising from the Lack of Mutual Recognition 
of Professional Qualifications according to 25% of respondents. 
➢ Bangladesh faces the greatest Complexity of Foreign Legal Systems, a barrier there identified by 
19.4% of respondents. 
➢ Sri Lanka faces the most Non-Tariff Measures, including technical and physical barriers, 
identified by 25% of Respondents. 
➢ Business people not Aware about the Opportunities Exist Under Free Trade Agreement is most 
prevalent 100% of respondent’s resident in the Maldives identified this as a barrier in Maldives. 
Bhutan and Sri Lankas at 25%, and India, identified by 21.1%. 




5.2.3.8. Most Pressing Problems by Occupation 
FIGURE 5: 8 MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS BY OCCUPATION 
 
• Among Law Maker respondents, 25% face the problem of Government Reluctance about 
SAFTA. This is a greater problem for Law Makers than any other occupation, with a close 
second among Business Owners, 23.8% of whom reported this difficulty. 
• Among Academicians, 16% face the problem of Complexity of Foreign Legal Systems, 
surpassed only by Law Executors, 16.7% of whom report facing this barrier. 
































• Law Executors most frequently face the problems of in Complexity of Foreign Legal Systems 
and Trade Related Officials are not able to Handle the Problem, each category reported by 16.7% 
of Law Executor respondents. 
SAFTA Article 7 laid a two-stage tariff reduction program to achieve a tariff regime of 
below 5% for India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka by 2015, and for the remaining Member States by 
2018.401 Member States have made inadequate progress toward effecting these stipulated tariff 
reduction programs.402 Also, there have been reservations that free trade is unattainable even 
with the full implementation of the proposed tariff reduction program because the Contracting 
States are insisting upon retaining a long list of exceptional sensitive products in efforts to shield 
their specific economic sectors from SAFTA’s duty exemption.403 
                                                 
401 Divesh Kaul, Eliminating Trade Barriers through Preferential Trade Agreements: Perspectives from South Asia,  
(2017). 
402 Intra-Regional FDI and Economic Integration in South Asia: Trends, Patterns and Prospects. (February 2013). 




5.2.3.9. Visa Related Service 
FIGURE 5: 9 VISA RELATED SERVICE 
 
Figure 5:9 shows what survey respondents think about the visa processing system within 
SAARC Member Countries. Respondents were questioned about their satisfaction in four 
different service categories:  time to process visa, service levels from visa office staff in Home 
country, immigration services on arrival at the border, and overall visa process. This graph 
shows that people are somewhat neutral when it comes to the Overall Visa Process of SAARC 
Member Countries. However, the opinions relating to Time Taken to Process Visa vary 
significantly, as an equal number of respondents think it is Satisfactory and Dissatisfactory, 
perhaps implying inconsistency in processing time among Member Countries. Service Levels 
from Visa Office Staff in Your Home Country shows similar results, as does the Immigration 
Services on Arrival at the Border category. 
5.2.3.10. Respondents’ opinions about implementation of SAFTA Article 7 requirements 
Article 7 of SAFTA is important because there Contracting States agreed to consider, other 
measures to support and complement SAFTA for mutual benefit, in addition to SAFTA’s other 
trade facilitation measures. 
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TABLE 5: 4 RESPONDENTS OPINIONS ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFTA ARTICLE 7 
REQUIREMENTS 
Key Elements of SAFTA Article 7 VD D N S VS 
Harmonization of standards, reciprocal recognition of 
tests and accreditation of testing laboratories 
5 30 25 30 10 
Certification of products by a manufacturing country 5 25 20 45 5 
Simplification and harmonization of customs 
clearance procedure 
10 25 30 25 10 
Harmonization of national customs classification 
based on HS coding system 
5 25 30 40 0 
Customs cooperation among member countries to 
resolve disputes at customs entry points 
10 25 20 40 5 
Simplification and harmonization among member 
countries on import licensing and registration 
procedures 
10 30 30 25 5 
Simplification among member countries of banking 
procedures for import financing 
5 25 30 40 0 
Transit facilities for efficient intra-SAARC trade 15 30 20 30 5 
Removal of barriers to intra-SAARC investments 20 25 30 20 5 
Macroeconomic consultations 11 21 42. 26 0 
Rules for fair competition and the promotion of 
venture capital 
15 40 20 25 0 
Development of communication systems and 
transport infrastructure 
15 25 30 25 5 
(Note: VD=Very Dissatisfied; S=Satisfied; N=Neutral; S=Satisfied; VS=Very Satisfied) 
Table 5:4 shows, most of the item respondents are 25% (around) in between dissatisfied-neutral-
satisfied. This is also upsetting Very few respondents are in-between very dissatisfied or very 
satisfied. With respect to one of the important Article 7 requirements—harmonization of 
standards, reciprocal recognition of tests and accreditation of testing laboratories—30 percent are 
satisfied and same percentage dissatisfied, 5 percent are highly dissatisfied, 10 percent are very 




With respect to another important element of Article 7, simplification and harmonization 
of customs clearance procedure 25% of all respondents are satisfied and the same percentage 
dissatisfied, 30% are neutral and 10% each are highly satisfied and highly dissatisfied. All eight 
SAARC Member Countries are the member of the World Customs Organization,404 so most of 
the customs procedures are similar within the Member Countries. Respondents answered survey 
questions regarding satisfaction with “Harmonization of national customs classification based on 
HS coding system” and “Customs cooperation among member countries to resolve disputes at 
customs entry points,” and 40% are satisfied and 25% dissatisfied with these efforts, whereas 
almost 25% of respondents are neutral. 
One of the more significant dynamics for free trade effective are Simplification and 
harmonization among member countries on import licensing and registration procedures; and 
Simplification among member countries of banking procedures for import financing. Among the 
respondents 30% are neutral, 30% are satisfied for licensing and registration procedures. 
However, 40% respondents are satisfied, and no one is highly satisfied besides 10% are highly 
dissatisfied with banking procedure. In their consideration of “Transit facilities for efficient 
intra-SAARC trade” 15% of respondents are highly dissatisfied, 30% are either satisfied or 
dissatisfied, only 5% are highly satisfied, and 20% are neutral. With respect to “Removal of 
barriers to intra-SAARC investments,” 20% of respondents are highly dissatisfied and same 
percentage satisfied, 30% of respondents are neutral, and only 5% are highly satisfied. 
                                                 





5.2.3.11. Experience with trade support organizations 
FIGURE 5: 10 EXPERIENCE WITH TRADE SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS 
 
Figure 5:10 depicts the respondents’ experience with the various stakeholders related to trade 
and ancillary services. Respondents’ high dissatisfaction with organizations related to issuing 
license and collecting VAT/income tax is alarming.  By contrast, the only definitively 
satisfactory experience is related to banks, which are overwhelmingly privatized in this region, 
implying relative state inefficiency when it comes to providing trade-related services.  
Respondents’ attitudes toward services related to container and transport are generally neutral. 
1
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5.2.3.12. SAFTA Regulatory Harmonization 
5.2.3.12.1. Lack of harmonization of regulations leading to inaccessibility 
On the issue of lack of regulatory harmonization 
(e.g., maintenance of separate regulations by each 
member country in addition to federal regulations), 
69% of respondents believe this factory is not 
hampering accessibility to markets.  This implies 
that the regulations in place are beneficial to keep 
the markets competitive and ensure quality products 
enter the market after going through the official 
channels, tax payments, and payment of other state 
and federal fees. 
 
FIGURE 5: 11 SAFTA REGULATORY HARMONIZATION 
 
 
5.2.3.12.2. Lack of harmonization due to regulators 
When surveyed for the cause of lack of regulatory 
harmonization, the majority of the respondents (64%) 
believes that it is not due to regulators, thus implying 
other root causes for the lack of harmonization, 
which results in the application of different standards 
in the sale of goods and services among different 
SAARC countries. 
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5.23.13. Trade Related Religious Issues 
5.2.3.13.1 Trade barriers based on religion by occupation 
FIGURE 5: 13 TRADE BARRIERS BASED ON RELIGION BY OCCUPATION 
 
Figure 5:13 depicts Trade Barriers based on religion by occupation.  Significant observations 
include: 
➢ License Restrictions account for 50% of the trade barriers faced by Law Makers.   Additionally, 
they account for 38.5% of the trade barriers faced by Law Executors. 
➢ Higher Tariff Schedules account for 37.5% of the trade barriers faced by Business Owners. 
➢ Import Bans constitute 100% of the trade barriers faced by Beneficiaries and 50% of the trade 
barriers experienced by Lawyers. Fifty percent (50%) of respondent Lawyers also face 
Unnecessary Testing.  Academicians face an array of trade barriers, including predominantly 
Import Bans at 26.7% of Academician respondents, Trade Related Issues at 25%, and 
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5.2.3.13.2. Trade Barriers Based on Religion by Country 
FIGURE 5: 14 TRADE BARRIERS BASED ON RELIGION BY COUNTRY 
 
Figure 5:14 depicts trade barriers based on religion by country.  According to respondents: 
➢ Afghanistan poses the most frequently identified barriers by religion in License Restrictions at 
50% and Unnecessary Testing at 50% of respondents. 
➢ Bangladesh poses religion-based License Restrictions, according to 29.4% of respondents. 
➢ The religion-based trade barrier most frequently identified by respondents is Import Bans, with 
100% of respondents identifying such barriers in Bhutan and Maldives, Nepal at 40%, and India 
at 30%. 
➢ Pakistan poses significant barriers by Unnecessary testing, identified by 40% of respondents. 
5.2.3.13.3. Trade Barriers Due to Religion by Respondents 
FIGURE 5: 15 TRADE BARRIERS DUE TO RELIGION BY RESPONDENTS 
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Figure 5:15 depicts restrictions respondents have experienced due to religion. The restriction 
reported by the most respondents is Import Bans at 24%, License Restrictions 22%, NTBs 15%, 
Higher Tariff 13% and Others 9%. 
5.2.3.14. SAFTA Policy and Support Services 
5.2.3.14.1. Satisfaction with Administrative Performance by Country 
FIGURE 5: 16 SATISFACTION WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE BY COUNTRY 
 
• Sixteen percent (16%) of respondents from Afghanistan and India are very dissatisfied with 
SAARC countries’ administrative performance. In Afghanistan, 36% are dissatisfied, 36% are 
neutral, 8% are satisfied, and 4% are very satisfied.  Among respondents from each nation, only 
4% are very satisfied with the administrative performance and 8% are very dissatisfied with the 
administrative performance, except India and Afghanistan. Apart from Afghanistan, 40-60% of 
respondents are neutral about their opinions regarding performance. Maldives has the greatest 
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• Economic benefits are the greatest concern taken in to consideration before entering a FTA as 
reported as maximum by 26% of respondents. 
• Twenty-three percent (23%) of respondents believe that the greatest concern to be considered 
before entering an RTA/FTA is the Size of the Trade Partner, 13% each believe it is the 
Neighboring Country and Relevant Culture and Practice, 12% focus on Complementarities of 
Products, 8% focus on the Same Membership of International Organizations, and 5% believe it is 
whether the trade partner has a Democratic Political Government. 
5.2.3.14.2. Opinions Regarding Fulfillment of SAFTA Objectives 
FIGURE 5: 17 OPINIONS REGARDING FULFILLING SAFTA OBJECTIVES 
 
Figure 5:17 illustrates the respondents’ opinions regarding fulfillment of SAFTA objectives. 
✓ This chart shows that the respondents are satisfied in all sectors especially with Financial 
Capabilities and Education at 56.5%. All the categories show that 39% or more of respondents 




✓ No one is very satisfied with the fulfilment of Financial Capability objectives, or very 
dissatisfied with the fulfillment of Strong Trade Organizations and Education objectives. 
However, overall, they are dissatisfied about them 8.7%, 17.4% and 17.4% respectively. An 
average of 20% of the respondents are neutral about all the categories. 
✓ Respondents registered the highest level of dissatisfaction regarding Article 7 in Removal of 
Barriers to Intra-SAARC Investments. Twenty percent (20%) of respondents believe removal 
was wrong. 
✓ Fifteen percent (15%) of respondents are very dissatisfied with progress in the subcategories of 
Transit Facilities and Rules for Fair Competition and the Promotion of Venture Capital, 
Development of Communication Systems, and Transport Infrastructure. 
✓ On average respondents are dissatisfied with all the categories at 25%. A maximum of 42.1% are 
neutral about progress with Macroeconomic Consultations. 
✓ A maximum of 45% are satisfied with progress in Certification of Products by a Manufacturing 
Country. 




5.2.3.14.3. Opinions Regarding Important Factors for Cross Border Trading 
FIGURE 5: 18 OPINIONS REGARDING IMPORTANT FACTORS FOR CROSS BORDER TRADING 
 
➢ Overall the respondents are satisfied with the factors important to enable cross border trading. 
They are the most satisfied with Opportunity to Work at 56.6% of respondents, Opportunity for 
Invest at 60.8%, and Opportunities for Reputation at 52.2%. 
➢ They are largely dissatisfied with Proximity of Home Country at 30.4% of respondents and 
Personal Safety and Security at 31.8%. No one is very dissatisfied with Cost of Product, Labor 
Cost, and Location, or very satisfied with Social Life, and Opportunities for Reputation. 
➢ Law Makers/have 40% experience Imports, 40% in Government Service, and 20% in Legislation 
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➢ Academicians have 8% experience in Imports, Exports, Government Services, Trade Operations, 
and Legislations of SAFTA in the last 12 months. Additionally, 33% Participated with SAFTA 
related issues and 25% with others. No academicians had experience with FDI. 
➢ Business Owners have 44% experience in Exports. 
➢ The maximum Law Executors have experienced with Government Services 38%. 
➢ 27% of Trade related support services has experienced in Government Services and Trade 
Operations. 
➢ 100% of Beneficiaries have experience in Export. 
➢ 100% of Other have experience in Participation with SAFTA related businesses. 
5.2.3.15. SAFTA make across border easier? 
As for the overall impact of 
SAFTA in making cross border 
trade easier 71% respondents 
believe it plays a positive role 






SAFTA make across border easier!
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5.2.3.16. Priorities Ought to Govern FTA by Occupation: 
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Figure 5: 20 shows respondent’s opinions about what Priorities Ought to Govern FTA by 
occupation, identifying the highest priorities for each occupation. For instance, Law Makers 
identify Government Awareness about the Beneficial Impact/Economic Benefit of Entering Such 
an Agreement and the Cost of Doing Business as equally important (50%) priorities to govern 
the FTA. The other categories (Market access demonstration effects of other RTAs and others) 
are not priorities for Law Makers. Beneficiaries prioritize the Cost of Doing Business as the only 
important priority. 
5.2.3.17. Priorities ought to govern FTA by Country: 
FIGURE 5: 21 PRIORITIES OUGHT TO GOVERN FTA BY COUNTRY 
 
Figure 5:21 depicts priorities that respondents believe ought to govern FTAs by Country. 
5.2.3.18. Outlook for SAFTA: 
➢ 92.3% of respondents believe that barrier removal will impact cross-border purchases and sales, 
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➢ 84.6% of respondents believe that price competitiveness will increase on the removal of these 
barriers and 7.7% believe there will be no change or removal of these barriers would reduce 
price competition. 
➢ 73.1% of respondents believe that SAARC currency is important for better free trade and 26.9% 
believe it is not. 
➢ 92.3% believe that SAFTA can boost overall economic growth and the other 7.7% believe 
otherwise. 
5.2.3.18.1. Outlook for SAFTA by Occupation, 
➢ Law Makers have the most experience in trade Imports within the last 12 months at 40% of 
respondents and Beneficiaries and Others have the least or no experience. 
➢ Beneficiaries have the most experience in trade Exports at 100% of respondents followed by 
44% of Business Owner respondents. 
➢ Only Law Executors at 10% of respondents and Trade Related Occupants at 9% have experience 
in FDI within the last 12 months. 
➢ Law Makers have the most experience in Government Services at 40% of respondents followed 
by 38% of Law Executors, 17% of Trade-Related Businesses, 11% of Business Owners, and 8% 
of Academicians. Lawyers, Beneficiaries, and Others have no experience in Government 
Services. 
➢ Trade-Related businesses have the most experience in Trade Operations at 27% of respondents, 
followed by 22% of Business Owners, 20% of Lawyers, and 8% of Academicians. Law Makers, 




➢ Law Makers have the most experience in Legislation of SAFTA at 20% of respondents followed 
by 11% of Business Owners and 8% of Academicians. All other occupations have no experience 
with Legislation of SAFTA in the past 12 months. 
➢ Only one respondent in “Other” had 100% of experience in Participation with SAFTA Related 
Issues followed by 33% of Academicians and 7% of Law Executors at 7%. No other occupations 
have experience with Participation with SAFTA Related Issues. 
5.2.3.18.2. Outlook for SAFTA by Country 
➢ Fifty percent (50%) of respondents from Afghanistan has been involved with Imports and 50% 
have been involved in Government Services under SAFTA. 
➢ Among respondents from Bangladesh, 26% have been involved in Exports, 23% in Government 
Services, 15% in Imports, 10% in FDI, 8% in Trade Operations, 8% in Participation with 
SAFTA Related Issues, and 3% in Legislation of SAFTA. 
➢ Among respondents from Bhutan, 50% have experience in Exports, 25% each in Imports and 
Government Services, and no other reported experience. 
➢ Among respondents from India 22% have experience in each of Exports and Participation with 
SAFTA Related Issues, and 11% each in Imports, Trade Operations, and Legislation of SAFTA. 
➢ The experience of respondents from Maldives is entirely (100%) in Government Services in the 
past 12 months. 
➢ Respondents from Nepal have experience 33% each in Imports, Government Services, and Other 
sectors. 
➢ Pakistan has experienced 38% in Government Services, 25% in Imports and Trade Operations, 




➢ The experience of respondents from Sri Lanka is entirely (100%) in Participation with SAFTA 
Related Issues. 
5.2.3.19. Lack of Harmonization of Regulations Leading to Inaccessibility 
FIGURE 5: 22 RESPONDENTS RESPONSE ACCESSIBILITY OF HARMONIZATION OF 
REGULATIONS 
 
Regarding harmonization, each member country has separate national regulations in addition to 
federal. However, 69% of respondents believe these national regulations do not hamper 
accessibility to markets. This implies that the regulations in place are beneficial to keep the 
markets competitive and ensure quality products entering the market after going through the 










5.2.3.20. Lack of Harmonization due to Regulators 
FIGURE 5: 23 HARMONIZATION DUE TO REGULATORS 
 
When asked about the cause of lack of harmonization in regulations, 64% of respondents believe 
that regulators are not responsible, thus, implying other root causes for lack of harmonization 
resulting in differing standards across different countries. 
5.2.3.21. Considerations before entering an FTA by Occupation: 
FIGURE 5: 24 CONSIDERATIONS OF ENTERING AN RTA/FTA BY OCCUPATION 
 
Figure 5: 24 shows respondents’ considerations before entering a RTA/FTA by Occupation. Like 
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instance, Law Makers give 50% of their consideration to the Size of the Trade Partner before 
entering a RTA whereas Academicians’ give 25% of their consideration to this factor. 
5.2.3.22. Considerations before entering a FTA by Country 
FIGURE 5: 25 CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE ENTERING A FTA BY COUNTRY 
 
Figure 5: 25 shows respondents Considerations before entering a RTA/FTA by Country. Like the 
previous figures, separately colored portions of each bar indicate the level of priority countries 
give each factor when choosing a RTA/FTA. For instance, Economic Benefits are almost every 
country’s major concern when entering a RTA/FTA. It is the highest concern of Maldives at 50% 
compared to other countries. 
 
5.2.4. Secondary Data Analysis: 
In addition to primary resources, this study utilizes a wide range of secondary resources. 
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business community reports written by trade experts and concerned officials, GATT Article 
XXIV Schedule of Commitments in the Free Trade Agreements, and published statistics from 
WB, ADB, UNCTAD, WTO, etc.   Some secondary materials were retrieved when conducting 
interviews. A critical analysis of the wide range of information facilitated corroboration and 
more precise analysis of other evidence and data retrieved during research, interviewing, and 
focus group discussions. 
5.2.4.1.Recent Trade Outlook 
South Asian GDP growth is expected to accelerate to 7.2% in 2018, after expanding slightly 
lower than expected 6.8% in 2016.405 World Bank South Asia Region Chief Economist Martin 
Rama said that Member States should emphasize encouraging economic growth to maximize 
export opportunity.406 
TABLE 5: 5 GDP GROWTH OF SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES 
 
(Legend: CY=Calendar Year; FY=Fiscal Year; est. = estimated, f = forecast *Bangladesh 2016 
Rate Actual) Source: World Bank407 
                                                 
405 See more at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/04/16/south-asia-could-potentially-benefit-
from-globalization-backlash 
406 Id. At  




The World Bank’s report confirms that South Asia remains the fastest-growing region in the 
world while gradually widening its lead relative to East Asia. Regional GDP growth is expected 
to rise from 6.7% in 2016 to 6.8% in 2017 and 7.1% in 2018.408 Table 5-3 is a comparative 
analysis of South Asian Countries’ GDP growth. This analysis shows that Afghanistan’s GDP 
has grown steadily since 2016. Additionally, India and Nepal demonstrate good GDP growth 
prospects. 
TABLE 5: 6 TOTAL TRADE VOLUME AND TOP TEN SOUTH ASIA TRADE PARTNERS 
2016 SAARC, Total World Trade (Value Millions USD)409 











Partner Value % 
World 
 
World 456,155 100 
 
World 299,372 100 
 
World 755,527 100 
1 China 84,602 18.5 1 EU 28 67,800 22.6 1 EU 118,423 15.7 
2 EU 50,622 11.1 2 USA 51,669 17.3 2 China 96,191 12.7 
3 UAE 28,295 6.2 3 UAE 31,956 10.7 3 U.S. 75,943 10.1 
4 U.S. 24,275 5.3 4 HK 13,913 4.6 4 UAE 60,253 8 
5 KSA 22,437 4.9 5 China 11,589 3.9 5 KSA 28,108 3.7 
6 Indonesia 16,958 3.7 6 Sin 7,876 2.6 6 HK 22,278 2.9 
7 Switzerland 15,750 3.5 7 Vietnam 6,337 2.1 7 Indo 20,272 2.7 
8 Japan 15,084 3.3 8 KSA 5,671 1.9 8 Japan 19,879 2.6 
9 S. Korea 14,575 3.2 9 Turkey 5,394 1.8 9 Sin 19,542 2.6 
10 Malaysia 12,291 2.7 10 Japan 4,795 1.6 10 S. Korea 18,563 2.5 
Legend: KSA=Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; HK=Hong Kong; S. Korea=South Korea; UAE= 
United Arab Emirates; Sin= Singapore; EU=European Union; U.S. =United States of America 
 
                                                 
408 Id. At.  




Table 5: 6 shows SAARC’s highest total trade is with the EU at 15.7%, followed by China at 
12.7%, and the U.S. at 10.1%. The largest percentage of imports to the region comes from China 
at 18.5%. The EU receives the highest percentage of exports from the region at 22.6%. The top 
exporting and importing partners include UAE, KSA, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, 
Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Switzerland. 
FIGURE 5: 26 COUNTRY SHARES % OF INTRA-SAARC IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 2011410 
  
Figure 5: 26 illustrates SAARC countries’ market shares within SAARC in 2011. This figure 
depicts each SAARC country’s relative importance in exports and imports within the intra-
regional bloc. From the data, India has 73% of overall exports and 13% of imports within the 
region.411  Sri Lanka has 24% of overall intra-regional imports and 5% of intra-regional exports. 
Bangladesh has 4% of overall exports within the bloc. Other countries, such Afghanistan, 
Bhutan, and Maldives have the less than 1% of the exports and between 1-5% of intra-regional 
imports within the bloc.412 
                                                 
410Next Steps to South Asian Economic Union: A Study on Regional Economic Integration (Phase II) 
Commissioned by the SAARC Secretariat. (2014). 
411 Id. at. 
















































TABLE 5: 7 SOUTH ASIA INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE 
Source: Data compiled from WITS and calculated for 2011. 
Table 5: 7 contains regional exports as a percentage of a country’s total exports. In 
Bhutan, regional exports are 82% of total exports. In Bangladesh, regional exports are 2% and in 
India 4% of total exports. Regional exports constitute 67% of Afghanistan’s trade and 71% of 
Nepal’s trade. In Afghanistan and Nepal, SAARC country imports are 50% and 44% 
respectively. 413 Whereas, in India SAARC countries account for 1% of total imports. India is not 
dependent on the intra-regional trade. Similarly, only 5% of Pakistan’s imports come from 
SAARC countries. The percentage varies among countries depending on trade facilities openness 
and market size. India makes 65% of regional trade exports, Pakistan makes 21%, and 
Afghanistan and Maldives make only 1%. Sri Lanka receives 24% of the intra-regional imports 
and Bangladesh 22%. Additionally, Bhutan and Maldives receive only 1% of SAARC countries 
total imports. 





Despite diverse results, intra-regional trade facilities are important to LDCs as external 
merchandise sources. According to Table 5: 5, regional trade is the bulk portion of global trade 
for three LDCs (Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal). This means that the intra-regional 
mechanisms are facilitating and promoting intra-regional trade among SAARC countries. 
However, Bangladesh and Maldives are not dependent on regional trade because both countries 
export a major portion of their merchandise outside of SAARC countries. Further, India and 
Pakistan lack significant amounts of SAARC regional trade. However, Sri Lanka, a developing 
country, has strong trade within SARRC region at 17.33%. The region’s LDCs intra-regional 
trade shares do not portray their overall business trends. For example, Bangladesh contributes 
14.3% of regional trade, which is second after India at 39.01%. However, it is the largest 
regional importer at approximately 4 billion USD in 2008. Moreover, it has a 25% share of total 
inter-regional imports.414 
                                                 
414UNDP, Integration of Least Developed Countries into South Asian Free Trade Agreement: A Human 




5.2.4.2.The Intra-Regional Trade within South Asia 
FIGURE 5: 27 INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE WITHIN SOUTH ASIA 
 
 
Asia is the least integrated region in the world, dwarfed by East Asia’s 35% and Europe’s 
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FIGURE 5: 28 MERCHANDISE EXPORTS OF REGIONAL RTAS BY DESTINATION 




A.  Figure 5:28 depicts merchandise exports of SAARC RTAs by destination,416 in 2015 (Share 
%). SAARC total merchandise exports share is 12% in EU, 11% in PRC, 8% in U.S., 2% in 
Japan, 34% in Rest of the World, and 33% in Asia (only 5% is in South Asia) in 2015. 
FIGURE 5: 29 (WORLD) MERCHANDISE EXPORTS OF RTAS BY DESTINATION IN 2015 
(SHARE %) 
 
Figure 5: 29 shows that in 2015, within RTAs merchandise exports, intra-area trade shares are 70 
% EU, 50% NAFTA and, 67% ASEAN, whereas, South Asian region intra-area trade is less than 
5% of total trade volume. 417 
5.2.4.3.Comparison with South Asian and Others Progress regarding; FDI and NTBs 
Attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is a challenge for any region. Creating an 
investment friendly environment encourages private investment, and are key to strong economic 
growth and rapid poverty reduction. A decent investment climate is important in fostering 
                                                 
416 Rest of the World includes Commonwealth of Independent States including associate and former member states, 
Middle East, and NES. 




productive private domestic or foreign investments.418 Asia remains the world’s top destination 
for foreign direct investment, attracting 527 billion USD in 2015, an increase of 9.0% over 
2014.419 Global FDI increased to a record 1.8 trillion USD in 2015, with nearly 30% going to the 
region.420 
5.2.4.4. Foreign Direct Investment 
The data suggest that South Asia has significant untapped trade potential.  The prediction is that 
a 30% increase in annual growth of intra-regional trade would boost up to 100 billion USD in the 
next five years. 421  Presently, annual intra-regional trade is 28 billion USD. Further, the 
expectation is that intraregional trade would increase from 5% to 10% of total trade. 422  This is 
an ambitious target but is achievable if we consider low base, artificial barriers to trade, and 
informal trade. Statistics reveal that this region falls below its trade potential and investment 
opportunities,423 but gains from a more integrated South Asia (addressing tariffs, non-tariff 
barriers, and trade costs) are nonetheless substantial.424 Table 5-6 indicates that amongst all 
regions, South Asia is receiving the least amount of FDI inflows. In 2012, South Asia received a 
                                                 
418 ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION REPORT 
WHAT DRIVES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC? (2016). 
419 Trade and Investment: ASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
REPORT 2016 HIGHLIGHTS. (2016);BANK. 2016. 
420 BANK. 2016. 
421Prabir De and Mustafizur Rahman, Regional Integration in South Asia  (Knowledge World (KW) Publishers Pvt. 
Ltd  2017). 
422Id. At. 
423Prabir De and Mustafizur Rahman, Regional Integration in South Asia  (Knowledge World (KW) Publishers Pvt. 
Ltd  2017). 




FDI inflow of 28.6 billion USD, India’s share of which amounted to 25.5 billion USD. This 
equals 89% of total FDI inflows of this region.425 
TABLE 5: 8 FDI INFLOW IN SOUTH ASIA (MILLION USD AT CURRENT PRICES) 426 
FDI inflow in South Asia (Million USD at current prices) 
Country/year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 271 238 189 94 76 211 83 94 69 54 
Bangladesh 845 792 666 1086 700 913 1136 1293 1599 1551 
Bhutan 6 72 40 10 26 76 29 49 14 32 
India 7622 20328 25350 47102 35634 27417 36190 24196 28199 34582 
Maldives 73 95 132 181 158 216 424 228 361 333 
Nepal 2 -7 6 1 39 87 95 92 71 30 
Pakistan 2201 4273 5590 5438 2338 2022 1162 859 1333 1865 
Sri Lanka 272 480 603 752 404 478 956 941 933 894 
Total 11292 26271 32576 54664 39375 31420 40075 27752 32579 39341 
                                                 
425Moazzem; Khandakar G 2013. Regional Investment Cooperation in South Asia: Policy Issues. Commonwealth 
Secretariat. March 2013 
426 Date usage here: Economics and Environment (SAWTEE) South Asia Watch on Trade, A Dialogue on Trade and 






FIGURE 5: 30 FDI INFLOW IN SOUTH ASIA: 2005-14 (MILLION USD, SHARE) 427 
 
 
Figure 5: 30 portrays FDI inflows in the South Asian region in 2005-14. It indicates that 
India attracted more than 85% of FDI inflows and the other seven countries combined attracted 
15%. Amongst the other countries, Maldives, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan attracted less than 
1% of overall FDI inflow. The second highest FDI inflow was Pakistan at 8% and Bangladesh at 
3%. 
Boosting FDI is a concrete method of furthering regional integration. India is successful 
in attracting significant amount of FDI, but the other SAARC countries lack progress in 
attracting FDI. For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2015 
report428 revealed that in 2014 South Asia only attracted 3.4% of global FDI inflows. This figure 
is poor in comparison to other regions. For example, the EU attracted 23.5% of global FDI 
inflows, while Latin America and Caribbean attracted 13%. 
The South Asian countries are unable to attract a considerable amount of FDI inflows for 
several reasons. First, South Asia’s ranking in the ‘ease of doing business’ is very poor. 
                                                 
427Id. at and Source: UNCTAD Stats, Aug 2016. 
428 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2015 report: 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf 
India : 286455 (85.44%)
Pakistan : 27.127 (8.09%)
Bangladesh : 10.559 (3.15%)
Sri Lanka : 6.788 (2.02%)
Maldives : 2.232 ( 0.67%)
Afghanistan : 1.379 (0.41%)
Nepal : 416 (0.12%)




According to the World Bank Doing Business Report 2016 South Asia ranks 128 out of 189.429 
However, the EUs ranking is 31 and the East Asia Pacific ranking is 89. These rankings correlate 
with FDI inflows. 

















Ease of doing business 177 174 71 130 128 99 138 107 
Starting business 34 117 91 155 48 105 122 98 
Construction permit 
dealings 
185 118 79 183 41 78 61 77 
Getting electricity 156 189 50 70 141 131 157 81 
Registering property 184 185 51 138 171 72 137 153 
Getting credit 97 133 79 42 126 133 133 97 
Protecting investor 189 88 115 8 134 57 25 49 
Paying taxes 89 86 28 157 128 124 171 158 
Trading across borders 174 172 21 133 137 60 169 90 
Enforcing contracts 172 188 50 178 95 152 151 161 
Resolving insolvency 160 155 189 136 135 86 94 78 
 
Another factor in the region’s low FDI attraction is the complicated and restrictive 
regional regulatory framework. In this region, to start a business the owner must comply with 
                                                 
429 World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2016: http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
430 See more at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/ media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/ Documents/Annual-




many regulations. Furthermore, transparency is lacking in legal issues. Excessive documentation 
requirements hinder investments in South Asia.431 Further, political unrest and the lack of law 
and order is a factor compromising private enterprises’ safety and security. In this region, the 
situation is so acute that countries impose travel advisory warnings for many locations. Finally, 
lacking infrastructure is another factor causing low FDI inflows.432 
TABLE 5: 10 POINT OF INFRASTRUCTURE FOR BUSINESS IN 2014433 
 
Enhanced export earnings and foreign investment inflows have an impact on the 
country’s external resource balance. Logistics Performance Index (LPI) scores are based on the 
retrospective measurements: Efficiency of border control and customs process; Transport and 
                                                 
431South Asia Watch on Trade, TRADE INSIGHT VOL. 12, NO. 2, 2016,  (2016). 
432COMSATS Saima Nawaz, and Nasir Iqbal, BISP, FDI key to the future of South Asian regional integration, EAST 
ASIA FORUM (11th May, 2016). 
433 See more at: http://lpi.worldbank.org/international/scorecard/column/254/C/ LKA/2014#chartarea and The 
logistic, customs and Infrastructure score for Business  (World Development Indicators) 
Countries Logistic Performance Index 





Afghanistan 2.07 2.16 1.82 
Bangladesh 2.56 2.09 2.11 
Bhutan 2.29 2.09 2.18 
India 3.08 2.72 2.88 
Maldives 2.75 2.95 2.56 
Nepal 2.59 2.31 2.26 
Pakistan 2.83 2.84 2.67 




trade-related infrastructure; Competitively priced shipments; Ability to track and trace 
consignments; and Timeliness of shipments. The computation of regional aggregates uses total 
trade as volumes.434 However, a number of factors such as the economy’s size, variation, 
economic policies overall texture, infrastructural facilities, cross-border facilities, and political 
factors differentiate investment flows.435 Achieving an effective integrated regional market 
would facilitate investment creation on a large scale at both the intra-regional and extra-regional 
levels. South Asian countries should effectively promote FDI as part of their regional 
cooperation scheme. 
5.2.4.5.Non-Tariff Barriers: 
According to Isabel Guerrero, Vice President, South Asia Region, World Bank, "reducing 
regional trade barriers could result in a 17% increase in GDP for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, a 
15% increase for India, and a 5% increase for Pakistan by 2020."436 Theoretically, South Asian 
countries are enthusiastic about global and regional trade agreements. As a result, they 
formulated various regional agreements like SAFTA and international organization such as 
WTO. Despite the intentions and requirements of these pro-trade commitments, the SAARC 
countries fail to live up to free trade expectations. Although they agree on broader regulation 
objectives, they implement them at various levels. The region produces procedural hurdles in the 
form of NTBs on overdrive limiting trade potential in South Asian countries. 
Moreover, LDCs in this region overly depend on exports and are therefore vulnerable to 
external shocks beyond their control. For example, Bangladesh relies heavily on exporting 
readymade garments, Maldives relies on fish merchandising and tourism, and Bhutan relies on 
                                                 
434 ADB, Asian Economic Integration Report 2016: Statistical Appendix  (2016). 
435 Sobhan, 2004 




electricity supplies. Furthermore, both Nepal and Bhutan are extremely dependent on India for 
imports and exports. This places them in a vulnerable position. For example, any Indian market 
economic shock will have a severe effect on the other countries’ economy because of their 
dependence. Diversification of business—products, services, and trading partners—can cure this 
problem. However, none of these countries shows promising signs of business diversification.437 
Previously mentioned non-tariff barriers such as lack of streamlining and harmonizing 
custom procedures, lack of infrastructure facilities, poor border point conditions, and protocols 
do not account for the political economy dynamics that generate the most persistent NTBs. The 
first set of NTBs negatively affecting trade is the lack of arrangements for the free flow of 
persons and finances within the region. Security concerns are one of the main factors behind this. 
Nonetheless, the governments have not devised a clear framework nor placed confidence in their 
own banks and border agencies to accommodate legitimate business transactions and visa 
applications. People cannot engage in free trade if they cannot meet and move freely.438 
                                                 
437 Id. At. 




TABLE 5: 11 COST TO EXPORT AND IMPORTS (USD PER CONTAINER) 439 
Country 
/Year 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 3545 3545 3545 4645 5045 3830 3830 3830 5180 5680 
Bangladesh 1070 1115 1175 1203 1281 1305 1370 1430 1437 1515 
Bhutan 2230 2230 2230 2230 2230 2505 2505 2330 2330 2330 
India 1005 1045 1332 1332 1332 1105 1150 1200 1462 1462 
Maldives 1550 1550 1623 1625 1625 1526 1526 1526 1610 1610 
Nepal 1960 1960 2295 2295 2545 2095 2095 2095 2400 2650 
Pakistan 611 660 765 765 765 680 705 705 1005 1005 
Sri Lanka 590 590 595 595 560 695 725 725 725 690 
                                                 





TABLE 5: 12 TIME TO EXPORT AND IMPORT (DAYS) IN 2010-2014440 
Time to export and import (days) 
Country 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Afghanistan 74 74 74 81 86 77 77 77 85 91 
Bangladesh 29 29 29 28.6 28.3 37 37 37 37.6 33.6 
Bhutan 38 38 38 38 38 37 37 37 37 37 
India 17 16 16 17.1 17.1 20 20 20 21.1 21.1 
Maldives 21 21 21 21 21 22 22 22 22 22 
Nepal 41 41 41 42 40 35 35 35 39 39 
Pakistan 21 21 21 21.7 20.7 18 18 18 19.4 18.4 
Sri Lanka 21 21 20 20 16 19 19 19 17 13 
 
 
The time to export/import data measures the number of days required to export/import by 
ocean transport, including the document processing required to complete the transaction. It 
covers time used for documentation requirements, procedures at customs and other regulatory 
agencies, and the time of inland transport between the largest business city and the main port 
used by traders. Regional aggregates are weighted averages based on total exports or imports. 
Average Time to Export and Import (hours)441 rest of the Asia (accessed October 2016) 
                                                 
440 See more at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=IC.IMP. COST. CD& country 
and Source: World Development Indicators  




TABLE 5: 13 AVERAGE TIME TO EXPORT AND IMPORT (HOURS) REST OF THE ASIA442 
Region/ Year (Serial) Export 2015 Import 
2015 
Export 2016 Import 2016 
Central Asia 209 80 203 77 
East Asia 37 92 37 92 
South Asia 158 331 152 324 
Southeast Asia 74 112 68 107 
The Pacific 136 153 136 153 
Oceania 43 41 43 41 
Asia 53 117 51 115 
Developing Asia 55 124 53 122 
Table 5:13   indicates the cost and time of imports and exports in this region. It shows that 
important and exporting products in and out of Afghanistan is the most costly and takes the most 
amount of time. The cost in Bhutan is also relatively high. Table 5-10 indicates that as of 2016, 
South Asia takes the longest period to export and import in Asia at 152 days and 324 days, 
respectively. This is much higher than the other regions of Asia. 
                                                 




TABLE 5: 14 SHARE OF VARIOUS NTBS IN ALL NTBS IMPOSED BY SOUTH ASIAN 
COUNTRIES
443 
Non-tariff measures Share (%) 
SPS, TBT and other related measures 86.3 
Tariff quotas 9.8 
Anti-dumping measures 7.4 
License requirements 5.2 
Countervailing measures 1.2 
Table 5-14 In the above table shows (Source: Rahman, 2010), based on ADB/UNCTAD, 
2008.  Note: The shares do not add up to 100 percent because some products face multiple 
NTBs. SPS= sanitary and phytosanitary; TBT= technical barriers to trade. 
To improve the regional integration as depicted in this study South Asian countries must 
take positive steps to harmonize their regulatory frameworks with the region’s LDCs in mind. 
Human resources development is a crucial element these countries should consider. Adopting a 
three-tier strategic approach can help these countries to reach their desired goal.  First, eradicate 
all market access barriers and expand the ambit of SAFTA. Second, developing countries should 
construe their sensitive lists very narrowly and remove NTBs on the LDCs and SMEs export 
products. Third, it is necessary to promote and encourage the development of infrastructure and 
the free flow of human capital. These countries need to impose efficient transit facilities and 
trade facilitation, and concentrate on research, development, and innovation to benefit fully from 
SAFTA.  Lastly, the expansion of SAFTA ambit is necessary to include issues like liberalization 
                                                 




of services and protection and promotion of investment. These issues are vital for desired 
economic integration of this region.444 
























SAARC was created to neutralize the deep-rooted mistrust and asymmetries between the 
South Asian countries. The main objective of SAARC was to promote effective cooperation 
between the member states. SAARC established a basic institutional framework of 
conceptualizing and implementing programs that are of regional significance. These cooperative 
arrangements also encourage the member countries to formulate common positions on vital 
economic and social issues at global platform. Since its inception, SAARC has been gradually 
developing in conjunction with UN and other regional organizations. But ironically, the 
development of SAARC has been symbolic rather than substantive. The main obstacle of 
SAARC is its institutional character. Bilateral problems and unwillingness of the political parties 
to integrate are also major problems in this region. This creates a gulf of difference between 
adoption of broader policies at the highest political levels and implementation of them at the root 
level. This gulf means most of the measures taken by SAARC lack practical effectiveness. 
Moreover, SAARC Secretariat and other Regional Centers have not taken any proactive actions 
so that similar to their counterparts like the ASEAN. If these basic flaws are not addressed and 
cured, it is then the objective of regional integration through SAARC will remain a distant 
dream.445 
 
6.2. Practical Achievements of SAFTA 
Economic cooperation among countries is imperative in the modern world and especially in 
the South Asian region. This is mainly because most of the people in this region are poor. 
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Therefore, free flow of trade would not only increase growth but also create job opportunities. In 
this regard, FTA can play a crucial role in opening the market and attracting more FDI. But the 
performances of all the FTA have not been equal. This is mainly because countries may 
customize comprehensive and ambitious agreements and other types of deals depending on their 
particular markets and demands. The dynamic gains from the trade agreements have the potential 
to liberalize trade in services and attract FDI not achievable through traditional comparative 
advantage theory. 
So far, SAARC has secured a modest achievement. It provides a basic institutional 
framework for regional cooperation by furthering free trade between SAARC countries. This 
desire was prominent in 2006 when SAFTA replaced SAPTA. Since 2006, SAFTA has 
contributed significantly to the free trade in the region, which has reached the $ 1.2 billion mark. 
But it remains below its potential. SAARC Agreement on Trade in Services (SATIS) of 2011 has 
been a significant leap towards broadening the scope of regional trade. SAARC declared the 
2010-2020 decade as the Decade of the Intra-Regional Connectivity. Moreover, the new South 
Asian University, established in New Delhi, India, plays an important role in regional 
integration. The university proposed the creation of a South Asian Forum for exchange of ideas 
on the future development in South Asia. This proposal is widely accepted.446 
Planning and creating the trade policies and framework will not automatically bring success 
in SAARC countries. To achieve the fullest benefits of SAARC, the member countries need to 
ensure economic cooperation through the FTAs in a broader context and to promote competition 
in the market by facilitating business, reducing costs of trade, enhancing connectivity via hard 
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and soft infrastructure, increasing the skills of the workforce, promoting entrepreneurship, 
innovation, and other efforts. Strengthening social safety nets to mitigate short-term adjustment 
costs may be part of the strategy. FTAs under GATT Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause 
reduce tariff rates by 2.1% and 1.5 % respectively. In NTBs, the impact is around 6.6% and 
5.7%. It appears that membership of the WTO does not itself have any impact on the reduction 
of tariff but does play a vital role in reducing NTBs.447 
Trade agreements ensure free movement of goods that enable the consumers to have 
better access to the products of the other countries at a cheaper rate. This boosts consumer 
surplus and facilitates consumer activity that has an impact on the economies of scale as the 
countries attract a better share of the market in the free trade zone. Domestic consumers will 
suffer from the tide of the trade diversion as they will be vulnerable to losing out on importing 
cheaper goods from non-members. Since they will have to import costly goods from the 
members of the trade bloc their consumer surplus will decline significantly. More significantly, 
such actions may also result in trade war with non-members that will make it more difficult from 
the domestic consumers to import niche products from the non-member states. 
There is no concrete evidence suggesting that preferential trade agreements benefit the 
member states. Their successful outcome requires proper design and implementation. Ultimate 
success depends on breadth, depth, and timing of the provisions. These three variables dictate the 
economic benefits of an FTA. For example, an FTA will be ineffective if it is narrow in 
coverage, 2) shallow in barrier reductions and 3) slow in phasing out barriers.448 If an FTA 
cannot achieve both long term and short term economic benefits it will not achieve sustainable 
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growth, i.e., generate a healthy economic flow. Further, issues like politics and national security 
have a lasting effect on FTAs.449 
Professor Bhagwati, a prominent author on international economics and former external 
WTO advisor, observed that very few predicted that Article XXIV exception would be used in 
wide circumstances.450 The thought was that leaning towards free trade and extending it to nearly 
all the commodities would discourage resorting to Article XXIV exception.451 
Prominent trade law scholar, Professor Raj Bhala, promotes a three-tier process of 
competitive liberalization by moving as aggressively as possible toward the end of global free 
trade by simultaneously pursuing trade liberalization at multilateral, regional, and bilateral 
levels.452 Bhala denies such terms as “complimentary liberalization” and “parallel 
liberalization.”453 He further identifies the benefits of FTAs as achieving domestic policy 
reforms, increasing multilateral bargaining power, developing strategic linkage, increasing 
political stakes in multilateral negotiations, and enhancing security.454 
SAFTA Article 7 made provisions for two-stage tariff reduction program to achieve a 
tariff reduction of 5% for India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka by 2015 and for the remaining Member 
States by 2018.455 However, it is possible that free trade cannot be achieved even after reducing 
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tariff barriers. This achievement requires countries to work hand-in-hand keeping in mind the 
primacy of the economic integration by promoting effective cooperation.  SAFTA measurement 
should consider its trade generating capacities. The basic structure for effective integration is 
there; it is now a matter for effective implementation. For proper implementation, integration of 
both economic factors, such as trade facilitation and infrastructure development, and non-
economic factors, such as political will and stability and building confidence, is necessary. The 
member states should embrace integration as part of the evolving process of development to 
achieve the goal of economic union. Despite the challenges, the South Asian countries have 
immense potential for deeper integration with the global economy. SAFTA provides the platform 
for such integration.456 
The South Asian countries are in close geographic proximity. However, there is uneven 
growth in this region. This is mainly because of the inward-looking policies of the government, 
political strife, conflict, and ideological differences among member countries. Economic growth 
rose to 6.9% in 2015, up to 6.7 % in 2014, and remained at 6.7% in 2016. Growth is predicted to 
accelerate to 6.8% in 2017 and to 7.1% in 2018. India is the leading and largest emerging market 
economy in the South Asia.457 
 
6.3. Challenges in South Asian trade 
Statistics of the Asian Development Bank reveal that South Asian intra-regional trade 
rose from 2% since 1967, but it remains below 6%. South Asia’s intra-region trade vis-à-vis its 
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global trade rose from 4.55% in 2010 to 5.58% in 2015.458 On the other hand, the ASEAN boasts 
an impressive intra-regional trade figure of approximately 24% (between 24.64% in 2010 to 
23.56% in 2015) of its total trade with the rest of the world.459 Statistics indicate that trade within 
the South Asian countries is increasing slowly but steadily. South Asia’s intra-regional trade 
increased from 2.7% in 1990 to 4.3% in 2011. For example, in 2011, SAARC’s intra-regional 
trade was only 4.3%, whereas the corresponding figures for ASEAN and ASEAN +3 were 26% 
and 39% respectively.460 Various factors are affect the level of intra-regional trade. Some of the 
notable ones follow: 
 
6.3.1. Lack of trusts & Mind set of political leaders 
Political willingness of the governments can significantly contribute to the inclusive 
growth in South Asia.461 Strong regional connectivity is central in ensuring food security, job 
creation, better nutrition, education, skill development, and sanitation.462 Significant imbalance 
of power is pre-dominant in this region. For example, India is the dominant economy in this 
region, creating suspicion and mistrust amongst the other countries of this region and retarding 
cooperation amongst the members. In SAARC, this process resulted in many distortions such as 
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avoiding the trade with India, discouraging FDI from India, unwillingness to work together to 
resolve regional issues, externalizing bilateral trade, and regional issues.463 
Continuity of these factors may significantly hinder regional cooperation and economic 
integration. This is mainly because the main purpose of cooperation and regional integration is to 
align the economic structures of the member states, which would, in turn, result in further 
interdependence with India. Because of the fear and mistrust of India the smaller SAARC 
countries will carry out business very cautiously when it comes to India.464 Professor Emeritus 
TN Srinivasan of Yale University observed that both India and Pakistan are trading heavily with 
UAE but are practically avoiding each other. Regional trade by India and Pakistan with other 
SAARC member countries are also very low. However, bilateral trade would have enhanced the 
GDP of both the countries.465 Their animosity and the long sensitive lists are damaging the 
economy of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Moreover, there are also several non-tariff 
barriers that are affecting regional trade. This paper succinctly pointed out these factors.466 
 
6.3.2. High level of informal border trade 
A significant amount of trade between the countries in this region are due to the informal 
trade. This is mainly because most of the countries share long, porous borders and their history, 
language, and culture of geographically proximate communities tends to blur across politically 
drawn boundaries in ways that facilitate informal trade regardless of formal ties between 
neighboring countries. UNESCAP’s analysis of inter-regional trade does not give the actual 
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picture because it does not mention the informal exchange made by the entrepreneurial 
communities in the frontiers.467 
Informal trade has been a common phenomenon in the South Asian countries, especially 
between India and its neighbors. To date there has been no quantitative study analyzing it. 
However, there have been some qualitative studies that estimated the informal trade between 
India and Bangladesh to be approximately 75% of the formal trade between the countries, and 
mainly India’s export to Bangladesh.468 Further, informal trade over the India-Sri Lanka border 
and the India-Nepal border is 33% and 100% respectively of the formal trade.469 SAFTA is 
predicted to divert informal trade into formal channels, and stimulate the diversion with other 
factors playing an important role to achieve this success.470 
 
6.3.3. High Intra-Regional Trade Cost 
The South Asian region is known for high trade costs. The trade cost is usually around 
114% of export goods value. 471  Whereas, South Asian countries trade cost the with U.S. is 
109% despite of the distance between them and the U.S. Trade between Member States has 
become more expensive and less competitive compared to trade costs with distant partners.472 
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Further, intra-regional trade in the ASEAN is 40% lower than intra-SAARC trade costs.473 The 
lack of fast-track land transportation service is one of the aggravating factors increasing trade 
costs in this region. Another important factor is the trade imbalance between India and other 
smaller SAARC countries. These countries find it difficult to supply the products that would be 
of interest to the India’s market economy. Furthermore, the productive capacities of the smaller 
SAARC countries have significantly declined because of the technical complexities and variety 
in comparison with the global market. 
 
6.3.4. Parallel Trading Arrangements (Multilateral Versus Bilateral 
Agreements) 
SAFTA countries have entered into various bilateral, sub-regional, and trans-regional trading 
arrangements among themselves, and at present the region has become a “spaghetti bowl” of 
such arrangements.474 India has bilateral trading arrangements with Sri Lanka, Bhutan, and 
Nepal. Bangladesh is trying to establish bilateral arrangements with India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. Further, there are ongoing bilateral negotiations between Sri Lanka and Pakistan. 
Moreover, in 1997 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal formed the South Asian Growth 
Quadrangle (SAGQ) to promote trade, investment, transport, and communication between the 
member states.475 
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Presently, South Asian countries are focused on bilateral arrangements as opposed to 
multilateral agreements. This focus prevents them from getting the maximum SAFTA benefits. 
Trade diversion is a common phenomenon in this region.476 Hostility between India and Pakistan 
hampers trade within this region.477 This hostile relationship causes Pakistan to trade with other 
developing countries like the U.S. and China. Presently, Pakistan has preferential tariff from 
China and the U.S. on many products. This undermines this region’s business opportunities. 
In this region, smaller countries seek to gain access to large countries markets, like India and 
Pakistan. Sri-Lanka obtained market access to India through the India Sri-Lanka FTA. Similarly, 
Sri-Lanka is also in the pipeline to obtain access to the Pakistani market. In this backdrop 
SAFTA will become marginalized not only to Sri-Lanka but other countries as they enter into 
bilateral agreements with each other. There is a further issue as to whether bilateral trade 
arrangements are possible in light of SAFTA. It is possible if members place SAFTA as the 
starting point of FTAs negotiations. If the FTA is not structured in this manner, it will act in a 
parallel manner with SAFTA and poses a threat to successful SAFTA implementation. However, 
most of bilateral arrangement between countries contain provisions reconciled as a starting point 
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6.3.5. Weak Physical Infrastructure and Lack of Border Trade Facilitation 
Various non-physical barriers hinder trade between South Asian countries and pose great 
threats to the regional integration. Excessive delays, high costs, documentary uncertainties, 
complex and un-unified border procedures, lack of information about the border rules are some 
of the common complexities of the South Asian trade. Unilateral measures cannot solve these 
problems. To cure these problems there is no alternative to the standardized procedures 
established bilaterally.479 The overall condition of physical infrastructure is poor in this region. 
The roads are not sufficient, railways and the waterways are not also up to the mark. These 
conditions increase the transport cost of the trade. In the present fast paced world, freight cost is 
one of the most important determinants of the competitiveness. Since the South Asian countries 
cannot minimize the transport costs they benefit less from trade liberalization regionally and 
internationally. Poor infrastructure increases trade costs and ultimately affects the trade flows.480 
Inferior infrastructure is one of the major obstacles of South Asia towards regional integration. 
For example, around 75% of the overall trade between India and Bangladesh is carried through 
the land transport over roads and bridges that are not wide enough to facilitate smooth movement 
of the vehicles.481 Usually the transport costs cover around 10% of the overall logistics costs.482 
It appears that if the transport cost is increased by 50%, trade decreases by 40%.483 To get the 
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fullest benefits of SAFTA the countries need to provide adequate support to improve the physical 
infrastructure to ensure that the goods move freely across borders.484 
Empirical studies identified transaction costs as one of the biggest hurdles of facilitation 
of cross-border trade amongst SAFTA member states. Upon a meticulous study of the empirical 
findings it appears that 10% reduction in transaction costs can result in increase of exports by 
2%.485 To cure these problems the government can set up e-filing of customs documents to 
streamline greater trade flows.486 Further, the countries can take initiatives enhancing border 
efficiency. One of SAFTA’s major limitations is its failure to provide a RTA between countries. 
Implementation of an RTA could cure the cumbersome, complex, and high cost of border 
transactions, and help to achieve the member states’ trade liberalization goals.487 
 
6.3.6. Nonexistent Regional Value Chain (RVC) 
Trade in this region is restrictive in nature. This problem becomes more acute when 
South Asian countries trade between themselves. High trade costs significantly add to the 
restrictiveness of this region. For example, it is costlier for the members to trade between 
themselves than to trade with the Latin American countries. Poor trade and transport 
infrastructure and restrictive rules and regulations of the countries cause the low level of trade in 
this region.488 Lack of a proper RVC network is also a prominent reason as to why this region 
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cannot keep pace with the rest of the world. The deficiency of value chains hindered the region 
from generating stronger gains in exports and employment generation. 
 
6.3.7. Slowdown Regional Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
Restrictions in trade services have also affected foreign investment inflows in the service 
sectors.489 The restrictive approach affects foreign investment penetration and discourages active 
competition of small domestic and new firms within the market. It becomes difficult to 
encourage innovation and create job opportunities in this restrictive environment. Further, it 
limits investment opportunities especially in technology and network infrastructure. This 
restrictive nature jeopardizes market productivity and competition. Consequently, it has far 
reaching impact on infrastructure services relied upon for trade in goods, global value, and 
digital services.490 
Trade restrictions translate into investment failure because trade and investments are 
inter-dependent. Additionally, a restrictive trade approach hinders intra-regional investment and 
negatively impacts small and medium sized companies investing in this region. Regulatory 
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6.3.8. Long Negative list of SAFTA-Review Not Regularly Assessed 
Long sensitive lists affect intra-regional trade.492 Under SAFTA, the sensitive lists cover 
approximately 53% of South Asia import products. The sensitive list includes a large market of 
products. As a result, Member States protect these products. To promote intra-regional trade, 
Member States must phase out the sensitive lists according to an agreed schedule. Presently, the 
tariff rate is around 5.5%, and should be timely reduced.493 India has an important role to play in 
eliminating its sensitive list of products because it has significant impact on other smaller 
economies trade relations. India leads in trade within the region and any positive movement 
taken will set precedent for other nations. 
A proliferation of statements and declarations without actual implementation limits 
SAARC progress. This is due to limited cooperation among Member States. Cooperation occurs 
primarily over previously agreed upon or non-controversial issues. These issues include 
alleviation of poverty, trade, and economic relations. 
Moreover, the poor relationship between India and Pakistan hinders full SAFTA 
implementation. The mistrust between these countries is a significant factor on trade facilities’ 
failure within these countries. In 2004, SAARC introduced SAFTA-facilitated intra-regional 
trade. Statistics reveal that intra-SAARC trade makes up less than 5.0% of regional trade and 
3.7% of global trade. Under SAFTA, the ‘free trade area’ operates based on the sensitive list.494 
                                                 
492 Taneja and Sawhney (2007) and Weerakon and Tehnnakoon (2006), among others, found the sensitive list 
provisions in SAFTA too stringent, as the sensitive list could cover 20 per cent of tariff lines compared to 10 per cent 
which was initially proposed. 
493 Raihan (2014) suggested sensitive list liberalization based on trade potential, wherein 29 priority sectors have been 
identified to be common in the sensitive lists of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Most of the tariff lines 
protected under sensitive lists relate to textiles, electronic equipment, iron and steel, plastic and rubber products. 




Member States tend to create long sensitive products list to shield specific economic 
sectors from SAFTA exemptions. Furthermore, some countries impose various para-tariffs to 
counter the contracting state’s limited tariff concessions under SAFTA. The sensitive list 
protection is a proviso of SAFTA’s TLP influence on trade.495 The sensitive list covers 20% of 
tariff lines in conjunction with top down tariff reduction mechanisms and other scheduled 
concessions for developing and least developed economies. This figure means sensitive lists 
blanket substantial trades falling outside tariff reduction envisaged by SAFTA. Downsizing 
sensitive lists is necessary for countries to achieve SAFTA’s optimum effectiveness. 
In addition to downsizing the sensitive lists, countries should focus on increasing trade 
efforts. The Working Group on Reduction in the Sensitive Lists attempted to narrow SAFTA’s 
sensitive list by 20%.496 Some nations are reducing their lists. For example, Maldives reduced its 
sensitive lists by 78% (reducing tariff lines from 681 to 152), and India reduced its sensitive list 
for LDCs by 95% (reducing tariff lines from 480 to 25).497 The second sensitive list revision 
began in 2012 with the objective of phasing out tariff lines.498 Under this scheme non-LDCs have 
three years (Sri Lanka has six years), and LDCs have eight years to meticulously revise their 
sensitive lists. The attempt to revise and reduce the tariff for the sensitive list is an important step 
towards regional integration.499 
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According to 2013 statistics, the sensitive list restricts around 53% of imports.500 
Additionally, some countries impose various para-tariffs to balance SAFTA’s tariff 
concession.501 All South Asian countries have a product sensitive list. Tariff liberalization is 
essential for proper SAFTA implementation. SAFTA Article 7.3(b) requires members to revise 
the sensitive products list every four years. It took four years to complete the first step to reduce 
the sensitive lists. Members are uncompromising to further reduce the list in the required sectors 
and degree.502 
6.3.9. Non-Tariff Barriers 
“Non-tariff barriers present nowadays the most important and dangerous barriers to trade 
with fragment markets in a more successful way that tariff have ever done.”503 SAARC counties 
need to work on non-tariff sectors such as sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical barriers 
to trade, restrictions on port entry and para-tariffs. Furthermore, SAARC should play an active 
role dealing with complaints received by SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other 
apex authorities. Greater harmonization is necessary in technological fields, especially in the 
animal and plant products sector. Eliminating NTBs will attract acceptances by importing the 
exporting country-issued certificates that will reduce the need for further inspection in border 
areas.504 
Studies reveal that non-financial tariffs cause greater trade hindrance than financial ones. 
Non-financial tariffs account for around 67% of trade barriers whereas tariff barriers cause 
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around 47.5%. Among tariff barriers, ordinary customs barriers have 64.3% and other trades 
have 35.7% of trade. The other cumbersome barriers are 11% corruption, 11% Custom 
documentation and formalities, 11% technical barriers to trade, 9-10% Anti-Dumping Costs, and 
5% other countervailing duties. 
South Asia has great potential to become a successful regional economic bloc despite 
wielding asymmetric economic power. It is necessary to view South Asian integration in a 
broader perspective accounting for changing global economics and business patterns across the 
wider Asian region. Such assessments are required for Member States’ economic interests and 
relations with other South Asian countries. Further, it will provide insight to how other South 
Asian economies will react to new challenges. The following sections discuss numerous NTBs. 
 
6.3.9.1. Unnecessary Testing Requirements 
Quality assessment and inspection is routine border trade work. Most South Asian 
countries lack proper infrastructure to carry out this work. Work, quality, and negligence in 
sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) test results significantly escalate costs. It is impossible to 
predict the required inspection timetable. Moreover, there are no accepted inspection standards, 
rules, or tests. For example, South Asian countries have a standard rule for pulp import. 
However, when Indian pulp exporters export to Sri Lanka they face additional requirements. 
They are required to obtain a Health Certificate from the Ministry of Health of Sri Lanka and go 
through a rigorous quality assessment process. This increases trade cost.505 In the early 2000s, 
Bangladesh had a good cement export market in the North-East India. Bangladesh exported 
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approximately $1.2 million worth of cement every month until February 2003.506 This was 
possible because Bangladesh cement was cheaper than the domestic cement and domestic 
transportation cost was very high. Indian authorities announced that all Bangladesh cement had 
to obtain a testing certificate from the Bureau of Indian Standard (BIS) before exporting and 
subjected such cement to a fee depending on export volume. This requirement resulted in 
stopping Bangladesh’s cement export to India.507 
6.3.9.2. Certification and Mutual Recognition Absence 
Unlike European jurisprudence, in this region the mutual recognition concept is 
unpopular. A recent MCCI study revealed that the exporting country certificate of conformity is 
generally unaccepted by the importing country except for very limited sectors. Usually, imported 
goods are required to go through a re-inspection process causing great obstacles to free 
movement of goods within this region.508 
 
6.3.9.3. Inconsistent Packaging and Labeling Requirements 
India has the largest consumer market in South Asia and receives the majority of exports. 
Consequently, India’s trade attitude influences neighboring countries economies. Similarly, 
India’s food and safety standards affect other countries trade volume. In India, the Food Safety 
and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) is responsible for determining the competitiveness of 
the foods and related products circulated in the Indian market. However, there are no harmonized 
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goods labeling requirements. This hinders regional goods trade and importing because it is 
difficult to comply with FSSAI guidelines targeting multiple markets. 
 
6.3.9.4. Insufficient Quarantine and Warehouse Services 
Lack of SPS facilities at borders causes further delay due to the quarantine period. This 
delay affects all imports. The biggest delays are imported plants, live animals, fruits, vegetable, 
and perishable goods. The lack of predictability, procedural delays, and port inefficiency can 
result in needing to warehouse goods. However, the warehouses are inadequate in this region’s 
land and seaports. There is no initiative at the regional level or from individual governments to 
build excellent warehouses in border regions. Uncertainty in the process and lack of adequate 
warehouse facilities increase overall trade costs. 
 
6.3.9.5. Absence of Formal Trade Financing 
There is no unified schedule of trade-related transaction costs. In this region, cost 
inflation is at different levels. For example, Bangladesh and India do not have direct banking 
facilities at their border. As a result, traders have to rely on third-party payments. This causes 




routes. A recent study revealed that, Hawala509 and Hundi510 bilateral trade payment systems 
carry out around 60% India trades and 72% Pakistan trade.511 
 
6.3.9.6. Information Asymmetries 
Under SAFTA Article 7(4) Member States are obligated to notify the SAARC Secretariat 
annually of all para-tariff and non-tariff measures. Further, the COE must regularly review such 
measures in their regular meetings to check their compatibility with other WTO measures. 
Despite these mechanisms, these organizations fail to provide a stable and steady trading regime. 
It is impossible for traders to make a cost risk assessment because important information is 
unavailable. Moreover, it is very difficult to obtain relevant information from concerned 
authorities. These uncertainties further escalate trade costs. However, GATT Article XI and the 
WTO advise countries to publish the actual regulations measures adopted and provide all 
relevant trading information on the internet for ease of access. 
 
6.3.9.7. Imposing Unusual Dumping/ Anti-dumping Duty 
Under SAFTA Article 16(5), Member States are required to safeguard non-discriminatory 
measures applicable to products imported from all other contracting states. On 28 January 2004, 
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Bangladesh filed a DSU case with WTO against India for imposing antidumping duty on lead 
acid batteries. Bangladesh contended the duty imposition was contrary to India’s obligation 
under GATT Articles I:1 and II:1 and Bangladesh’s benefits under the WTO were nullified or 
impaired pursuant to GATT Articles XXIII:1(a) and XXIII:1(b). India’s lead acid battery market 
was around 600 million USD. After SAFTA’s implementation, battery export tariffs reduced 
from 64.21% to 38.33%. Bangladeshi exports fulfilled around 10% of India’s market. In 2002, 
the Indian government imposed anti-dumping duties on all battery exporters because China and 
Korea were exporting batteries below normal value. Bangladesh challenged this provision before 
the WTO dispute settlement body. In 2004, these two states held a consultation.512 India decided 
to withdraw the controversial anti-dumping duties. However, Bangladesh lost its previous battery 
market in India during the three-year case.513 
On 1 January 2017, India imposed a five-year anti-dump duty on Bangladesh and Nepal 
jute and jute good import ‘protecting the domestic industry.’ 514  After three months, India 
withdrew additional customs duties levied on jute product import from Nepal. However, there 
was no anti-dumping duty reduction.515 Bangladesh’s duty ranges from $19 to $352 per ton.516 
The anti-dumping duty effects Bangladesh’s economy in sectors like jute yarn, hessian fabric, 
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and jute sacking bags. Jute is the Bangladesh’s third largest export product.517 In 2015-2016, 
Bangladesh exported jute and jute products worth 919.58 million USD, a 5.88 % increase from 
the previous year. Bangladesh exports around 20% of its jute to India covering around 8% of 
India’s jute market.518 
 
6.3.9.8. Corruption 
Procedural delay and uncertainties significantly increase trade cost. This indirectly 
encourage traders to opt for informal payment methods to ensure goods are processed and 
delivered on time. Customs authorities have some discretionary powers to facilitate the free flow 
of trade, and often they arbitrarily use and abuse their powers. For example, instead of charging 
import tariffs according to the goods quality or value they routinely decree product value on 
other bases.519 
6.3.9.9. Para-Tariffs 
Generally, all tariffs falling outside conventional custom duties are para-tariffs, including 
port access fees and handling charges. For example, India subjects all apparel products to 1% 
landing charges, 2% education taxes, and 12% countervailing duty. Additional countervailing 
duties apply to apparel in certain routes such as India-Bangladesh land route. Additionally, 
charges arise for porter and laborer trade unions when goods enter India by road.520 
 
6.3.10. Terrorism Suppression 
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Large-scale terrorist violence affects South Asia.521 Including Afghanistan in SAARC 
adds new dimensions of violence and terrorism. After the signing at the third summit, in 
November 1987, the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism came into effect 
on 22 August 1988. The Convention adopted a regional approach to the established principles of 
international law of terrorist offences. It made provisions for exchanging information on terrorist 
activities and extraditions between Member States. Article VIII of the Convention states 
“contracting States shall cooperate among themselves, to the extent permitted by their national 
laws, through consultations between appropriate agencies, exchange of information, intelligence 
and expertise and such other cooperative measures as may be appropriate, with a view to 
preventing terroristic activities through precautionary measures.”522 Following this Convention, 
in 1990 SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) was established in Colombo. Its 
main purpose is to collate, analyze, and disseminate information regarding the terrorist incidents, 
tactics, strategies, and methods.523 
6.3.11. Failure to Comply Compensation to Revenue Loss Mechanism 
Under SAFTA Article 10(E), non-LDCs are required to compensate LDCs for customs 
revenue losses for undertaking tariff reduction. The compensation formula is: RL (17) = CRNS 
(17) – (1+α) * CRNS (16). RL (17) = the revenue loss in 2017, where CRNS (17/16) = custom 
revenue of non-sensitive products covered under SAFTA 2016 and 2017 tariff liberalization 
program, and α = annual customs revenue growth rate of non-sensitive lists. The compensation is 
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calculated in USD. The main objective is to aid vulnerable economies by making up for losses 
resulting from normal tariff reduction.524 
SAFTA allows Member States to withdraw tariff concessions in limited circumstances to 
protect domestic industry from injury caused by increased free trade imports under SAFTA. 
These provisions are to prevent economic damage. Such measures’ duration is less than three 
years. These safeguards are not applicable to LDCs products that do not exceed 5% of the 
importing country’s import share.525 
 
6.3.12. Absence of Proper SAFTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
SAFTA Article 10(7) states, “The COE will also act as Dispute Settlement Body under 
this Agreement.”526 However, SAFTA lacks a streamlined dispute resolution method in the 
SAARC Secretariat. SAFTA takes a minimalist approach and provides a method that can 
effectively resolve their disputes through consultation by providing parties flexibility and 
control.527 The present dispute settlement method focuses on amicable dispute settlement 
between parties.528 An aggrieved contracting party is required to make a written request to the 
other party for a consultation setting out the main disputed issues.529 Further, the complaining 
party has to explain the complaint facts and legal basis to the COE. Following the request for 
consultation, the other party must reply within fifteen days and must engage in consultation 
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within thirty days of the initial request.530 If the other party does not respond within the 
prescribed time, does not take part in consultation, or they fail to reach a settlement then the 
complaining party may request the COE to settle the dispute.531 
The COE must examine the dispute and make recommendations within sixty days from 
the referral date. The COE has sweeping power on the manner of dispute settlement. For 
example, the COE can request a specialist from the panel of specialists from a contracting party 
with direct interest in the present dispute.532 Once appointed, the specialist must report to the 
COE within thirty days.533 However, there is no provision directing the COE about the impact of 
the specialist recommendation. If the specialist’s report is silent the COE chooses whether to 
give it any weight. The COE’s wide power in final dispute determination may undermine the 
specialist’s role. Any party aggrieved by the COE’s recommendation can appeal to the SMC. 
The SMC’s powers are like an appellate court. The SMC can sustain, modify, or reverse the 
COE’s recommendations.534 The SMC has sixty days to settle the appeal.535  When the COE and 
the SMC find the complaint issues inconsistent with the agreement’s provision the SMC can 
provide recommendation and demonstrate implementing measures. The SMC and the COE are 
facilitators unlike courts giving judgment.536 The contracting party is required to inform the COE 
or SMC about their course of action following recommendation within ninety days. If the COE 
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does not receive the information, they retain power to authorize other interested parties to 
withdraw concessions with equivalent trade effect.537 
With one exception, Article 20 of SAFTA provides that bilateral consultation shall 
resolve all potential agreement disputes. 538 However, there are many disputes where the 
complaining party and responding party are more than two. Other references to contracting states 
in Article 20 are in a different context or jointly referred to the complaining and responding 
party. This can cause problems. For example, one party’s decision to initiate a measure to protect 
its domestic industry against the temporary surge of the goods can affect multiple countries. 
There is no provision as to whether the affected parties shall bring separate complaints and solve 
each the matters bilaterally or whether to address the dispute collectively. Furthermore, there are 
no guidelines as to the position when the COE decides to solve the dispute, whether they should 
consider it on a bilateral basis or whether it will treat is as multiple individual complaints 
involving identical subject matter. The COE faces further complexities in substantive dispute 
settlements with identical findings on identical subject matter. Even considering matters 
separately, there are chances for several complaints regarding the same subject matter. All these 
ambiguities are avoidable by amending SAFTA provisions to accommodate single proceedings 
in cases that involve identical claims by or against more than one Member State. 
6.3.13. Absenteeism of LDCs Technical Assistance 
SAFTA Article 8 identifies facilities set up to promote intra-regional trade. These 
facilities are efficient intra-SAARC trade, removal of investment barriers, import licensing and 
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registration procedures simplification and harmonization, legislative and policy related issues, 
assistance for developing national capacity training and human resource development, effective 
market promotion in export-oriented sectors, harmonization of standards, and streamlining 
mutual recognition test results.539 These factors require signatories to give meticulous and 
effective consideration to their implementation. 
To make the most out of SAFTA, LDC’s should come forward in fields like technical 
assistance and cooperation arrangements. LDCs should develop their technical aspects on a 
priority basis absent binding commitments. This is possible by ensuring training and skill 
development, product certification, amending and improve national anti-dumping legislation, 
taking export and investment oriented measures, developing and improving tax policies and 
instruments, reforming and modernizing trade policies, eliminating technical trade barriers, and 
improving SPS facilities, safeguards, and compensation, etc.540 However, there is no roadmap for 
how the signatories will achieve these goals. 
The developing contracting states provide technical assistance to LDC for their trade-
related capacity development .541 The agreement highlights the objectives of technical assistance 
for enhancing trade capacities, developing and improving tax and tariff policies and related laws, 
refining and developing national expertise on different WTO agreements, undertaking rigorous 
studies on boosting trade related infrastructure, supporting export, and facilitating investments.542 
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6.3.14. Stoppage Reduction Based on Tariff Structure 
Tariffs for the priority sector range from 5%-50%. Member States should move towards 
adopting Tariff Liberalization Programs for Sensitive Lists. In 2015, member states agreed to 
reduce tariffs by 20% and 30% by 2020 with some flexibility for highly sensitive products.543 In 
South Asia, two sided conflicts and tensions are common phenomena. These conflicts arise 
because of historic animosity or difference in the laws and regulation across Member States. The 
lack of unification hinders smooth trade import and export among SAARC countries. However, 
mutual agreements may ease or resolve asymmetries between the countries. Such bilateral 
arrangements can be highly beneficial for both conflicting states.544 
 
6.3.15. Trade in Services Barriers 
Service trade policy interlinks with the international trading system of goods. Trade cost 
reductions have a direct impact on service performance improvement because goods produce 
enterprises and increase diversity and quality.545 Statistics reveal open attitudes towards service 
trade directly impact productivity of those countries’ manufacturing industries.546 
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In practice, the cause of trade barriers is adverse legal and regulatory frameworks, 
typically a national government’s intention to discriminate foreign services or suppliers.547  
Service trade barriers can limit or restrict the number of suppliers or operations, transaction 
value, and the entity type through which suppliers provide services.548 Market access and 
treatment measures combined determine international contestability and competition in a 
country’s service market. 
Some common forms of barriers to service include monopolies, discretionary foreign 
investment screening, foreign equity limits, caps on number of licenses, restrictions on 
temporary movement of natural persons supplying services, and discriminatory subsidies or 
licensing requirements. Service trade policies include service supply to foreign suppliers whether 
across borders, through establishments, or natural persons moving to supply services. 
 
6.3.16. SAARC Fails to Resolve Inter-State Conflicts 
This region is one of the world’s most conflict prone regions. India has bilateral disputes 
with most of its neighboring countries. There is an historic dispute between India and Pakistan 
over Kashmir. This dispute is one of the most difficult challenges of SAFTA. This animosity 
delayed many SAARC summits and implementations of various measures.549 In 1971, India 
supported Bangladesh’s liberation war. This weakened their relationship with Kashmir. 
Furthermore, there are several conflicts between India and Bangladesh originating prior to 
Bangladesh’s liberation. These conflicts arose when India constructed the Farakka barrage over 
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the river Ganges about 18 kilometers away from the Bangladesh border. India diverts Ganges 
water during the dry season.550 The bilateral relation between India and Bangladesh further 
deteriorated when India constructed the Tipaimukh barrage in the Borak river, just one kilometer 
away from Bangladesh’s border leaving the North-Eastern part of Bangladesh vulnerable to 
desertification.551 Additionally, Bangladesh has disputes with India regarding border 
demarcation, enclave exchange, and illegal migration. Similarly, border relations between India-
Sri Lanka and India-Nepal are unsatisfactory. The main conflict between India and Sri Lanka 
began when India supported militant Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Moreover, India 
and Nepal have various economic issues. Apart from these, the inter-state relations between 
other South Asian countries are tension free.552 
There are various theories regarding the relationship between RTAs and conflict. Under 
the classical trade theory, RTAs ensure increasing political incentives that results in political 
stability and are beneficial to Member Countries. Barbieri (2002) analyses the difference 
between RTAs and conflicts and the strong positive connection between them. He believes RTAs 
in conflict prone zones may trigger militarized inter-state dispute and the inter-state conflicts 
within South Asia obscure SAFTA’s goals.553
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6.4. Market Leader or India’s SAFTA Role 
It is common phenomenon that India faces considerable amounts of regional opposition 
while the larger world outside hails its soft power. Generally, most countries seem to have a 
mistrustful relationship with the larger powers. For example, the U.S. seems to face these 
problems from the neighbors of Central America. Similarly, Germany has grown as a dominant 
power in the EU and China in the ASEAN region.554 The role of India on the global stage is 
misleading due to its misconception with this region. 
In 2008, India’s trade within SAARC was 0.8% of its total imports and 5% of total 
exports. Whereas, Nepal’s was around 73.9% total imports and 59.6% total exports.555 India is 
the strongest economy in South Asia and can take the initiative to build trust amongst SAARC 
nations. India can show openness and explore various arrangements to alleviate neighboring 
countries’ security and domination concerns. This can be done in through discussions at the 
ministerial level; forming agreements, pacts, and informal civil society organizations; and 
developing people-to-people contacts. Such efforts would send a strong message across SAARC 
to develop a closer and collegial relationship between countries. India is in a position to initiate a 
healthy relationship between members by disregarding previous misunderstandings and restoring 
faith in SAARC unity.556 
There are many reasons behind SAARC neighboring countries’ cageyness. Historically, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh have difficult border issues with India. Moreover, there is a growing 
concern about cross border access to terrorists and illegal immigration. All these issues generate 
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a climate of distrust between these nations. These countries have an internal attitude of economy 
with each other. As a result, the growth amongst the South Asian countries is exclusive. For 
India, this created more suspicion. No country benefits from this restrictive attitude towards each 
other, regional integration is necessary for growth. For example, all of India’s neighbor countries 
need to benefit from its huge and growing economy. India needs better relations with neighbor 
countries to create a friendly climate for a sustainable development and enhancing its foreign 
policy ambitions beyond the region. This is possible if India embraces this region and builds a 
framework of cooperation that increases contact and a sense of developed prosperity in the South 
Asian region.557 
Regional cooperation can play a critical and decisive role in maximizing individual 
experience. The SAARC charter includes elements like regional harmony, peace, and prosperity. 
India should take the lead to build mutual confidence and comfort levels. The former Prime 
Minister of India, Inder Kumer Gujral, said that there is no zero-sum game in the South Asia and 
it is in the best interests to all to move towards mutual prosperity.558 Given its geographic 
position and the size of its economy, India can play a vital role in regional integration without 
sacrificing its own basic interests.559 
India shares land and maritime borders with all SAARC counties except one. As a result, 
India’s role in SAARC region is of paramount importance. India should not perceive its 
neighbors as being envious of its growing economic and political clout. From India’s 
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perspective, prosperity lies in regional cooperation rather than isolation. As a result, India should 
take active initiative to engage other countries and undertake confidence-building schemes.560 
Sustainable economic development and prosperity of this region is possible by 
prioritizing more than just the western market. A large and vibrant regional Asian market can be 
significant, cause a demographic shift, and grow global demand for Asian products. These 
countries can adopt a long-term strategic approach to create the Asian market. To achieve this 
goal, Pakistan is an important hub to connect the Asia-wide market.561 Full-fledged economic 
relations between India and Pakistan are a pre-requisite for successful liberalization. These 
countries should eliminate all voluntary export restraints tending to hurt small and medium sized 
manufacturers. Further, India should concentrate on exporting machineries and technologies to 
Pakistani firms. These firms currently import from developed countries at a higher cost. 
Moreover, the visa facilities must be flexible and user friendly so that small- and the medium-
scale entrepreneurs can develop a cross-border linkage and make maximum utilization of 
liberalization. 
Some terrorist’s attacks in India drastically shut down communications, visits, and 
healthy trade flows with Pakistan. Rather than destroying the entire relationship, India should be 
more proactive in distinguishing, the isolated militants from the greater people of Pakistan which 
no connection with militant activities. Adopting a hard line can prove counterproductive in 
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realizing prosperous and peaceful Asian economic integration.562 Identification and solution of 
political and economic sectors pose greatest challenge for the proper SAFTA implementation.563 
With 78%, India is the largest GDP contributor in the South Asia. Pakistan contributes 
10%, Bangladesh contributes 8%, and Sri Lanka contributes 3%.564 Other SAARC members 
have negligible GDP contribution. This figure demonstrates India’s position in taking the 
initiative of greater trade integration in this region. India comprises 73% of SAARC’s regional 
territory, has 75% of the regional GDP, accounts for 78% of regional export and 60% of regional 
imports.565 Therefore, India is in the position to advance the trade agenda and take initiative for 
regional integration. The import and export flow of goods to and from India with neighboring 
countries demonstrate neighboring countries receive Nepal 55%, Bangladesh 20%, and Sri 
Lanka 15% of their total imports whereas exports by these countries is a small in comparison to 
India. Furthermore, India has the largest military force of this region. India and Pakistan have 
nuclear weapons.566 
There are various socio-cultural and religious similarities between India and other 
SAARC countries. Therefore, without India’s active participation and leadership, it is impossible 
to achieve regional integration. “India constitutes the core while all its neighbors form a 
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periphery of the South Asian region.”567 Statistics reveal that FTAs with nations having 
hegemonic power are more successful than the ones constituted amongst equal states.568 This is 
because in regimes where there is hegemony, the strong countries can act as the institutional 
focal point to implement the FTA. Moreover, such countries also can play an important role in 
minimizing and neutralizing tension that may arise from unequal distribution of FTA gains 
which between countries with similar power is very difficult to coordinate.569 
Despite India’s superior position within this region, SAFTA countries do not accept India 
as the leader of this region. India’s dominant position within this region creates distrust and 
suspicion amongst members. In this environment, countries cannot work together towards 
regional trade integration. Moreover, Pakistan constantly challenges India’s hegemonic power 
within this region. The lack of consensus regarding hegemonic power and leadership has two 
impacts on the proper SAFTA. First, India may feel reluctant to act as the institutional focal 
point to implement SAFTA goals and, second, may feel unwilling to ease the tensions that 
persist between other Member States that may arise from distributional arrangements. 
 
6.5. Observer Role 
When a country has considerable stake in a certain region, it starts attending as an 
observer and thus explores various political, cultural, and economic avenues. The SAARC 
Charter does not define the term observer. Inclusion of new states and observers will convert 
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South Asian into a new power game. SAARC’s success lies on the perceptual move of regional. 
For third world countries, the regional schemes work as a mechanism to satisfy national 
aspirations and realize national goals.570 Though SAARC fails in economic regional integration, 
the presence of the observers is a positive sign. At the 14th SAARC Summit, Afghanistan became 
the 8th SAARC member and five nations (U.S., EU, Japan, China, and South Korea) obtained 
observer status. Economically and strategically, these states hold key positions in the global 
market. Further, at the 15th SAARC Summit, held in 2009 in Colombo, delegates of nine 
countries participated as observers. The Chairperson and the Prime Minister of Bangladesh 
stated, “I am happy to announce that SAARC leaders have admitted Afghanistan as member of 
SAARC, subject to the completion of the formalities, we have also decided to accord observer 
status to People’s Republic of China and Japan, Afghanistan will certainly prove as a bridge 
between Central and South Asia.”571 The presence of China as the observer unwelcomed by 
India and Nepal because they fear China’s presence will make their focus thinner. As an 
observer, China will affect other member countries. Other countries may use China. Further, 
China’s presence may divert regional cooperation goals from socio-economic development to 
global power politics promoting East-West Connectivity. China’s connection with this region is 
through common historical, geographical, ecological, and other common interests such as 
military, terrorism, and environmental security.572 Moreover, China shares common borders with 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan. Therefore, China can be beneficial as observer 
because it is a stakeholder in the declining South Asian economy. On 3 March 2007, China made 
the formal application to SAARC for observer status. 
                                                 
570 See more at, http://india.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/05/12/saarc-iii-challenges- and-prospects/ 
571 See more at, http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers17%5Cpaper1626.html 




During the 14th SAARC Summit Iran gained observer status to enhance SAARC trade 
links between Iran and SAARC Member Countries. Apart from the commercial and geographical 
links Iran acts as the gateway for East-West connectivity, Iran’s observer status may be 
beneficial to India. India may get strategic advantages for the fight against terrorism, fulfill their 
security and economic needs, and obtain easier access to Central Asia.573 
The observer issues carry both challenges and opportunities. Observers enhance SAARC 
internationally and creates imperatives for peace and cooperation. The presence of observers 
enhances credibility. This can attract foreign direct investment, open up transit trade facilities, 
inter-regional trade, and economic cooperation opportunities within the member states. On 10 
November 2006, U.S. and South Korea gained observer status following the Standing Committee 
meeting. The observers provide a wider platform for business trade and strategic development. 
Inclusion of Iran and the U.S. contributes to economic growth and attracts mutual aid. Moreover, 
these countries may bring in new power within this region. The U.S. has shown concerns about 
Iran- Pakistan- India (IPI) gas pipeline. This project may change the outlook of regional politics. 
For example, if the nuclear tension between Iran and the U.S. rises, Pakistan will not be able to 
step out of the project. The presence of Iran in SAARC will greatly stimulate East-West 
connectivity. The fear of the impact of the big power is undeniable and justified. However, they 
can be positive too. For example, their inclusion can provide economic stability and progress 
both regionally and globally. 
 
                                                 





Economists and globalization experts observe that multilateral trading systems within 
regional trading blocs can foster regional integration and globalization. Some of the problems 
that plagued this region are large sensitive lists, weak provisions for para-tariff and non-tariff 
measures, lack of adequate transport facilities, complex visa rules, lack of technical assistance to 
LDCs, poor revenue compensation mechanisms, and other political disputes among Member 
States. SAFTA has the potential to grow if these countries take a positive outlook. Despite the 
positive measures envisaged by SAARC, Member States generally adopted a restrictive approach 
in liberalizing economies. Further, there is inherent political conflict between them. To get the 
most from SAFTA Member Countries should take immediate steps to the cut down the sensitive 
lists, reduce the non-tariff and para-tariff barriers, formulate streamlined revenue compensation 
schemes, protect and promote investments, improve transport facilities, and integrate bilateral 
agreements into SAFTA. SAFTA leaders can incorporate one significant FTA embodying their 
overall economic interests and targets. Politically and geographically, this region has great 
potential for highly integrated trade, investment, and production space. However, this goal is 
impossible without the members accepting inter dependencies in trade and services.574 
Despite SAARC countries sharing common heritage and historic background, this region 
is the least integrated and most unstable region of the world. To get the most out of SAFTA there 
must be a diversification of trade. Further, it is necessary to implement SATIS. These countries 
need to strengthen cross border investments and gradually remove NTBs that constrain cross 
border trade and investments. Further, these countries should fully implement existing 
                                                 
574 Hoi-Yong*․ Dhruba Kumar Gautam**․ Lee Chong, Hak-Chun, South Asian Free Trade Area 




declarations and agreements. Recently, as part of enhancing bilateral trade with India, Pakistan 
granted India MFN status. Further, to develop bilateral relations with LDCs India decided so sign 
various strategic agreements with Afghanistan and Nepal. The main purpose of such agreements 
is to cut the sensitive list for LDCs to 25 items and grant duty free and quota free access to all 
commodities with the exception of tobacco and liquor. It appears that the South Asian countries 
are taking bold strides towards business liberalization. This is the ideal time to adopt a 
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SAFTA’s aim is to establish a smooth mechanism for cross-border goods movement 
between individual regions by eliminating trade barriers. SAARC’s initiative, patterned like the 
EU, is to create free trade without obstacles, free travel without visa requirements, and establish 
common currency and defenses for Member States. Organizations established by South Asian 
citizens influenced SAARC’s formation. Its formation combines their innovative ideas to 
develop regional trade. However, these governments fail to implement SAARC goals. 
Additionally, the lasting conflict between India and Pakistan prevents regional integration and 
cooperation. Suspicions persist and cast doubt on SAARC’s effective performance. Countries 
with smaller economies like Pakistan aggregate because of India’s dominance. India is 
circumspect of neighboring differing countries unity.575 Despite favorable aspects, South Asian 
countries intra-trade business system achievement lags. The focal points of this concluding 
chapter are the possibilities and recommendations for imminent researchers. 
 
7.2. Option One: Disband SAFTA 
If Pakistan-China border trade is successful like NAFTA and the EU ensures trouble free, 
fast, and free movement of goods and services, then is the same possible for SAARC? Intra-EU 
trade Export has a 70% success rate; the Intra-NAFTA trade has a 50% success rate, whereas, the 
Intra-SAARC trade can only achieve a 5% success rate.576 According to a WB estimation, annual 
India-Pakistan trade is approximately 1 billion USD. However, eliminating trade barriers could 
result in an increase up to 9 billion USD.577 The Asian Development Bank Institute indicates that 
34 years after SAARC’s establishment, it negatively affects intra-trade business. This is evident 
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from the 4.23% decrease ratio in grouping’s global business.578 The WTO identifies South Asia 
as the world’s least integrated region corresponding with other RTAs. 
To progress, the South Asian intra-trade system states must look beyond SAARC 
frameworks to alternatives like bilateralism and sub-regionalism. In 2014, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi endorsed this idea at the 18th Summit held in Kathmandu. Modi recommended 
that South Asian countries’ unification should be expanded through or beyond SAARC, between 
all or some of the regions.579 SAARC development should succeed because of history and 
culture, which creates bonds between South Asian citizens. Unfortunately, SAARC fails to 
impact social, economic, or cultural aspects. Regional organizations should target and observe 
some core objectives and take measures to address the prevalent distrust and mistrust obstructing 
overall growth and integration. Additionally, officials and leaders lack of political determination 
defeated unification. 
 
7.3. Option Two: Renegotiate SAFTA 
Sub-regional grouping within SAARC is possible through maintaining SAARC while 
circumventing maintenance engagement. An initiative exists among Bangladesh, India, Bhutan, 
and Nepal through implementing the motor vehicles agreement. The purpose of this agreement is 
to ensure passengers and cargo transports trouble-free movement between countries. 
Additionally, expanding the scope of corresponding agreements into different areas created 
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enormous opportunities. These areas may include interpersonal connectivity through tourism, 
cultural exchange, transit, and related areas. A trouble-free visa policy is a step towards this 
development. 
 
7.3.1. Sweeping Uncertainties 
Global capital and technology depend on regional harmonization. This harmonization 
requires state infrastructure, available trained labor, and economic expenses and subsidiary 
industry transfers. Harmonization will result in all parties benefiting from territorial 
collaboration.580 Regional collaboration and cooperation are the solutions for intra-state 
controversies and internal problems. However, SAARC fails to establish regional cooperation 
and relationships within Member States. Bilateral disputes and political controversies, especially 
between India and other regions, are matter of Member State’s non-interference. This lack of 
conversation prevents regional cooperation.581 Generally, effective economic integration 
transforms regions and spreads infrastructure and institutions with lower frictions enabling 
coordination and better information exchange.582 
 
7.3.2. Escalating Intra-Regional Trade 
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Economic development in different parts of states separate where there are substantial 
social and geographical gaps. These gaps can cause higher transportation costs, decreases in 
inter-connection, and strong institutional differences.583  Unified economic methods will improve 
lagging and peripheral parts of states.584 Escalating intra-regional trade is not a new idea. 
However, the expectation is SAARC will remain absent an adhesive unified economical 
procedure. This expectation is due in part to Intra-SAARC trade’s limited performance compared 
to trade within other regional blocks. Performance may improve through the WTO initiative to 
develop the trade system between SAARC states through regulations and governmental 
policies.585 It is necessary to identify obstructions and possible assistance for trading within 
SAARC. 
SAFTA’s proper application increased South Asian intra-regional trade more than 2 
billion USD. The ratio of intra-regional trade is less than 5%, well below East Asia’s 32%.586 
SAFTA compared to other RTAs remains the lowest because South Asian countries are more 
willing to trade with the U.S. or EU. Nevertheless, South Asia took a step towards unifying the 
rest of Asia. 
SAARC was established to achieve the goal of intra-trade of 100 billion USD.587 Member 
States are required to act towards an eventual CU through removing tariffs, NTBs, complex 
sensitive lists, and adopting a common external tariff (CET). They are required to give 
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inspiration to value chains, textile, and clothing value chains, uphold intra-region investments, 
improve connectivity-financial trade, define the scope of economic corridors formation, 
encourage service trade, and resolve the India/Pakistan dispute through regularizing their trade 
relationship.588 Through moving towards a CU, South Asia’s future prospective trade will 
illuminate among the regions.589 
FIGURE 7: 1 POTENTIAL FOR THE SOUTH ASIAN REGION590 
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7.3.3. Uppermost Prospect Implementation 
SAARC fails to improve the politico-security environment through South Asia 
regionalism. Trade diplomacy should be free from political unrest and security issues. The 
national security range should increase to ensure economic and trade stability. South Asia 
countries’ political unrest conflicts with achieving SAU. As the basis of a peaceful union, the EU 
should be a model. The European Union established the free movement of people; common 
currency and common foreign and economic policies. To establish a peaceful region SAARC 
must ensure these objectives by developing a regional entity.591 
Poverty, unemployment, national security, environment, and globalization have impeded 
South Asian progress. SAARC leaders must consider the bigger picture beyond national interests 
to achieve a harmonious environment through effective economic cooperation. However, 
SAARC’s present framework is fragile and cannot tackle the challenges of bilateral political 
questions. To achieve similar economic progress, South Asian countries should concentrate on 
improving transportation and business infrastructure and construct an institutional method to 
achieve harmonization and collaboration between government and investors.592 
 
7.3.4. Move Towards a CU by 2020 
To give effect to the shared aspirations for a more prosperous South Asia, the Leaders 
agreed to the vision of a phased and planned process eventually leading to a SAEU. SAARC 
must make timely and consistent progress to meet the milestones of an FTA, a Customs Union, a 
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Common Market, and a Common Economic and Monetary Union to envisage the SAEU. Trade 
liberalization is sought as a stepping stone for greater cooperation and a step toward setting up a 
SAEU along the lines of the EU.593 SAARC countries must take several steps before forming a 
CU.594 These steps include having a fully functional FTA within SAARC and CETs for the entire 
province. However, they must abolish tariffs, NTBs, and complex lists before phasing in a South 
Asia CET. SAARC’s constant improvements will enable establishing this union. The first step 
towards transformation lies in SAFTA’s mission to establish a CU and common market, known 
as South Asian Economic Union (SAUE) by 2020.595 Establishing a CU plays a vital role in 
trade advancement. SAARC takes CU examples from the South Africa Customs Union (SACU) 
and the EU. 
 
7.3.5. Eliminate NTBs 
South Asia border procedures are ineffective and outdated. This region suffers from poor 
infrastructure and inadequate administrative services. The lack of regional support and improper 
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transit agreements results in long delays. These problems increase transaction costs and 
negatively affect trade.596 An NTB’s purpose is to provide protection for domestic industries or 
affect free trade movement. Generally, there are three types of NTBs. First, export barriers 
including export sponsorship, prohibitions, and quotas. Second, import barriers including import 
licensing, bans, and customs processes. Third, rules and regulations dealing with restrictive 
product standards, product and labor quality, and environmental standards, etc. These countries 
fail to take measures to eliminate NTBs. Eliminating NTBs will bring this region considerable 
dividends. Additionally, tariff and NTBs elimination may increase intra-regional trade 1.6 
times.597 Developing India-Bangladesh border infrastructure, which can increase trade amounts 6 
times current levels.598 
 
7.3.6. Promote Intra-Regional Tourism 
This region has great potential for tourism.  South Asia is most diversified, 
experiencing an amazing variety of landscape and cultures. Additionally, it lays claim to 
both the Himalaya in the top of the world and Maldives, which lie flush against the lapping 
ocean.  According to Chanda’s (2014) observation, the intra-SAARC travel accounts for 
20% of all international arrivals amongst SAARC countries. South Asia is a combination 
of different cultures, religions, and languages. The geographical contiguity, inter-
connection between culture, social, and history can lead to a stronger and more competent 
region. South Asian countries have natural beauty, historical places, monuments, and 
                                                 






ancient culture. These attributes create opportunities for developing the tourism industry. 
The sea and hills are some of the main tourist attraction. Nepal, Bhutan, India, and 
Pakistan benefit from hill tourism. India, Bangladesh, Maldives, and Sri Lanka benefit 
from seacoasts tourism. Nepal is gaining popularity for Eco tourism and India attracts 
health tourism. India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh have a high share of overall tourism 
inflows. As a result, they can work together to exploit the regional opportunities. 
Therefore, the promotion of regional tourism is important for SAFTA Member States. 
Security issues hinder tourism promotion, creating a business and investment friendly 
environment, and promoting services trade. 
7.3.7. Promote Intra-Regional Investment 
South Asia is the world’s fastest growing region. However, it faces problems in capital 
inflows deterioration, increasing inflation, and reductions in remittances from oil-exporting 
countries. Economic growth rose from 6.8% in 2014 to 7.0% in 2015. South Asia’s economic 
growth is projection is 7.1% in 2016 and 7.2% in 2017.599 SAARC should encourage trade and 
inspire investment activities between Member States. The joint venture should be a priority 
because signing agreements and treaties cannot ensure accomplishing regional goals. An 
investment friendly environment is a necessary because and investments are closely connected. 
Presently, South Asia lags behind with low levels of trade in goods and performs very poorly in 
the ease of doing business where South Asian countries rank the lowest. In 2011, SAARC 
members pledged to promote greater flow of financial capital and long-term investment. SATIS 
provides for services investment. It focuses on issues like market access, progressive 
                                                 




liberalization, domestic regulations, recognition, dispute settlement, safeguarding measures, and 
subsidies. In order to achieve this goal, FDI and facilitation of value chains are key. 
An investment friendly environment is necessary because this region has fails to secure 
more than 2% of overall FDI.600 In order to attract FDI, Member States should focus on 
establishing regional value chains or regional value platforms for exports similar to ASEAN 
countries.601 Additionally, they need to address and cure non-transparent regulatory restrictions 
on incoming FDI such as land availability to set up business, restrictions on doing business with 
other countries, etc. Lastly, Member Countries must address the frequent corruption, 
bureaucratic delays, and property disputes significantly undermining the investment 
environment. To accommodate foreign investment these countries can take certain steps to 
reduce corporate and personal income taxes in high priority sectors, subject to avoiding 
counterproductive regional competition. Addressing these issues and eliminating them will 
significantly attract FDIs.602 
SAARC countries should facilitate public-private investment partnerships, keeping in 
mind the need for developing regional and sub-regional energy and infrastructure projects. Such 
steps shall promote regional value chains in the apparel, service sector and other industries. 
SAARC countries should focus on reinforcing and streamlining existing value chains and 
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developing new value chains. Costa Rica is an example of new value chain possibilities. In Costa 
Rica, for 25 years the source of international business was exporting coffee and bananas. Then a 
massive economic boom occurred, and it began exporting over 4500 products to 150 nations.603 
This transformation is a result of innovative trade policies and trade agreements attracting 
foreign company investments.604 
Innovation in streamlining investment regulations and adopting fast procedures for 
regional investors and commercial services is necessary. SAARC countries need to make up to 
dated information on investment related regulatory frameworks and service contracts bidding 
process easily accessible. Additional benefits exist in formulating a regional investment treaty 
duly highlighting bilateral investment treaty with India and Pakistan and facilitation, intra- trade, 
FDI, value chains, and innovative treaties and ease of access, investor protection, dispute 
settlement, contract enforcement, rule against double taxation, etc. 
 
7.3.8. Promote Trade in Services 
The South Asian service sector contributes more than half of the region’s GDP.605 The 
service sector is growing faster than manufacturing businesses. The service sector is vital to 
overall integration because it contributes significantly to the GDP. The region’s goal is to ensure 
gradual and progressive service liberalization in conjunction with the individual country’s 
national policy issues, the economy size, and level of development. However, Member States 
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have not taken initiative to this effect. The general constraints on cross border service, 
cumbersome visa regimes, and poor communication and transport links restrict individual 
mobility. 
 
7.4. Option Three: Merge with a Bigger Block 
In the two decades following NAFTA’s establishment, trade between the U.S. and 
Mexico increased by 506% trade between the U.S. and Canada increased by 192%,606 and trade 
between the U.S. and non-NAFTA countries increased by 279%.607 In 2000-2014 NAFTA’s total 
trade rose from 1349 billion USD to 2400 billion USD, MERCOSUR rose from 42 billion USD 
to 108 billion USD, the EU rose from 3348 billion USD to 7800 billion USD, and ASEAN rose 
from 185 billion USD to 608 billion USD, whereas, South Asia rose from 6.3 billion USD to 
51.3 billion USD.608Another researcher Baldwin, states that RTA expansion is due to domino 
theory.609 According to this theory, change stimulated by the creation, extension, or deepening of 
a preferential trade area aggravates economic actors in nonparticipating nations to employ 
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inclusion pressure.610 Though there are lobbies both for multilateral and regional approaches due 
to trade blocs’ discriminatory practices, it becomes difficult to lobby regional approaches.611 
The non-preferential rules ultimately become ineffective because every country is entitled to 
MFN status. Former WTO Director General Pascal Lamy stated: 
“There is no more the notion of country of origin for manufactured goods as the various 
operations, from designing the products to manufacturing components, assembling and 
marketing have spread worldwide by forming international production chains. Nowadays, 
conceptually, products are/should be tagged ‘Made in the World’ rather than ‘Made in the UK’ 
or ‘Made in France.’  What we call ‘Made in China’ is indeed assembled in China, but the 
commercial value of the product depends on numerous countries that led its assembly in China in 
the global value chain, from designing to manufacturing and organizing the logistical support to 
the chain. To put it in simple words, the manufacture of goods and services can no more be 
considered ‘mono-located,’ but rather, ‘multi-located.’” 
It is time to discover new channels so that accounting and statistical systems can consider 
the new international trade geography in an economic system. According to American 
Economist Tom Friedman, this system crashed under the influence of globalization and 
internationalization of production relations. The old mercantilist thoughts of us against them; of 
resident against rest of world, have lost much of their meaning.612 Lamy proposition ROOs with 
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his “Made in the World” idea as a mode of assessing any trade based on its value rather than 
from the originating country.613 
 
7.4.1. SAFTA-China FTA 
China dominates foreign investment policy and SAARC leader India fails to deliver 
significant investment. This causes constant political strife with Pakistan and causes many 
Member Countries to insist on merging with China.614 These demands for merger cause India 
discomfort because it has long enjoyed the status of the biggest economy. This status 
automatically grants policy-making power within the region. In the concluding speech of the 18th 
SAARC summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi conveyed that India has a vision to 
develop SAARC. Modi proposes developing the foundation on five pillars -Trade; Investment; 
Assistance; Co-operation; and People-to-People Connections. China also envisions integrating 
South Asia. However, it is ultimately beneficial for all parties if these two fast growing 
economies join together to foster regional development. New Delhi and China have conflict over 
India’s northeastern border region. Ultimately, India’s desire to dominate the region leads to 
resisting China’s integration and all parties lose the potential benefits.615 
Pakistan lobbies for increasing China’s SAARC status from observer to dialogue partner 
or full member. The message is that China will counterbalance India. Sri Lanka and Nepal also 
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want China’s upgrading in status or inclusion in SAARC to weaken India and, thereby, disrupt 
the association’s equilibrium. Beijing can easily take the advantage of the gap between Member 
States. Beijing may utilize Islamabad, Sri Lanka, and Nepal’s support. Additionally, China’s 
investment in the regions like Africa and Latin America negatively affects environmental 
sensitivities and labor laws. The region could fall into a vulnerable position if SAARC fails to 
establish clauses on environment and labor issues. 
India has FTAs with Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan and participates in SAFTA with seven 
other South Asian counties, whereas, China has one South Asia FTA, with Pakistan. Starting in 
2001, China created preferential RTAs with India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh under Asia-Pacific 
Trade Agreement (APTA). However, such arrangements are in respect only to certain goods. 
Similarly, India also has preferential market access to both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka under 
APTA. However, it remains a weak trade agreement. 
Since the mid-2000s, China’s trade link with this region has resulted in inflows of loans 
and aid. The loans are mainly for developing infrastructural projects such as ports, highways, 
bridges, and power plants. China has overtaken traditional donors to countries like Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka, and Bangladesh. For example, since 2009, China has emerged as the largest donor to Sri 
Lanka.616 China invests in Pakistan, specifically in military training services. 617 India does not 
have the ability to prevent China’s growing influence.618 The South Asian countries are 
dependent on China’s financial assistance because they directly benefit from deep trading and 
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investment links. Professor S.D. Muni identifies India’s policy towards China revolves around 
containment, conflict, competition, and cooperation.619 This causes India’s policy towards China 
to remain confused, diluted, and following lobby interests. 
However, the relation between these giants should change under Modi government 
leadership. Since 1990, China’s economy has experienced rapid growth, whereas, India’s lags. In 
2012, China’s trade with SAARC countries was 25 billion USD, whereas, India’s trade was 17 
billion USD.620 China is the largest trading partner with Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan and is 
the second largest trading partner with Sri Lanka and Nepal.621  
 
7.4.2. SAFTA-BIMSTEC: 
The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC) is an institution responsible for promoting inter-regional cooperation and bridging 
the gap between South Asian countries and East Asian countries such as Myanmar and Thailand. 
BIMSTEC promises to play an active role in furthering regional connectivity and integration in 
Asia. Despite positive aspects, BIMSTEC like SAFTA failed to make any significant practical 
impact. India organized the BIMSTEC Summit in mid-October 2016 for discussing issues like 
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transport, electricity, and broadband connectivity.622 To extract the fullest benefit of both 
SAFTA and BIMSTEC, SAFTA can merge with the BIMSTEC and focus on South East Asia. 
 
7.4.3. SAFTA -ASEAN 
ASEAN is the most dynamic and successful FTA within this region. India has bilateral 
trade relations with 10 ASEAN countries. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) is the most comprehensive integration initiative in Asia. This scheme is a unique FTA 
comprised of 10 ASEAN and Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. 
ASEAN countries have bilateral trade relations these countries. It is one of the most prominent 
trading blocs in recent times. In November 2012, the RCEP negotiations began and so far, there 
have been 18 round of negotiation between countries. The RCEP covers 45% of global 
population and accounts for 40% of the world’s GDP and 30% of world trade. 
India is the only South Asian country in the RCEP. This creates great opportunities for 
India to integrate with advanced economies in Asia and the Pacific and contribute to global value 
chains. RCEP may help curb Asian FTAs overlapping provisions. Further, it can rationalize the 
rule of origin and promote FDI inflows and technology transfers by multinational corporations. 
Merging with RCEP could further alleviate poor economic business conditions. ASEAN is 
actively working towards integration. At the 31stASEAN Summit, the Secretary General of the 
ASEAN emphasized integrating ASEAN and APEC economic regions with the objective of 
fragility of global trade recovery emerging with the trends and challenges of globalization and 
multilateralism. Keeping pace with this, South Asian countries should take a pro-active role in 
                                                 




developing infrastructures, capacities, and institutions through upgrading them in order to 
safeguard against potential loss of market access from the erosion of trade preferences. 
 
7.4.4. SAFTA- EU 
There had been various attempts by governments to facilitate trade through FTAs. 
However, the progress of such initiatives has been very slow if not negligible. For example, 
Bangladesh is trying to enhance bilateral relations with Turkey, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Macedonia, and Malo. There is a slight chance of success with Turkey and Sri Lanka.623 The 
FTA objective is to eliminate trade barriers by exempting tariff and other import costs. 
Generally, these countries are reluctant to sign a FTA that is worse off due to the conditions 
attached. Government officials tend to focus more on protecting local industries from negative 
FTA impacts. This attitude hampers the overall objective of regional goods and services 
integration. 
Trade liberalization opens the doors to additional opportunities and stronger productivity 
growth. Trade and investment brings in new ideas, innovations, technologies, and better research 
which ultimately improves products and services. EU statistics indicates that 1% economy 
openness results in o.6% rise in labor productivity in the following year.624 This indicates that 
openness in the market has a direct connection with labor productivity. However, some analyst 
observes that as a RTA, SAFTA is too little and too late.625 Additional observations are that the 
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previous South-South mechanisms, like AFTA and MERCOSUR, were acting rapidly towards 
dismantling trade barriers.  
 
7.5. Recommendations 
SAFTA has many economic and political effects within this region. Promoting South 
Asian regional integration is a difficult task. The follow modifications are recommendations for 
successful integration. 
 
7.5.1. Trade Rules and Procedures Simplification and Transparency 
The transparency provision in GATT Article X:1 requires relevant information to be 
published in a manner and form remaining accessible to third parties. This information includes 
relevant laws, regulations, and other concerned judicial decisions. These measures enhance 
transparency and ensure good governance. Easy access to authentic information eliminates 
opportunities for corruption and outdated practices. Additionally, streamlined procedures are 
helpful when challenging a matter in the neutral appeal forum. Member of WTO, TFA, and 
SAARC are under a duty to publish and make information available to all. Under TFA Article 1, 
member states have to publish all trade related information in an accessible manner so that 
concerned people can access them. The information should be available to all. Further, they must 
create an enquiry point and duly notify the point to all. 
There must be progress in monitoring trade diversification, exported products levels, 
preference utilization rate, and other firm level information. This information allows contextual 




development, and poverty reduction.626 These publications promise to increase transparency in 
trade transactions and simplify trade procedures and documents by applying international 
instruments. These countries need to adopt a transparency and make all relevant regulation 
available. The lack of transparency and publicly available trade related information is one of the 
biggest NTBs in international trade. Countries should upgrade their existing trade information 
after consulting with regional import and export experts. If Countries engage in greater dialogue 
among themselves then they will have a more active and amenable business environment. These 
dialogues can be beneficial to fill regulations and procedures information gaps. The exchange of 
information can be through networks, trade fairs, and other exhibition forums. Additionally, 
SAARC lacks a dynamic statistics wing. This research collected the most current statistics and 
information. The most current data found is 5 years old. SAARC should have a more dynamic 
and current resource and statistics center like other international forums like the WTO, ADB, 
UNCOMTRADE, and WB statistics. The SAARC Secretariat should take steps to rectify this. 
 
7.5.2. Commit to Continuous Dialogue for Swelling Intra-Trade 
One of SAARC’s major drawbacks is that it lacks effective conflict mediation or 
resolving institutes for bilateral or multilateral issues. Over the years, SAARC evolved into an 
institution providing broader guidelines. SAARC plays a passive role in devising instruments 
and techniques for consultation on bilateral and multilateral political and security problems. 
SAARC excluded bilateral discussion forums that are vital for eliminating historic mistrust. 
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Additionally, dialogue is difficult because SAARC faces difficulties in holding summits. 
SAARC has cancelled or postponed about half of its summits. Boycotting summits weakens 
communication. Considering the broader objectives of regional integration, members should 
commit to continuous dialogue through summit participation. Attending summits enables 
countries to foster the decision-making process. SAARC can learn from the ASEAN minus x 
scheme. This allows members to opt out of a scheme when they are not ready or willing to 
initiate. This initiative enables smooth measures implementation. Similarly, SAARC should 
adopt a SAARC minus x’ scheme. This scheme is necessary because of the ongoing nuclear 
tension between India and Pakistan. However, SAARC is silent on these matters. Additionally, 
like the ASEAN Summits, SAARC can arrange summits twice a year. This will facilitate the 
dialogue process between SAARC countries. SAARC requires parties have a fair and equal 
chance of succeeding for regional agreements. This is a streamlined and model GATT with wide 
ranging cross-retaliatory powers. However, there is little initiative from Member States to 
resolve or manage interstate and intra-state conflicts.  
 
7.5.3. Ensure Seamless Trade in South Asia 
South Asian countries can adopt a CET with multilateral obligations to harmonize 
external tariffs on a sector-by-sector basis. The goods with the closest current tariff rates can 
initiate this. Next, these countries can focus on reducing the large gaps with the ultimate purpose 
of adopting a common external tariff. Incorporating these steps will eliminate the rules of origin, 
facilitate trade integration, and make optimum use of scarce resources. To achieve this goal the 
first step is to encourage junction in the MFN tariff rates from imports and exports outside South 




services flow. Further, the governments should address problems arising from discriminatory 
charges and subsidization by South Asia competition. The countries should tackle the foreign 
suppliers’ unfair trade practices in the South Asian market. The countries need to expedite 
customs clearance procedures automation under the Automated System for Customs Data 
(ASYCUDA). The countries should adopt these steps to create seamless market throughout 
SAARC. 
Free trade is possible with proper elimination of tariffs and NTBs on all trade and goods. 
However, SAFTA does not properly mention provisions like NTBs and para-tariffs. It calls for 
elimination. This objective is too broad; SAFTA should formulate exact elimination models and 
provide definitive periods for accomplishing this goal. The lack of active measures causes 
significant hindrances to potential trade gains. The SAARC is more equipped to combat NTBs 
such as SPS, technical barriers to trade, port entry restrictions, and para-tariffs. The SAARC 
Secretariat is keen on tackling these measures through report and complaint procedures. Greater 
harmonization levels are necessary to the overcome technical barriers to trade and SPS especially 
for animal and plant products. Additionally, governments can take steps to eliminate sensitive 
lists, providing relevant trade information, ease transport, and eliminate tariffs and NTBs. Lastly, 
for better and effective SAARC integration nations should consider India’s SAARC power grid 




                                                 




7.5.4. Establish a Permanent South Asian Dispute Resolution Tribunal 
Under SAARC, SMC is the highest administrative body and COE is the primary dispute 
resolution body. Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) can follow a negotiation or rule based 
approach to settle disputes. The rule-based approach is more plausible than the negotiation based 
approach because it ensures neutrality and consistency. Further, it ensures unbiased dispute 
solving mechanism. ASEAN follows the rule-based approach. Whereas, SAFTA follows the 
DSM international best practices with clauses that vary to some extents. 
The WTO DSB has sole jurisdiction for appointing the expert panel to consider the case 
and to accept or reject the panel’s recommendations or other appeal results. The DSB ensures the 
ruling and recommendation implementations and has the power to authorize retaliation if a 
country does not follow a ruling consultation within 60 days. However, before taking action the 
dispute countries must carry out negotiations to solve the disputes by themselves. If the parties 
cannot reach a settlement, they can ask the WTO director-general to mediate the matter or help 
another way. At this stage if the parties cannot resolve their dispute the complaining country can 
ask for panel appointment. The other country, commonly known as the country in the dock, has a 
one-time power to block the panel appointment. There is no power to block when the DSB meets 
the second time. The procedures of the DSB can be an effective role model for SAARC 
tribunals. 
The ASEAN DSM may take up to 290 days to decide and the NAFTA DSM up to 310 
days, whereas, the SAFTA DSM up to 330 days. This demonstrates SAFTA DSM’s delay.628 
Further, SAFTA should adhere to a clear in-depth attitude towards the rule-based approach. 
SAFTA can learn from NAFTA and use independent experts in dispute settlement. However, the 
                                                 




unanimous decision of the political entity with SAFTA supervisory power operates as the highest 
interpretative authority for the agreement.629 The SMC can continue in the role of supreme body. 
It also assumes the roles of appellate authority that seems to be objectionable in certain 
circumstances. The body should consist of individuals from Member States who have expertise 
in international trade law. Further, it is necessary to vest the task of settling disputes in personnel 
with jurist expertise since because the task requires high-level juristic expertise. 
 
7.5.5. Stoppage Bilateral FTA with Plurilateral FTA 
There are several debates on multilateralism and regionalism. These concepts require 
discussion in a broader theoretical context. The center of the debate is whether the two modes of 
liberalization (regional versus bilateral) are competitive or complimentary in nature. These 
considerations are vital to regional politics, cooperation, and for bilateral trade relations amongst 
countries with FTAs. Amongst South Asian countries, Sri Lanka has bilateral agreements with 
India and Pakistan, and India has bilateral agreements with Nepal, Maldives, and Bhutan. The 
majority of negotiations and complaints occur through bilateral negotiation forum. These 
communications result in inconsistency between the bilateral agreement and SAFTA. Generally, 
bilateral agreements contain comparative TLP, sensitive list, and ROOs in the DVA with the 
PSFTA. The ISFTA is often contradictory to SAFTA provisions.630 Typically, multilateral 
trading systems accommodate the changing trade realities. 
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Bilateral preferences may receive discrimination in multilateral trading systems. There 
are instances where RTAs overlap specifically designed regional integration situations and 
directly counterbalance MFN results. Regionalism cannot be an alternative to multilateralism 
because it threatens multilateral frameworks. Tension is evident whenever there is collusion 
between the rules of origin. In the integrated world, the rules of origin are of utmost importance 
to rationalize FTA independence. 
 
7.5.6. Transit Transport System Integration and Harmonization 
A single national system is essential for integrating trade frameworks and ensuring 
smooth goods movement. This scheme will be an integrated hub for importers, exporters, and the 
facilities required for goods in transit. To streamline the process there must be a unified 
electronic gateway for information exchange. This procedure will accelerate revenue collection 
and improve trade compliances, transparency, and accountability. These measures will promote 
improved coordination between customs and government agencies such as plant quarantine, 
banks, chamber of commerce, export promotion council board, insurance companies, etc. 
Implementing harmonization of standards and conformity assessment procedures may strengthen 
regional integration and encourage governmental contracts and national certification institution 
agreements. This would address a multitude of problems. For example, it would solve BSTI 
Bangladesh’s testing report problems in acceptability to the Indian authority. 
Due to the lack of transit trade, India’s exports to Pakistan and Afghanistan and 
Pakistan’s export to Bangladesh and Nepal are very expensive.631 Under the 2013 WTO Bali 
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Package, the countries are required to provide each other transit facilities. This agreement 
requires India and Pakistan to provide each other with seamless transit facilities. If these 
provisions are implemented the regional economy will significantly strengthen. For example, 
India would have easy access to Afghanistan and Central Asia and Pakistan would have easy 
access to the growing market of Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Nepal. To implement this scheme all 
forms of transportation must be available to assist smooth goods and services movement within 
this region. 
Following intense negotiations, bilateral smart borders agreements can be a solution for a 
unified South Asian border action plan. South Asian nations need to curb visa complexities, 
harmonize visa regulations including entry screening and tracking procedures, and integrate 
name-based and biometric watch lists. Furthermore, exit and export tracking procedures need 
streamlining and there must be a procedure for data sharing mechanisms for foreign nationals’ 
entrance and exit. To build container security, initiatives should require joint container inspection 
for entering South Asian ports. 
 
7.5.7. Periodic Sensitive Lists Review 
Generally, Member State’s sensitive list comprises of important items having potential 
regional trade. LDCs include core export items on their sensitive list, which ultimately 
encourages negative trade of these products. Nearly 53% of total SAARC countries imports are 
included on the sensitive list for protection. Long sensitive lists are a great hindrance to regional 
integration. Member States must reduce their sensitive lists on a priority basis with time limits. If 
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this occurs, the tariff could reduce significantly.632 India can play a vital role in eliminating its 
sensitive lists. India is in a better position to do so because the impact of eliminating the sensitive 
lists is minimal for India compared with other trade statistics. There is a requirement to revise the 
sensitive list every four years. However, there is no formal requirement to reduce the list.633 
There is no practical reduction because revising sensitive list lies within the member’s discretion. 
SAARC members need to prepare a clear plan to identify a few priority sectors for trade 
liberalization under SAFTA. They must carry out quantitative assessments to reduce the tariff to 
0-5% and improve bilateral relation with other SAARC countries, especially LDCs. Reducing 
trade barriers should increase Bangladesh’s GDP by 17%, India’s GDP by 15%, and Pakistan’s 
GDP by 5%.634 
 
7.5.8. Market Leaders’ Superior Role 
India and Pakistan have important roles in facilitating regional economic cooperation and 
integration. This is because India and Pakistan combined account for 90% of GDP, 80% of intra-
regional trade, and 86% of the population in South Asia. India’s trade with Pakistan is below 
0.5% and Pakistan’s trade with India is below 5% of overall trade. However, they have huge 
business potentials. These countries should come out their historic animosity, adopt trade 
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policies, and facilitate measures to increase their bilateral trade. These countries share a long-
shared border. Therefore, adopting progressive policies will be highly beneficial for their 
economies. Informal trade between India and Pakistan is at 250 million USD to and indirect is at 
4 billion USD through third countries, i.e., UAE, Singapore, Iran, and Afghanistan.635 
Trust and confidence are key to mutual growth. To enhance this, SAARC members must 
have a unified and harmonized voice speaking of mutual prosperity. India, as the largest 
economy in this region, can dominate SAARC integration and development. India’s influence 
can be a catalyst in furthering trade relationships between Member Countries. However, India 
has not always encouraged other countries trade policies at the level of SAFTA. India’s business 
is not dependent of SAARC countries. The expectation is that Indian, being the leading 
economy, will lead towards integration and cooperation. India will gain business opportunities if 
this region achieves workable economic integration and cooperation. These steps will expedite 
India’s growth and ensure its stability. 
 
7.5.9. Superlative Application of Rules of Origin 
A strict regime regarding rules of origin specificity, design, and application can make it 
cumbersome for LCD exporters to maximize on the preference scheme. Promoting integrated 
production structure in the recipient country required strict rules of origin. However, in the 
modern business environment to get the most benefits from bilateral agreements requires 
liberalizing the rule of origin. Seeking coherence in the rules of origin, for RTAs and preference 
schemes, will help business structure their production to take advantage of market opportunities 
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these arrangements create. Further, 30% of SAFTA’s rules of origin value-addition provisions 
require adjustment to better facilitate intra-regional South Asia trade expansion. The value 
addition of most LDCs products remains very low and the 30% value added provisions provides 
further export trade barriers. 
 
7.5.10. Ensure Visa Free Travel for Superfluous Trade 
Within this region, the procedure for obtaining a visa is very complex because the rules 
are not flexible and lack uniformity. Visa requirement’s complexity and rigidness cause 
significant hindrances to intra-regional services trade, especially between India and Pakistan. 
The reviews and primary data of the respondents reveal these problems. Visa hurdles 
significantly hamper the free movement of persons and intra-regional trade. 
To alleviate the situation, SAARC set up the Visa Exemption Scheme. This is a 
significant leap towards trade freedom. This scheme, first introduced in the fourth SAARC 
Summit in Islamabad, came into being in 1992. This scheme is limited to special travel 
documents for a certain category of dignitaries. Nonetheless, the SMCs are required to 
continuously revise the list of people entitled to special treatment under this category. Twenty-
four categories of personnel qualify for this exemption including Members of Parliaments, 
Judges of the Higher Courts, businesspersons, journalists, sportsmen, senior officials of the 
government, and others.636 The visa exemption scheme is different from the free movement of 
persons provision of the EU. In the EU, any person can freely travel between EU countries. 
Tourists can roam around EU countries if they obtain a Shenzhen visa from any European 
                                                 




country. SAARC stresses the free movement of persons but provides only for dignitaries. In the 
South Asian region, the free movement of the persons provision is not fully implemented.637 
There are strict visa rules between South Asian countries, especially between India and Pakistan. 
SAARC countries cannot ensure visa free travel to its citizens. The free movement of persons 
and visa-free travel would enhance goodwill and foster peace within neighboring countries. 
Moreover, it would open new trade opportunities.  SAARC countries’ immigration authorities 
should reconsider this issue and review the provisions in order to facilitate free movement of 
persons within the region. 
 
7.5.11. Ensure Assistance to Protect Revenue Losers 
To facilitate intra-SAARC trade, SAFTA Article 8 focuses on setting up various 
instruments for protecting trade losers. In this region, enhancing technical assistance for building 
LCDs trade capacity is necessary for expanding trade and promoting economic integration. 
LDCs should focus on the technical assistance and cooperation arrangements to gain the most 
from SAFTA. It should be a priority design and address technical assistance without binding 
commitments. Specifically, LDCs should work on training and skill development, product 
certification, improving national capacity for anti-dumping legislation, measures promoting 
export and investment, developing tax policy regimes, revising and reforming trade policies, 
eradicating technical barriers to trade, adopting streamlined and modern SPS measures, policy 
related measures, safeguards, compensation etc. However, effective measures lack to assist 
revenue losers. 
                                                 





7.5.12. Ensuring Trade Remedy Measures Provisions 
SAFTA lacks a specific provision for adopting anti-dumping or countervailing measures. 
Dumping occurs when a company exports goods at a higher price than normally charged in the 
local market. Countervailing results in an additional duty known as countervailing duty on some 
subsidized products. Such provision hampers domestic producers. Amongst SAARC countries, 
India is the only frequent user of anti-dumping measures.638 Similarly, in Pakistan, there have 
been fifty-three investigations, with measures imposed on twenty-four. There are anti-dumping 
measures against Bangladeshi and the Nepalese exporters from SAFTA. This is an important 
weapon for countries because they are targeting the most competitive producers. The relative 
lack of anti-dumping and countervailing duties may be due to the relative low value of intra-
regional trade. 
Furthermore, SAFTA does not contain any undertaking calling for abolition of additional 
trade remedy measures. SAFTA provides contracting states too much leeway to protect domestic 
industry from import surges. Moreover, contracting parties reserve the right to suspend the 
concessions when there is evidence that the imported products cause or threaten to distort the 
competition in the importing country’s market. Generally, such measures follow an investigation 
by the public authority. The investigation must comply with GATT Article XIX and the WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards. The investigation must determine if there is a clear evidence of a 
surge of imported goods from the other contracting parties and if such imports cause serious 
injuries to the producers or are likely to distort competition within the market. There must be a 
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causal link between imports from the producers and the likelihood of injuries. The Article XIX 
requirement depicts that a surge in imports must be unforeseen and done away by SAFTA 
drafters. This provision should eliminate the difficulties with the WTO wording.639 Generally, in 
situations where safeguard measures are applicable against an exported product from more than 
one LDC contracting parties, LDC producers will be exempt provided their import does not 
constitute more than 15% of total import. In addition, the contracting parties must also show 
indiscriminate measure application. Unlike Article XIX (3), countries affected by safeguard 
measures cannot suspend comparable trade concessions to exports from the contracting party 
implied safeguard measures. 
 
7.5.13. Launch an Innovative Oversight Institution 
By virtue of SAFTA Article 10, the SMC is the highest SAFTA decision-making body. 
The COE assists the SMC. The COE is comprised of on one nominee from each contracting 
party at the level of senior economic officials with expertise in trade issues. The COE ensures 
South Asian countries comply with SAFTA provisions. The COE is the ‘custodian of the 
treaties.’ The COE is responsible for overseeing the administration and implementation of legal 
frameworks within the ambit of SAFTA. SAFTA provisions do not precisely define the term 
‘senior economic officials.’ However, senior economic officials are commonly senior 
government officials who have expertise in relevant trade matters. The COE simultaneously 
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monitor, review, and facilitate implementation of SAFTA provisions and other functions 
assigned by the SMC. However, the COE has failed to accomplish its responsibility. 
To make the most of SAARC provisions there has to an independent institution that will 
create a jurisprudence by which SAARC and SAFTA automatically become binding throughout 
all SAARC countries. The SAARC Secretariat can create a commission that has a similar 
mandate to the EC provisions and directives. Further, there has to be provisions by which 
SAARC countries incorporate the decisions of the commission in their state legislation. 
However, the SAARC Secretariat should supervise such commission for overseeing conformity 
and corollaries. There has to be a streamlined action plan that shall create and implement 
groundbreaking regulatory mechanisms. Furthermore, the countries need to adopt a joint 
approach to tackle unfair trade practices. Moreover, there has to be routine and effective review 
of the legal, technical, and administrative features of SAFTA in order to get the full benefit. 
NTBs need to be property identified and eliminated to facilitate trade within this region. There 
has to be review not only to the Sensitive Lists and NTBs but also to the ROOs, compensation 
mechanism, and dispute resolution. Furthermore, there has to be effective use of technology for 
the combined value addition requirements and the issuance of origin certificate. It shall meet at 
least biannually and shall submit its report to the SMC after every six months. 
 
7.6. Conclusions 
The business potential of the South Asian region is huge. Better regional cooperation in 
the South Asian region promises large gains in welfare and growth. However, various 
obstructions stand in the way of realizing the true potential of this region. In trade liberalization, 




liable to lose and limited procedures that export will gain because of better input. This business 
environment causes domestic procedures to encourage increased productivity and consumers will 
be the ultimate gainers. SAFTA had a modest beginning. Despite this SAFTA has set the pace 
for tariff reduction for LDCs and non-LDCs Member States and laid down specific guidelines for 
implementation. SAARC formation was in the background of hostilities between South Asian 
countries, asymmetrical economies, and several other challenges. The intra-regional integration 
within this region is very limited. TLP is a step in the right direction. In spite of this, the intra-
regional trade is below 5%. To alleviate the situation, the tariff reduction agenda must be 
complied in the time bound manner. Integration at customs level in SAARC seems to be a distant 
milestone. However, harmonization of the common external tariffs may mitigate the 
complexities of the rule of origin. 
The major recommendations include moving towards a CU, adopting steps like 
elimination of tariffs and sensitive lists, reduction of NTBs by way of ensuring reporting, 
monitoring and eliminating NTBs, and moving towards a CET. Moreover, South Asian countries 
should come under the umbrella of harmonization of rules and standards under an MRA. 
Moreover, value chains focusing on the T & C can be established on a pilot basis. Other notable 
recommendations include promotion of intra-regional investment by pro-actively attracting 
flagship investors, facilitation of improved connectivity through experimental transit regimes 
based on corridor on a mutual basis, exploration of idea of joint borders with single clearance, 
promotion of service trade, and concentrate more on a liberal visa regime both the specialized 

























Afghanistan Kabul 652,864 34,169,169 53.3 $20.57 $559 3% 
Bangladesh Dhaka 147,610 164,827,718 1,116.6 $248.85 $1,520 6.9% 
Bhutan Thimphu 38,394 792,877 20.6 $2.31 $2,870 5.9% 
India New Delhi 3,287,263 1,342,512,706 408.4 $2450 $1,850 7.2% 
Maldives Malé 298 375,867 1,261.3 $3.58 $9,950 4.1% 
Nepal Kathmandu 147,181 29,187,037 198.3 $23.32 $799 5.5% 
Pakistan Islamabad 881,913 207,774,520 223.1 $304.4 $1,547 5% 
Sri Lanka Colombo 65,610 20,905,335 318.6 $84.02 $3,930 4.5% 
- - 5221,133 1800,545,229 345 - - - 
Source: World Bank 645 
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ANNEXURE 2: 1 EVOLUTION OF RTAS GRAPH IN THE WORLD646 
 
                                                 











ANNEXURE 3: 2 LIST OF SAARC SUMMITS 
Number City Country Date 
1st Dhaka Bangladesh 7-7 December 1985 
2nd Bangalore India 16-17 November 1986 
3rd Kathmandu Nepal 2-4 November 1987 
4th Islamabad Pakistan 29-31 December 1988 
5th Male Maldives 21-23 November 1990 
6th Colombo Sri Lanka 21 December 1991 
7th Dhaka Bangladesh 10-11 April 1993 
8th New Delhi India 2-4 May 1995 
9th Male Maldives 12-14 May 1997 
10th Colombo Sri Lanka 29-31 July1998 
11th Kathmandu Nepal 4-6 January 2002 
12th Islamabad Pakistan 4-6 January 2004 
13th Dhaka Bangladesh 12-13 November 2005 
14th New Delhi India 3-4 April 2007 
15th Colombo Sri Lanka 1-3 August 2008 
16th Thimpu Bhutan 28-29 April 2010 
17th Addu Maldives 10-11 November, 2011 
18th Kathmandu Nepal December 2014 





ANNEXURE 3: 3 SAARC SECRETARY GENERALS 
Serial  Name Country Tenure of Service 
01 Abdul Ahsan Bangladesh 16 January 1987 to 15 October 1989 
02 Kant Kishore Bhargave India 17 October 1989 to 31 December 1991 
03 Ibrahim Hussain Zaki Maldives 01 January 1992 to 31 December 1993 
04 Yadav Kant Silwal Nepal 01 January 1994 to 31 December 1995 
05 Naeem Hasan Pakistan 01 January 1996 to 31 December 1998 
06 Nihal Rodrigo Sri Lanka 01 January 1999 to 10 January 2002 
07 Q. A. M. A Rahim Bangladesh 11 January 2002 to 28 February 2005 
08 Lyonpo Chenkyab Dorji Bhutan 01 March 2005 to 29 February 2008 
09 Sheel Kant Sharma India 01 March 2008 to 28 February 2011 
10 Uz. Fathimath Dhiyana Maldives 01 March 2011 to 28 February 2014 
11 Arjun Bahadur Thapa Nepal 01 March 2014 to 28 February 2017 






Annexure 5: 2 Research Questionnaire 
Research Questionnaire: Electronically presentable 
To begin, click “start Survey”. https://kusurvey.ca1.qualtrics.com 
(Again, all information will be kept confidential.) 
 
Part 01: Country and Occupations: 
 









h) Sri Lanka 
02.  What is your main occupation? 
 
a) Law Maker/ Politician (e.g. MPs) 
b) Academician (e.g., Scholars, researcher) 
c) Business Owner (e.g., MD/ Chairman/ 
Proprietor/ Director or CEO) 
d) Business Leader (e.g., leaders of FICCI; 
FBCCI; FPCCI); 
e) Lawyers (e.g., International business law 
practitioners) 
f) Law Executor(e.g., Government-
Customs/Port or non-government-Bank) 
g) Trade related support service (e.g. Customs 
Broker; ) 




i)  Other (please specify) 
 
Part Two: SAFTA Barriers to Trade 
No. Question Response 
 03.  During the last 12 months have you 
experienced or engaged in trade 





c) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
d) Government Service (e.g., Customs/Port) 
e) Trade  operations (e.g. customs broker, 
bankers) 
f) Legislation of SAFTA 
g) Participate with SAFTA related issues (e.g. 
Attending Seminar) 
h) Others (Please Specify) 
04.   What are the barriers that you did 
experienced before? 
a) Tariff (e.g., Customs duty) 
1. Ordinary Customs Duties 
2. Other than Customs Duties 
b) Non-Tariff Barriers-NTBs (e.g., Import 
bans; general or product specific quotas, 
excessive documentation ) 
1. Conventional NTBs 
2. Quotas; 
3. Tariff rate quotas; 
4. Licenses bars 























05. During the imports, which level did 








3. Intellectual Property 
a. Yes 
b. No 
06. During the Exports, which level did 







 2. Services 
c. Yes 
d. No 
3. Intellectual Property 
a. Yes 
b. No 
07. During the FDI which level did you 
experience Barriers? 
 
1. Inbound FDI 
a. Yes 
b. No 
2. Outbound FDI 
a. Yes 
b. No 
08. During the Financial transaction, 
which level did you experience 
Barriers? 
 
1. Inbound Transactions 
a. Yes 
b. No 
2. Outbound Transactions 
a. Yes 
b. No 
09.  What is the most pressing problem 
regarding free movements of goods 
within the member countries?  
a) Government reluctance about SAFTA; 
b) Imposition of national standards, testing 
rules; 
c) Complexity of foreign legal systems; 
d) Lack of mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications; 
e) Lack of Transparency in implementation of 
agreement; 
f) Non-tariff measures including technical and 




g) Trade related officials are not able to handle 
the problem 
h) Business people are not aware about the  
opportunities exist under  free trade 
agreement 
i) Business leaders are not cooperative 
j) The quality of foreign product 
Other (please specify) 
 
10.  NTBs in the form of VISA: During the visa application process, how satisfied were you 












Time taken to process visa       
Service levels from visa 
office staff in your home 
country 
      
Immigration service on 
arrival at the border 
      
 
11. Please indicate your experience or level of services of the following trade support 
organizations. 
















Trade license issuing 
authority 
      
Import/Export license 
authority office 
      
Bank       
Local Chamber of 
commerce 
      
Port services       
Transport services       
Trade related Brokers 
(Customs Broker; Freight 
Forwarders; Agents) 
      
 
Part 3: SAFTA Regulatory Harmonize   
12. Do you think that due to lack of 
harmonization of regulations 
among different regions of a 
country, (e.g. each region has its 
own regulations in addition to the 
Federal one) you face problems in 




If the answer is YES, could you please 
name few problems? 
*13 Each SAFTA country may have its 
own regulations respect to 
particular good or service. For 
example, different countries have 
a. Yes (if yes, please share one example of 
how different regulatory standards posed a 





different professional standards for 
licensing factors. Is this the lack of 
harmonization of regulators? 
14. Do you believe the free trade 
agreement in South Asia (SA) 






Part 4: Religious Issues 
15. Due to religion, do you think 
the tariff schedule may 
change? 
 




Part 5: Outlook for SAFTA 
 
16. Do you think, there will any impact 
on cross border purchase/ sale if 
barriers will be removed? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
Don’t know/Non- response 
 
17. Is there any effect on price if 
barriers will remove? Or what 
would be effect of price 
competitiveness if barriers are 
removed? 
a) Yes price competitiveness will increase.   
b) No change in level of competition on price 
 No- there would be less competition on 
price 
 
18. Do you think, SAFTA can boost 












Part 6: SAFTA policy and Support 
 
19. For your knowledge and or in your experience, how would you evaluate the SAARC 
countries administrative performance for solving trade barriers, when the problem identified? 
Country H
D 
D N S HS N/R 
Afghanistan       
Bangladesh       
Bhutan       
India       
Maldives       
Nepal       
Pakistan       
Sri Lanka                            
 
20. What priorities ought 
to govern the 
decision to enter into 
negotiations for an 
a) Government awareness about the beneficial 
impact/economic benefit of entering such an 
agreement. 




FTA or Customs 
Union? 
c) Market access Demonstration effects of other RTAs 
d) Other (please specify) 
21. What are the possible 




a) Economic benefits?  
b) Size of the trade partner 
c) Complementarity of products? 
d) Neighboring Country 
e) Same membership of international organizations 
f) Democratic political government 
g) Relevant culture and practices 
h) Other (please specify) 
 
22. Please evaluate the following factors of member countries regarding importance level for 
ensuring free trade agreement. 
Factors Highly 
Unimportant 














      
Legal 
Institutions 
      
Expertise in 
trade, 















      
Level of 
Education 
      
 
23. An important Article 7 of SAFTA, where contracting States agree to consider, in addition 
to the measures the adoption of trade facilitation as well as other measures to support and 
complement SAFTA for mutual benefit. Please tick the following statement based on the 
performance.  














Harmonization of standards, 
reciprocal recognition of tests 
and accreditation of testing 
laboratories of Contracting 
States. 
      
Certification of products by 
manufacturing country 





harmonization of customs 
clearance procedure (member 
countries) 
      
Harmonization of national 
customs classification based 
on HS coding system 
(member countries) 
      
Customs cooperation to 
resolve dispute at customs 
entry points 
      
Simplification and 
harmonization of import 
licensing and registration 
procedures 
      
Simplification of banking 
procedures for import 
financing 
      
Transit facilities for efficient 
intra-SAARC trade, 
especially for the land-locked 
Contracting States 
      
Removal of barriers to intra-
SAARC investments 
      
Macroeconomic consultations       
Rules for fair competition and 
the promotion of venture 
capital 





communication systems and 
transport infrastructure 
      
 















Proximity of home country       
Personal Safety and security       
Quality of Product       
Cost of Product       
Labor cost       
Social life       
City/ Locations       
Opportunity to work       
Opportunity to further 
investment 
      
Opportunities for reputation       
 
 
Part 7: About yourself (Optional) 
(Again, all information will be kept confidential.) 




26. Are you?    I. Male 
II. Female 
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